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ABSTRACT
Adem Orsdemir: Essays on Sustainable Operations and Corporate Social
Responsibility.
(Under the direction of Vinayak Deshpande and Ali K. Parlakturk.)
Environmental and social issues have gained significant attention recently as stakeholders
have become more aware of the impact of unsustainable practices on the quality of life and
profitability. Governments have been developing environmental and social regulations, and
constantly tightening the limits of these regulations in order to incentivize adoption of envi-
ronmentally sustainable and socially desirable practices. This push drove many firms around
the world to consider business practices that have been touted as environmentally sustainable,
socially responsible and profitable. These practices can be incorporated into a firms’ business
strategy at different phases of product lifecycle: production, use, and end-of-use. We examine
three business practices that are implemented at these phases of the product lifecycle. At the
end-of-use phase, the products can be collected after consumer use, and remanufactured and
sold back to consumers to save material and energy (Product Remanufacturing). At the use
phase, manufacturers, instead of selling the product, can sell the functionality of the product
and bear the operating cost (Product Servicization). At the production phase, manufactur-
ers can choose to source from suppliers who follow socially responsible practices (Responsible
Sourcing). This thesis aims to identify the key trade-offs in these business strategies that
drive the environmental and social benefits for the society, and profitability for firms. More
specifically, in my dissertation, I intend to understand when these strategies improve firms’
profit, and environmental and social footprint.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In a globalized world, environmental and social impacts of business operations cannot
be swept under the rug. Consumers are becoming more and more environmentally and so-
cially conscious and demanding companies to follow environmentally and socially sustainable
practices. In this dissertation, we study the impact of several business operations on the
environment and corporate social responsibility, and suggest sensible practices to reduce envi-
ronmental impact and increase compliance levels with the environmental and labor standards.
1.1 Dissertation Overview
1.1.1 Competitive Quality Choice and Remanufacturing
In this chapter, we consider an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who faces competition
from an independent remanufacturer (IR). The OEM decides the quality of the new product,
which also determines the quality of the competing remanufactured product. The OEM and
the IR then competitively determine their production quantities. We explicitly characterize
how the OEM competes with the IR in equilibrium. Specifically, we show that the OEM relies
more on quality as a strategic lever when it has a stronger competitive position (determined
by the relative cost and value of new and remanufactured products), and in contrast it relies
more heavily on limiting quantity of cores when it has a weaker competitive position. The
IR’s entry threat as well as its successful entry can decrease the consumer surplus. Further-
more, our results illustrate that ignoring the competition or the OEM’s quality choice leads
to overestimating benefits of remanufacturing for consumer and social welfare. In addition,
we show an IR with either a sufficiently weak competitive position (so the OEM deters entry)
or a sufficiently strong one (so the OEM is forced to limit quantity of cores) is desirable for
reducing the environmental impact. Comparing our results with the benchmark in which the
OEM remanufactures suggests that encouraging IRs to remanufacture in lieu of the OEMs
may not benefit the environment. Furthermore, the benchmark illustrates that making re-
manufacturing more attractive improves the environmental impact when the remanufacturer
is the OEM, while worsening it when remanufacturing is done by the IR.
1.1.2 Is Servicization a Win-Win Strategy? Profitability and Environmen-
tal Implications of Servicization
Servicization, a business strategy to sell the functionality of a product rather than the prod-
uct itself, has been touted as a profitable and an environmentally friendly business practice.
Profitability can increase because a firm can tailor the service to the needs of a customer. Envi-
ronmental impact may be reduced because, under servicization, the firm retains the ownership
and is responsible for the maintenance of the product. As a result, the firm has stronger incen-
tives to invest in product durability. Motivated by these dynamics, we analytically characterize
when servicization can simultaneously increase a firm’s profits and decrease its environmental
impact compared to selling products. We endogenize the firm’s product durability and pricing
decisions, as well as the customer’s level of use of a product. We allow for heterogeneous
customer segments with differing product valuations, and capture the difference in product
operating cost incurred by the firm and by the customer.
We find that whether servicization is greener and more profitable depends on the firm’s
relative operating efficiency and the relative environmental impact of a product in its use phase
as compared to the production and disposal phase. When the relative operating efficiency of
the firm is high (low) and the product’s relative use impact is low (high), servicization can
be both environmentally friendly and more profitable. In addition, we show that servicization
does not necessarily increase the product durability. It may decrease the product durability
when servicization leads to market expansion. We also show that servicization can be more
profitable for the firm even when its relative operating efficiency is low. However, we also
show that servicization may lead to lower social surplus even when a firm’s relative operating
efficiency is high. Thus, while servicization as a business strategy holds promise, it should be
2
implemented with care.
1.1.3 Responsible sourcing via vertical integration: the impacts of scrutiny,
demand externality, and cross sourcing
As outsourcing to emerging economies have increased, many unfortunate events about the
practices in those countries hit the news channels. These includes but not limited to collapse
of the Rana Plaza factory in Bangladesh (New York Times, 2013), allegations of sweatshop
and child labor at factories of Nike suppliers (Daily Mail, 2011). Companies outsource from
emerging economies mainly because the lower operating and labor costs. However, many times
this cost advantage comes at the expense of social responsibility compliance. Suppliers may
engage in unethical practices to lower costs and squeeze more profits. Insufficient regulations
in these countries also fuel noncompliance.
In this chapter, we investigate vertical integration as a way to ensure compliance in a com-
petitive setting. One of the firms is capable of vertical integration and chooses to comply/not
comply with the environmental and labor standards, whichever is more profitable. If at least
one of the firms does not comply with the law, with positive probability it will get caught and
lose a portion of its demand. This may have positive or negative impact on the other firm.
The impact may be positive because a portion of the consumers exited the firm caught with
a violation may purchase from the other firm. On the other hand, it may be negative because
the violation publicity may tarnish the image of entire industry.
Motivated from these dynamics we research how violation externality impact the firms
decision to become socially responsible. We find that the answer depends on whether it is
viable for a firm to sell to its competitor (cross sourcing), or not. When cross sourcing is not
viable, higher positive externality always increases the compliance. On the other hand, when
cross sourcing is viable, higher positive externality may reduce the compliance.
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CHAPTER 2
COMPETITIVE QUALITY CHOICE AND REMANUFACTURING
2.1 Introduction
Remanufacturing operations involve taking used products, bringing them back to as-new condi-
tion, and selling them again (Atasu et al., 2010). These activities in an industry can be carried
out either by third-party independent remanufacturers (IR) or by original equipment manu-
facturers (OEM). Especially in the US, majority of remanufacturing is done by IRs (Hauser
and Lund, 2008). The same study finds that the remanufacturing industry in the U.S. is
worth $53 billion, which means that IRs are not an insignificant competitive threat to OEMs.
OEMs try to fend off competition from IRs through limiting quantity, specifically by creating
scarcity of cores available for remanufacturing (e.g., by offering free take-back of cores from
consumers (HP 2010a) or making cores ineligible for remanufacturing (Lexmark 2010)) and
rarely through litigation (e.g., HP 2010b).
There is also evidence that OEMs change their product designs with remanufacturing
concerns in mind. For example, Subramanian et al. (2011) argue that HP refrains from using
common print heads in its business inkjet printers because doing so makes the IRs a bigger
competitive threat in the market. Atasu and Souza (2012) describe how Xerox and Kodak take
remanufacturing into consideration when they design their products. An important product
design decision that is the focus of this paper is quality. Following Moorthy (1988) and Desai
(2001), we define quality as an attribute which exhibit the “more is better” property, so given
the same price, all customers prefer the higher quality product. It is well known that firms
can use quality as a competitive lever; however, in the remanufacturing context the dynamics
around the quality decision are intricate because when an OEM increases its product quality,
it also increases the quality of the remanufactured product to a certain extent. Therefore,
the results on product quality from papers that consider competition between independent
products (e.g., Moorthy 1988; Desai 2001) do not immediately extend to the remanufacturing
context. Thus, in this paper we study how an OEM can use product quality along with quantity
as a competitive lever against an IR.
Remanufacturing is generally perceived as an environmentally-friendly end-of-use man-
agement option for many products. Commonly-cited benefits include diversion of discarded
products from landfills, reduced virgin raw material usage and reduced energy usage when
compared to manufacturing (U.S.EPA, 1997). At the same time, Gutowski et al. (2011)
find that while remanufacturing itself uses less energy than manufacturing, remanufactured
products may be less energy efficient. Thus, the relative environmental impacts of new and
remanufactured products should be carefully considered and the total environmental impact
of remanufacturing in a given market is not clear.
Recently, we have seen a surge of activities that promote remanufacturing. For example, the
Automobile Parts Remanufacturers Association introduced the Recycling/Remanufacturing
Tax Credit Bill, HR 5695 (The Remanufacturing Institute, 2008) and campaigns such as Man-
ufactured Again (Motor and Equipment Remanufacturers Association 2011) work to increase
remanufacturing levels by increasing consumer awareness. An underlying tenet of these activ-
ities is that remanufacturing is good for the consumer. However, just like total environmental
impact, the social welfare implications of remanufacturing, especially when it is conducted by
a third-party are not well understood. To this end, we research how the competition between
the IR and the OEM affects total environmental impact and social welfare, specifically when
the OEM can adjust product quality in response to competition.
We consider an OEM who faces competition from an IR. The OEM decides the quality
of the new product which also determines the quality of competing remanufactured product.
The OEM and the IR competitively determine their production outputs which determine the
prices of the new and remanufactured products. Remanufactured product can be perceived
inferior in quality but cheaper to manufacture. We study the relation between the competitive
positioning of the OEM and the IR and how the OEM chooses to compete with the IR as
well as the environmental and social welfare implications of this choice. In our base model,
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the OEM sells the new product and remanufacturing is done solely by the IR. In addition
to our base model, we consider several benchmarks: a monopolist OEM without remanufac-
turing capability (NR benchmark), a monopolist OEM with remanufacturing capability, and
competition with exogenous quality decision. These benchmarks help tease out the effects
of competition, the OEM’s quality choice and the type of the remanufacturing firm on our
results.
Even though most remanufacturing in the US is done by IRs, OEMs like Xerox, Kodak and
Caterpillar have remanufacturing operations, too. In an extension to our base model, we study
how the answers to our research questions change when the OEM remanufactures instead of the
IR. Comparing our findings with the results of this extension, we are able to provide insights
on how the environmental and social welfare benefits of remanufacturing depend on the type of
company (IR vs. OEM) offering the remanufactured product. When faced with competition
from an IR, some OEMs like Lexmark choose to collect cores and dispose of them rather than
remanufacture in-house. We analyze this scenario as an extension to our base model as well
and provide insights regarding when the OEM prefers to collect cores to compete with the IR.
We now summarize our key findings:
•We explicitly characterize how the OEM competes with the IR in equilibrium. When the
OEM has a significant competitive advantage (which is determined by the relative cost and the
perceived quality of the remanufactured product vis-a-vis the new product and is explained in
detail in Section 2.3), it deters the IR’s entry by choosing a quality level that is higher than it
would if the IR was not in the market. In contrast, when the IR has a significant competitive
advantage, the OEM reduces production and, hence, decreases the number of cores the IR can
remanufacture. In between, the IR enters the market and does not encounter core shortage.
In this region, when the OEM has the competitive advantage, it chooses a higher quality level
compared to the NR benchmark to emphasize its advantage. When the IR has the competitive
advantage, the OEM chooses a lower quality level to de-emphasize its competitor’s advantage.
Our results show that when the OEM has a stronger competitive position, it is more likely
rely on quality as a strategic lever whereas when the IR’s competitive position gets stronger,
the OEM is more likely to rely on limiting core availability.
• The IR’s entry threat as well as its successful entry can decrease the consumer surplus
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compared to the NR benchmark; that is, remanufacturing may harm consumer welfare. This
is because the OEM chooses an inefficiently high quality level to deter or weaken the IR. In
contrast, when the product quality is exogenously fixed, the consumer surplus always increases
with remanufacturing. We show a similar result for the social surplus. These results are in
contrast with our monopoly remanufacturing benchmark which shows remanufacturing by
an OEM always benefits the consumer and social surplus. There are two factors in play
here: (i) An IR chooses to remanufacture even when the perceived value to cost ratio of the
remanufactured product is unfavorable relative to the new product. In other words, the OEM’s
remanufacturing incentives are better aligned with consumer and social surplus than that of
the IR. (ii) When the OEM remanufactures itself, it chooses product quality more efficiently as
far as consumer and social surplus are concerned. Overall, our results illustrate that ignoring
competition or OEM’s quality choice lead to overestimating benefits of remanufacturing for
consumer and social welfare.
•We also study the environmental impact of remanufacturing. When the OEM deters the
IR’s entry through increasing quality, the environmental impact always decreases. Basically,
a higher quality product implies a smaller sales volume reducing the environmental impact.
When the IR enters the market and remanufactures, the environmental impact decreases if and
only if the remanufactured product has a sufficiently smaller per unit relative impact compared
to the new product and we explicitly characterize this critical threshold. As far as environ-
mental impact is concerned, an IR with either a sufficiently weak competitive position (so the
OEM deters entry) or a sufficiently strong one (so the OEM is forced to limiting quantity
of cores) is desirable. When neither the OEM nor the IR has a strong advantage, the bitter
competition between the two increases the total sales quantity aggravating the environmental
impact. Comparisons with our NR benchmark show that when remanufacturing has a com-
petitive advantage determined by its relative cost and perceived quality, remanufacturing by
the OEM is more likely to reduce environmental impact than remanufacturing by an IR. This
is due to two factors. (i) Competition increases the sales quantity worsening the environmental
impact. (ii) The OEM can choose a lower quality level when competing with the IR, which also
increases the sales quantity. Our results can have important policy implications: Encouraging
OEMs to remanufacture their own products may be more beneficial for the environment than
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encouraging IRs to remanufacture.
• For the two alternative models we consider, in which the OEM can also remanufacture or
it can preemptively collect cores, we show through numerical studies that the way the OEM
chooses to compete with the IR is similar to our base model. Consistent with our insights
from the base model, the OEM follows a deterrent quality strategy when remanufacturing
does not have a strong value proposition; in contrast, it uses a deterrent quantity strategy
(remanufacturing itself or collecting cores and disposing of them) when the IR’s remanufactur-
ing becomes a bigger threat. Furthermore, we find making remanufacturing more attractive,
by either lower cost or higher quality perception, can worsen the environmental impact when
remanufacturing is done by the IR; in contrast it lessens the environmental impact when the
OEM is remanufacturing. Thus, the consequences of these incentives on environmental impact
critically depend on the type of the remanufacturing firm.
• We demonstrate the robustness of the equilibrium structure, which shows how the OEM
chooses to compete with the IR, under three different extensions: the IR incurs an additional
cost independent of the quality level; perceptual quality gap between new and remanufac-
tured products is independent of product quality; the OEM and the IR compete in prices.
Comparison of our results from the base model and the extensions, however, shows that the
effect of IR’s competitive threat on the OEM’s quality choice may critically depend on how
the cost and perceived quality of the remanufactured product are modeled. Furthermore, the
implication of remanufacturing on the social and consumer surplus and environmental impact
can be sensitive to the type of competition (price vs. quantity).
2.2 Literature Review
The closed-loop supply chain literature has studied a number of questions that arise when a
remanufactured product is introduced into the product mix. The literature makes different
assumptions regarding who produces the remanufactured product: a monopolist OEM who
also sells the new product (e.g., Ferrer and Swaminathan 2010; Esenduran et al. 2010), an
IR competing with an OEM (e.g., Majumder and Groenevelt 2001; Ferrer and Swaminathan
2006; Esenduran et al. 2012) or an OEM who faces competition from another firm (e.g., Heese
et al. 2005; Atasu et al. 2008). Ferguson and Toktay (2006) compare, from the point of view
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of an OEM, the profitability of introducing a remanufactured product versus collecting and
disposing of used products to deter the entry of an IR. This stream of literature studies how
the competition between new and remanufactured products affects the pricing and quantity
decisions of the OEM (a feature that also exists in our model) but does not capture the OEM’s
endogenous quality decision. We extend this literature by allowing the OEM to explicitly
set product quality. We characterize how the OEM uses two modes of competition–quality
and quantity–as its competitive position vis-a-vis the IR changes. We also research how the
competition between an OEM and an IR and the OEM’s ability to choose the quality level
affect consumer surplus and the product’s total environmental impact.
How competition affects a firm’s quality choice has been studied extensively in marketing
literature. One fundamental difference of our model is that the OEM makes the quality
decision and its decision locks in the quality of the remanufactured product whereas in the
extant literature, competing firms are allowed to choose their own quality levels independently.
This difference leads to significantly different insights. For example, Moorthy (1988) shows
that in a duopoly when firms choose their quality levels first and then compete in prices,
consumer surplus is higher than the monopoly case. In our model, consumer surplus may
be lower than the monopoly case because the OEM takes advantage of the interdependency
between the products and may inefficiently increase or decrease quality in order to weaken the
IR’s competitive position. Desai (2001) also models a duopoly but with symmetric firms. In
contrast, the asymmetry between the OEM and the IR determine their relative competitive
positioning which plays a key role in our results.
In the operations management literature, a number of papers study how competition im-
pacts firms’ quality decisions or related variables such as service levels and waiting times.
Banker et al. (1998) model the quality and price competition between two manufacturers.
They find that product quality increases when a low-cost entrant enters the market where
an incumbent has the intrinsic demand advantage. We reach the exact opposite conclusion
and this is because, in their model, both firms are allowed to choose their own quality levels
independently. In other work in operations management (e.g., Tsay and Agrawal 2000; Bern-
stein and Federgruen 2004) there is an interdependency between quality and demand/supply
parameters, and imbalance between supply and demand deteriorates quality. In contrast, in
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our model quality is an intrinsic product attribute independent of the magnitude of demand.
We study competitive quality choice for a remanufacturable product. Quality is an impor-
tant product design decision and has been of great interest in the new product development
literature (e.g., Souza et al. 2004; Plambeck and Wang 2009; Fishman and Rob 2000). How-
ever, these papers are mainly concerned with sequential quality improvements whereas quality
choice is made only once in our model. Furthermore, the remanufacturing context has some
unique aspects: the remanufactured product’s cost and quality level depend on the new prod-
uct’s quality level and the OEM can limit the cores that the IR can access for remanufacturing,
which adds another layer of interdependence. Here, we contribute by studying quality choice
for a product that competes with an interrelated product.
In the context of product recovery, few papers consider product quality explicitly. In Debo
et al. (2005) and Robotis et al. (2009), quality refers to the remanufacturability level of the
returned product, which reduces the remanufacturing cost; this is different from our definition.
Debo et al. (2005) model a monopolist OEM and research whether the OEM should sell a
remanufacturable product and if so, what the level of remanufacturability should be. In an
extension that allows competition with IRs, they find that as remanufacturing competition
intensifies, the remanufacturability level of the product goes down. However, we find that as
the IR becomes more competitive up to a threshold level, product quality goes up. Robotis
et al. (2009) consider a monopolist and show uncertainty in remanufacturing cost may lead to
higher reusability investment. Subramanian et al. (2011) study how remanufacturing threat of
an IR affects component commonality decision for an OEM selling two vertically differentiated
products with exogenous qualities.
Atasu and Souza (2012) is the closest to our work. They consider a monopolist who reman-
ufactures in-house and study the effect of three product recovery forms, i.e., quality recovery
(remanufacturing is an example), profitable material recovery and costly recovery, on quality
levels. They find that quality recovery and costly recovery lead to increased quality and de-
creased environmental impact while profitable material recovery leads to decreased quality and
increased environmental impact. Furthermore, quality recovery benefits the consumers, but
costly recovery reduces the consumer surplus. Atasu and Souza’s work clearly demonstrates
that not all forms of recovery are equally beneficial for the environment and the consumers. In
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this work, we confine ourselves to a single recovery form, i.e., remanufacturing, but consider
the competition between the OEM and the IR. We also study how the product quality level
and benefits of remanufacturing depend on the party (OEM or IR) doing the remanufactur-
ing. We find that when an OEM and an independent remanufacturer are in competition,
remanufacturing may indeed result in decreased quality and increased environmental impact.
2.3 Model
We consider an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) selling a new product and an inde-
pendent remanufacturer (IR) selling the remanufactured product. We begin by introducing
the demand model, discuss the cost structure and finally describe the firms’ decisions.
Each customer considers new product, remanufactured product and no purchase options
and chooses the one that maximizes her utility. We model consumer preferences as in Moorthy
(1988). Consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for quality and are uniformly
distributed over a bounded support with unit density, which we normalize to [0, 1]. A consumer
of type θ ∈ [0, 1] is willing to pay θs for a product of quality level s. This implies that everything
else being equal all consumers prefer higher quality over lower quality. Given that pn is the
new product’s price, the utility a type θ customer receives from the new product is θs − pn.
Consumers often perceive the remanufactured product as being of inferior quality. We capture
this by modeling consumers’ willingness to pay for the remanufactured product as a δ fraction
of the new product where δ ∈ (0, 1). Consumption of the remanufactured product provides
a utility of δθs − pr where pr is the remanufactured product’s price. This implies that the
quality gap between the new and remanufactured products is proportional to product quality
s. Among others, Ferguson and Toktay (2006) and Atasu et al. (2008) model demand and the
relative valuation of the remanufactured product similarly. In Section 2.8.3, we consider an
alternative model where the quality gap is independent of product quality.
The unit variable cost of producing a new product with quality level s is βs2 where β is
a scaling parameter and does not alter our insights (e.g., Moorthy 1988, Desai 2001, Atasu
and Souza 2012). The quality level of the new product impacts the remanufacturing cost,
too. Since remanufacturing brings a product to like-new condition by replacing older and
worn-out parts, it is costlier to repair and replace the higher quality parts of a higher quality
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product. At the same time, remanufacturing a product costs less than manufacturing a product
because some parts are reused. The remanufacturing cost is proportional to the cost of new
product, specifically, it is equal to βαs2. As such, our base model does not consider a quality-
independent cost term. An extension in section 2.8.2 allows for such an additional cost term
as in Atasu and Souza (2012). Here, α ∈ (0, 1) is an indicator of the remanufacturing cost
advantage and it decreases as the cost savings from remanufacturing increases. Like Debo
et al. (2005) and Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006), we assume that the remanufacturing cost
subsumes the cost of all remanufacturing related activities.
The order of decisions is as follows. First, the OEM decides the quality of the product s.
Then the OEM and the IR competitively choose new product and remanufactured product
quantities, qn and qr that are sold in a single period. The IR’s remanufacturing quantity is
constrained by the available cores, which is determined by the new product quantity. The
IR can also choose to stay out of the competition by choosing to remanufacture zero units.
Finally, consumers make their choices.
We consider a product that has a single (long) life and the quality decision is made at the
beginning of this long life cycle. Single period models have previously been used in Atasu and
Souza (2012); Agrawal et al. (2011a); Subramanian et al. (2011) in the sustainable operations
management literature. This approach, which focuses on steady state profits, facilitates ana-
lytical tractability in our model and allows us to focus on our research questions. Furthermore,
the OEM and IR engage in Cournot type quantity competition in our model as in Ferguson
and Toktay (2006); Debo et al. (2005); Atasu et al. (2009a). Both quantity and price competi-
tion models are extensively used in the OM literature. While our base model adopts quantity
competition, we also study price competition showing that our equilibrium results propagate.
Following Johnson and Myatt (2006), the OEM’s and the IR’s chosen quantities and cus-
tomer choices lead to following prices for the new and remanufactured products:
pn = s(1− qn − δqr), pr = δs(1− qn − qr).
The above equations assume that the product’s useful lifetime is one period, it can be reman-
ufactured only once and all recovered cores are in good enough shape for remanufacturing
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(e.g., Atasu and Souza 2012; Debo et al. 2005; Ferguson and Toktay 2006). Our model can
be extended such that only a fraction of the cores is available for remanufacturing, but for
tractability and to keep the focus on our research question, we only consider the case where
all cores can be remanufactured.
We derive the equilibrium by backward induction. For a given quality level s, the OEM
and the IR play the quantity game. Formally, the OEM solves
max
qn
piOEM (qn|s) = [s(1− qn − δqr)− βs2]qn
s.t qn ≥ 0
and the IR simultaneously solves
max
qr
piIR(qr|s) = [δs(1− qn − qr)− αβs2]qr
s.t qr ≥ 0, qr ≤ qn.
This solution approach is the same as in Agrawal et al. (2011a). The IR’s problem has an ad-
ditional constraint reflecting the fact that the remanufactured product quantity cannot exceed
the new product quantity, i.e., qr ≤ qn, core availability constraint. Finally, the OEM chooses
the optimal quality level s∗ by solving maxs piOEM (s|q∗n(s), q∗r (s)). The resulting equilibrium
is described in the next section. Note that we use the superscript (*) to denote equilibrium
values throughout the paper.
In addition to our base model, we consider the monopoly no-remanufacturing, monopoly
remanufacturing and exogenous quality benchmarks. The monopoly no-remanufacturing (NR)
benchmark considers a monopolist OEM who sells only the new product, deciding the quality
and quantity of its product. In the monopoly remanufacturing benchmark, a monopolist
can sell both new and remanufactured products. In the exogenous quality benchmark, the
quality of new product is fixed at level sf and the OEM competes with the IR using only
quantity. Thus, in this benchmark, when the IR enters the market, the OEM adjusts its
product quantity but cannot change exogenous product quality. These benchmarks help us
characterize the effects of competition, remanufacturing and OEM’s quality choice on our
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results. The equilibria for the benchmarks and all the proofs are provided in Appendix A.
2.4 Equilibrium
In this section, we discuss the decisions of the OEM and the IR in equilibrium. As it will
be evident, remanufactured product’s relative cost-to-value ratio, α/δ, simply referred to as
the cost-to-value ratio plays an important role in our result. When α/δ ratio decreases, the
IR’s competitiveness increases and vice versa for the OEM. This is because increasing α/δ
ratio indicates either the cost of remanufacturing goes up or the consumer perception of the
remanufactured product goes down. Specifically, when α/δ is greater than 1, the OEM has
the cost-to-value advantage against the IR. In contrast, when the cost-to-value ratio is smaller
than 1, the IR has the advantage. Consider medical imaging equipments and printer cartridges
for two examples that fall on two opposite ends of the spectrum. Remanufacturing medical
imaging equipments (e.g., computer tomography and magnetic resonance imaging) have a
high marginal cost due to high technology components used in these products. In addition,
hospitals are skeptical about buying remanufactured imaging devices (Elsberry, 2002) since
they can have a direct impact on patients’ health. Thus, medical imaging equipments can be
characterized by a large α/δ ratio. In contrast, printer cartridges possess a small α/δ ratio
due to low cost and high consumer acceptance of remanufactured cartridges. In fact, cartridge
industry is one of the prominent examples where the competition between the IRs and the
OEMs (e.g., Lexmark, HP) is very severe. The next proposition describes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1. The following characterizes the equilibrium regions. The equilibrium quality,
new and remanufactured product quantities are provided in Table 2.1.
R1. If αδ ≥ 2, the IR cannot enter the market and the OEM acts like a monopoly.
R2. If 8−δ4+δ ≤ αδ < 2, the IR is a threat and its entry is deterred by the OEM.
R3. If δ(18−8δ−2δ
2+δ3)
(4−δ)2 <
α
δ <
8−δ
4+δ , the IR enters the market but does not remanufacture all
available cores.
R4. If 0 < αδ ≤ δ(18−8δ−2δ
2+δ3)
(4−δ)2 , the IR enters and remanufactures all available cores.
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Figure 2.1: Characterization of Equilibrium Regions
Region s∗ q∗n q
∗
r
R1 1
3β
1
3
0
R2 δ
β(2α−δ)
α−δ
2α−δ 0
R3 2−δ
3β(2−α)
2(2−δ)
3(4−δ)
(8−δ)δ−α(4+δ)
3(2−α)(4−δ)δ
R4 1
3β
2
3(2+δ)
2
3(2+δ)
Table 2.1: Equilibrium product quality, and new and remanufactured product quantities
Figure 2.1 graphically depicts the equilibrium regions in the Proposition. Note that the
cost-to-value advantage shifts from the OEM to the IR as we move from region R1 to R4. In
region R1, the IR does not pose a threat due to its severe cost-to-value disadvantage and the
OEM acts as a monopolist leading to the same outcome as the NR benchmark.
In region R2, the IR is a competitive threat. However, the OEM is able to deter entry by
choosing a higher level of quality compared to the NR benchmark. Because the quality of the
new product directly impacts its remanufacturing cost, by increasing quality the OEM also
increases the cost of remanufacturing. Thus, the IR cannot recover its cost due to its significant
cost-to-value disadvantage and stays out of the market. Table 2.1 shows that the OEM needs
to increase quality to deter entry when the IR becomes a bigger threat as a result of more
favorable cost-to-value ratio. Figure 2.2a graphically demonstrates how the OEM’s chosen
quality level depends on the IR’s cost of remanufacturing. We refer to the OEM’s behavior in
region R2 as entry deterrence because the OEM prevents the IR’s entry by deviating from the
NR benchmark. Note that entry deterrence does not exist in the exogenous quality benchmark
(see Section A.1). In other words, quantity alone is not sufficient to deter entry.
In region R3, the OEM can no longer deter the IR’s entry. In this region, the OEM can
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium new product quality and quantity (δ = 0.4, β = 1, Exogenous quality
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choose a higher or lower quality level when compared to the NR benchmark depending on
who has the cost-to-value advantage. When the OEM has the cost-to-value advantage, i.e.,
α
δ > 1, it chooses a higher quality level. In this case, increasing product quality increases the
remanufacturing cost but customer perception of remanufactured product does not increase
proportionally, which in turn weakens the IR’s competitive position. In contrast, when IR has
the cost-to-value advantage, i.e., αδ < 1, the OEM chooses a lower quality level to de-emphasize
its competitor’s advantage.
Finally, in region R4, the IR is very powerful and remanufactures all available cores. In
this region, there is little perceived quality difference between the new and remanufactured
products due to high δ, and the OEM cannot compete with the IR using the quality lever.
Thus, the OEM keeps the quality at the NR benchmark level, instead competes with the IR
by limiting the new product quantity, thereby the available cores for remanufacturing. We call
this the quantity limiting strategy. Figure 2.2b shows the OEM’s quantity in the base model
as well as in the NR and exogenous quality benchmarks. The figure illustrates that the OEM
reduces the new product quantity compared to the NR benchmark to restrain the IR. Because
the OEM stops using the quality lever and instead focuses on the quantity lever in region R4,
there is discontinuity in the quantity and the quality levels in Figure 2.2 when moving from
region R3 to R4 due to this strategy switch. We do not observe the same phenomenon in
the order quantity of the exogenous quality benchmark shown in Figure 2.2b. This is because
quantity is the only lever in the exogenous quality benchmark, therefore there is no switching
16
between strategies.
Proposition 1 demonstrates when the IR has a significant cost-to-value advantage, the
OEM focuses primarily on a quantity limiting strategy. Indeed, this is consistent what we
see in the printer cartridge industry where IRs have a significant cost-to-value advantage and
OEMs mostly try to compete with IRs by creating quantity scarcity.
Proposition 1 illustrates that when the OEM has the cost-to-value advantage it relies more
on the quality lever whereas when the advantage shifts to the IR, it increasingly relies on
the quantity lever. Regions R2 and R4 demonstrate two extremes. In R2, the OEM has a
significant cost-to-value advantage, and it relies solely on quality to deter the IR’s entry (the
OEM’s quantity is the monopoly quantity given its chosen quality). In contrast in R4, the IR
has a significant cost-to-value advantage, and the OEM uses only the quantity lever in this
case keeping its quality at the NR benchmark level.
It is worthwhile to contrast our findings with the monopoly remanufacturing benchmark.
A monopolist always increases its chosen product quality after engaging in remanufacturing
(Details of the analysis are provided in section A.1.2). In contrast, when remanufacturing is
performed by the IR, the OEM can decrease product quality compared to the NR benchmark.
This happens because the OEM’s quality decision directly affects the IR’s competitive position
while a monopolist OEM who remanufactures in-house does not need to worry about a com-
petitor. When faced with competition from an IR, the OEM needs to take into account who
has the cost-to-value advantage when making its quality decision. Under different modeling
assumptions, Atasu and Souza (2012) also find that a monopolist OEM engaging in quality
recovery (of which remanufacturing is an example) chooses a quality level that is weakly higher
than the no-recovery scenario.
2.5 Consumer and Social Welfare
In this section we investigate the impact of remanufacturing and quality choice on consumer
surplus (CS) and social surplus (SS). The consumer surplus is given by
CS =
∫ 1−qn
1−qn−qr
(δθs− pr)dθ +
∫ 1
1−qn
(θs− pn)dθ, (2.1)
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where the first term is the surplus from remanufactured products, and the second term is the
surplus from new products sold. The social surplus is the sum of the consumer surplus and
the firm profits.
Intuition suggests remanufacturing should improve consumer welfare. Indeed, the next
proposition confirms this conjecture for the exogenous quality benchmark, that is, when the
OEM responds to the IR’s entry only with its quantity keeping its quality constant.
Proposition 2. IR’s entry always increases CS in the exogenous quality benchmark.
However, the OEM does not keep its product quality constant when faced with the IR
threat. Proposition 1 shows how the OEM adjusts its product quality to strengthen its com-
petitive position. Basically, it may choose lower or higher quality levels depending on its
cost-to-value position relative to the IR. The next proposition demonstrates remanufacturing
can hurt CS due to the OEM’s quality choice.
Proposition 3. There exists αc satisfying 1 <
αc
δ <
8−δ
4+δ such that CS is higher than that of
the NR benchmark if and only if α < αc. Furthermore, CS is strictly smaller than that of the
NR benchmark when αcδ <
α
δ < 2.
Propositions 1 and 3 show αcδ falls in region R3. Thus, CS is lower than or equal to the
NR benchmark in regions R1 and R2. In region R1, the IR is not a threat and the outcome
is identical to the NR benchmark. In region R2, however, CS is strictly smaller than that
of the NR benchmark as shown in the second half of the proposition. Specifically, in region
R2, the OEM inefficiently chooses higher quality to deter the IR’s entry, therefore focuses on
the higher valuation consumers which in turn reduces CS. Interestingly, CS can also suffer in
region R3 even when the IR enters the market. This is again due to the OEM’s choice of high
quality to play to its cost-to-value advantage.
Proposition 3 indicates that an IR with a weak competitive position is not preferable for
CS. In order for CS to benefit from remanufacturing, the IR must have a sufficiently strong
cost-to-value advantage, otherwise OEM’s quality response hurts CS. This dynamic does not
exist and CS always increases with remanufacturing in the exogenous quality benchmark.
Thus, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that disregarding the OEM’s quality decision can lead to
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overestimating the benefit of remanufacturing for consumers. Now let us consider the impact
of remanufacturing on social surplus.
Proposition 4. There exists αs satisfying 1 <
αs
δ <
8−δ
4+δ such that SS is higher than that of
the NR benchmark if and only if α < αs. Furthermore, SS is strictly smaller than that of the
NR benchmark when αsδ <
α
δ < 2.
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of Social Surplus with NR and Exogenous Quality Benchmarks (δ =
0.4, β = 1 and Exogenous quality sf =
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The proposition indicates that the IR’s entry threat as well as its successful entry can de-
crease not only CS but also SS when the IR’s cost-to-value position is not sufficiently favorable.
Figure 2.3 compares SS against the NR and exogenous quality benchmarks. In the exogenous
quality benchmark, the new product quality is kept at the NR benchmark quality disregarding
the OEM’s quality response to the IR threat. When the IR remanufactures, SS is always
lower than the exogenous quality benchmark. Furthermore, note that when 0.516 < α < 0.55,
remanufacturing worsens SS in our base model while improving it in the exogenous quality
benchmark. In this case, ignoring the OEM’s quality decision leads to incorrectly concluding
that remanufacturing would benefit social welfare.
Propositions 3 and 4 show an IR’s remanufacturing can decrease CS and SS. In contrast,
our monopoly remanufacturing benchmark demonstrates both CS and SS increase when a
monopolistic OEM engages in remanufacturing. Likewise, our extension in Section 2.7.1 (when
only the OEM remanufactures) show a similar result. This contrast is due to two factors.
First, an IR chooses to remanufacture products even when remanufacturing does not have
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a very attractive cost-to-value position. The OEM would not choose to remanufacture in
regions in which the IR’s remanufacturing decreases CS and SS.1 In other words, the OEM’s
remanufacturing incentives are better aligned with consumer and social welfare compared to
the IR’s. Second, when the OEM utilizes the benefits of remanufacturing, it chooses product
quality more efficiently as far as CS and SS are concerned. In contrast, when an IR does the
remanufacturing, the OEM can inefficiently increase quality to deter entry or decrease quality
to undermine the cost-to-value advantage of its competitor.
Our findings have important policy implications. There is an ongoing policy debate whether
and when to promote remanufacturing. For example, the Recycling/Remanufacturing Tax
Credit Bill, HR 5695 (The Remanufacturing Institute, 2008) introduced by the Automobile
Parts Remanufacturers Association (APRA) calls for tax credits for investments in remanufac-
turing equipment. Although the bill did not pass the first time round, efforts to pass it continue.
Similarly, the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive legislation in the
European Union holds manufacturers financially responsible for taking back and disposing of
end-of-life electric and electronic equipment. In a recent vote on changes to the directive, a 5%
reuse target was introduced to promote higher levels of reuse/remanufacturing (Jowitt, 2011).
In addition, environmental awareness campaigns, companies promoting sustainable business
practices, etc. may work to improve customers’ perception of remanufactured products. Such
incentives and campaigns can alter competitive positioning of IRs and OEMs and change their
behavior. Our findings illustrate policy makers should be careful when designing such incen-
tives especially when IRs (rather than OEMs themselves) engage in remanufacturing. Making
remanufacturing attractive for IRs does not necessarily improve social welfare. Propositions
3 and 4 show that the IR’s threat and entry can decrease both CS and SS. Furthermore,
ignoring competition or the OEM’s quality decision can lead to overestimating benefits of
remanufacturing for consumer and social surplus.
1The monopoly remanufacturing benchmark in Appendix A illustrates that the OEM never remanufactures
when the remanufactured product has an inferior cost-to-value position compared to the new product.
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Region α δ
R1 Constant Constant
R2 ↑ ↓
R3 ↓ Concave(if e
E
< 1), ↑ (if e
E
> 1)
R4 Constant ↓
Table 2.2: Environmental impact comparative statics
2.6 Environmental Impact
We follow the convention in the literature (Atasu and Souza, 2012; Agrawal et al., 2011b;
White et al., 1999), and assume that one unit of new product and remanufactured product
entail E and e environmental impact respectively considering all stages of product life cycle
which includes production, use by customers, end of life and remanufacturing. Therefore,
when the OEM produces qn units and the IR remanufactures qr units, the total environmental
impact is qnE + qre.
Next proposition shows the effect of remanufacturing on the environment comparing it
the NR benchmark and describes how environmental impact depends on relative cost α and
perception δ of the remanufactured product.
Proposition 5. Table 2.2 shows how the environmental impact changes with α and δ.
• When the IR is not a threat (region R1), the environmental impact is the same as the
NR benchmark level.
• When the IR’s entry is deterred by the OEM (region R2), the environmental impact is
always lower than the NR benchmark level.
• When the IR enters the market but does not remanufacture all available cores (region
R3), the environmental impact is lower than the NR benchmark level if and only if
e
E <
(−2+α)δ2
(−8+δ)δ+α(4+δ) .
• When the IR enters the market and remanufactures all available cores (region R4), the
environmental impact is lower than the NR benchmark level if and only if eE <
δ
2 .
The proposition demonstrates that the IR’s entry threat in regionR2 reduces environmental
impact. To deter entry, the OEM increases product quality and focuses on higher valuation
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customers, which in turn decreases the quantity sold. Furthermore, Table 2.2 shows that as the
IR becomes a bigger threat, the environmental impact decreases further in this region since
the OEM needs to keep increasing quality to deter entry as the IR’s cost-to-value position
improves.
The IR remanufactures in regions R3 and R4 and the relative impact of new and remanufac-
tured products eE determines the environmental impact of remanufacturing in these regions.
Specifically, when remanufactured product has a sufficiently smaller relative environmental
impact indicating small eE , the overall environmental impact decreases with the IR’s entry.
Otherwise, remanufacturing increases the environmental impact.
Figure 2.4 illustrates how the environmental impact depends on the IR’s relative competi-
tive position showing that environmental impact attains its worst level in region R3. This is
because competition between the IR and the OEM is more intense yielding more quantity sold
(new + remanufactured) when neither has a significant cost-to-value advantage. The environ-
mental impact gets smaller near region R2, as the OEM’s cost-to-value advantage improves.
Similarly at the other end, the environmental impact is also smaller in region R4, where the
IR has a significant cost-to-value advantage.2
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Figure 2.4: Environmental Impact (e = 1, E = 3, δ = 0.5 in (a), α = 0.5 in (b))
In region R4, the OEM follows the quantity scarcity policy to limit the IR’s remanufactur-
ing. Table 2.2 shows that when the IR’s cost-to-value position gets even better due to a higher
δ in this region, the OEM further decreases its quantity, benefiting the environmental impact.
2Although e < E in Figure 2.4, the insights discussed here hold for e ≥ E as well.
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Both in regions R2 and R4, quantity hence the environmental impact decreases when the IR
becomes more powerful. But there are different dynamics in place. In R2, quantity decreases
because the OEM increases quality to deter the IR, whereas in region R4, the OEM creates
scarcity to limit the IR’s remanufacturing.
Comparisons with the monopoly remanufacturing benchmark (see section A.1.2 for details)
show that how remanufacturing changes the environmental impact level depends on who—
OEM or IR—does the remanufacturing. We find that if remanufacturing has the cost-to-value
advantage (αδ < 1), and hence, is socially desirable
3, whenever the environmental impact in
the base model is smaller than the NR benchmark, environmental impact in the monopoly re-
manufacturing benchmark is also smaller than the NR benchmark but not vice versa. Hence,
remanufacturing by an OEM is more likely to decrease environmental impact than remanufac-
turing by an IR (Our extension in Section 2.7.1 finds a similar result). This is mainly due to
two factors: (i) Competition increases the total quantity sold; a monopoly always sells fewer
units. (ii) The OEM can reduce the quality level when the competing IR has the cost-to-value
advantage and a lower quality level implies a bigger quantity in the market. Under somewhat
different modeling assumptions, Atasu and Souza (2012) find that quality recovery (of which
remanufacturing is an example) carried out by a monopolistic OEM always decreases the en-
vironmental impact, which is also in contrast with our base model. Our findings together with
Atasu and Souza (2012) suggest that as far as the environmental impact is concerned, it may
not be beneficial to encourage IRs rather than OEMs to remanufacture. Furthermore, when
an IR does the remanufacturing, increased competition can aggravate environmental impact.
In this case, it is desirable to have an IR with either a sufficiently unfavorable cost-to-value
ratio so the OEM increases the quality level or a sufficiently favorable cost-to-value ratio so
the OEM competes by creating quantity scarcity.
3We know from section 2.5 and section A.1.2 that in both the base model and the monopoly remanufacturing
benchmark, CS and SS levels are higher than the NR benchmark when α
δ
< 1. In addition, in the monopoly
remanufacturing benchmark, the OEM remanufactures only when it is socially advantageous to do so.
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δ s∗ q∗n q
∗
mr q
∗
ir CS SS e/E
0.40 0.333 0.333 0 0 0.0185 0.0556 −
0.43 0.368 0.316 0 0 0.0184 0.0551 ∞
0.46 0.403 0.298 0 0 0.0179 0.0538 ∞
0.49 0.419 0.287 0 0.014 0.0181 0.0516 3.278
0.52 0.411 0.284 0 0.042 0.0193 0.0527 1.186
0.55 0.403 0.280 0 0.067 0.0205 0.0531 0.793
0.58 0.394 0.277 0 0.090 0.0217 0.0538 0.631
0.61 0.298 0.190 0.190 0 0.0152 0.0455 0.758
0.64 0.304 0.187 0.187 0 0.0155 0.0466 0.780
0.67 0.309 0.185 0.185 0 0.0159 0.0478 0.802
δ s∗ q∗n q
∗
mr q
∗
ir CS SS e/E
0.70 0.315 0.183 0.183 0 0.0163 0.0489 0.824
0.73 0.320 0.181 0.181 0 0.0167 0.0501 0.844
0.76 0.326 0.179 0.179 0 0.0171 0.0513 0.863
0.79 0.331 0.177 0.177 0 0.0175 0.0525 0.883
0.82 0.333 0.175 0.175 0 0.0179 0.0538 0.901
0.85 0.345 0.174 0.174 0 0.0183 0.0550 0.919
0.88 0.348 0.172 0.172 0 0.0188 0.0563 0.936
0.91 0.354 0.171 0.171 0 0.0192 0.0577 0.953
0.94 0.359 0.169 0.169 0 0.0197 0.0590 0.969
0.97 0.365 0.168 0.168 0 0.0201 0.0603 0.974
Table 2.3: Equilibrium and the resulting consumer/social surplus and environmental impact
when the OEM can also remanufacture (β = 1, α = 0.8)
2.7 Additional Competitive Levers
In this section we study two additional levers an OEM can use to compete with an IR. Specif-
ically, the OEM can also remanufacture its own product or it can collect cores to make them
unavailable for the IR.
2.7.1 Remanufacturing by both OEM and IR
Remanufacturing can be done by IRs as well as by the OEM itself. There are examples of
both in practice. For example, Xerox leases its copiers and remanufactures end-of-lease copiers
by itself; in contrast in the cartridge industry mainly IRs do the remanufacturing. Here, we
extend our base model and allow the OEM to remanufacture its own product in addition to
the IR. We conduct a numerical study to analyze the resulting equilibrium.
The OEM and the IR have the same remanufacturing cost (βαs2 in our model) and they
choose their desired remanufacturing quantities simultaneously. However, the OEM has the
priority in quantity allocation when their total demand exceeds the number of available cores.
In other words, the IR can remanufacture only the cores that the OEM chooses not to re-
manufacture. Admittedly, this approach favors OEM’s remanufacturing, but even with this
bias, we show the OEM may prefer letting the IR remanufacture and instead continue to com-
pete through manipulating quality. Note the other extreme where the IR gets priority in the
allocation of available cores results in the same equilibrium outcome as our base model.4
4Essentially, in this scenario, any core that is not profitable for the IR to remanufacture is not profitable for
the OEM either. Therefore, in equilibrium remanufacturing is done only by the IR, which is the same as our base
model. However, when the OEM has the priority, a core that is not profitable for the OEM can be profitable
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Table 2.3 reports results of our numerical study as δ varies for one α value, α = 0.8. In
our study, we repeat the same analysis for α ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9} values
and find that Table 2.3 is representative of their outcomes as well. Quality cost coefficient
β is a scale factor in our model and it is kept at β = 1. In the table, qmr and qir show the
number of remanufactured units by the OEM and the IR, respectively. Furthermore, e/E
shows the maximum e/E ratio–environmental impact of remanufactured product relative the
new product–below which remanufacturing (or the possibility of it) reduces environmental
impact compared to the NR benchmark. In the Table e/E is not reported for δ = 0.4 since
when δ ≤ 0.4, remanufacturing is not viable, and the NR benchmark and our extended model
yields the same outcome.
To better understand the effect of competition, consider the OEM’s optimal policy in the
absence of an IR. A monopolist OEM does not remanufacture when the cost-to-value ratio
favors the new product, i.e., α/δ > 1. It remanufactures some but not all available cores when
the remanufactured product has the cost-to-value advantage, i.e., α/δ < 1 but the advantage is
not sufficiently big (0.8 < δ < 0.9 in Table 2.3). Finally, when the remanufactured product has
a significant cost-to-value advantage, a monopolist OEM remanufactures all available cores.
Table 2.3 shows when remanufacturing has a sufficiently big advantage or disadvantage, the
OEM does not need to deviate from the monopoly optimal policy to compete with the IR.
Specifically, when remanufacturing has a severe disadvantage (δ ≤ 0.4), the IR is not a threat,
the OEM sells only the new product. In contrast, when remanufacturing has a significant
advantage (δ ≥ 0.91), the OEM remanufactures all available cores leaving no cores to the IR.
When cost-to-value ratio of remanufacturing α/δ is moderate (0.4 < δ ≤ 0.88 in Table 2.3),
the OEM needs to actively compete with the IR. The OEM uses different policies depending
on the cost-to-value position of remanufacturing. Note remanufacturing becomes increasingly
attractive as δ increases. When 0.40 < δ < 0.49, similar to our base model, the OEM increases
quality to deter the IR from remanufacturing. When 0.49 ≤ δ < 0.61, the OEM lets the IR
remanufacture but it increases quality to weaken the IR’s competitive position. It is interesting
that the OEM is using only quality as a strategic lever in 0.40 < δ < 0.61 although our core
to remanufacture for the IR since unlike the OEM, the IR does not need to worry about cannibalization of the
new product.
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allocation gives absolute priority to the OEM. Finally, the OEM inefficiently remanufactures
all available cores itself in order to leave no cores available to the IR when 0.61 ≤ δ ≤ 0.81.
This discussion demonstrates that similar to our base model, the OEM relies on quality as
a competitive lever when remanufacturing does not have a strong cost-to-value position, in
contrast, it uses a quantity limiting strategy when the IR’s remanufacturing becomes a bigger
threat.
The OEM increases quality when the remanufactured product has the cost-to-value ad-
vantage, i.e, α/δ < 1. This is in direct contrast to the base model. Essentially, when the
OEM itself rather than a competitor IR does the remanufacturing, the OEM is better off
underscoring the remanufactured product’s advantage by increasing quality. However, when
the remanufactured product has the disadvantage, i.e., α/δ > 1 and the OEM remanufactures
solely to eliminate available cores for the IR, the OEM decreases quality.
Similar to the base model, CS and SS decrease when the OEM uses quality to deter the
IR’s entry (0.40 < δ < 0.49).5 Likewise, the IR’s remanufacturing can also decrease CS and SS
(δ = 0.49). In these examples, the OEM inefficiently chooses a high quality level to strengthen
its competitive position. Similarly, CS and SS suffer when 0.61 ≤ δ ≤ 0.85 and the OEM
inefficiently remanufactures all available cores itself to starve the IR in this range. When
cost-to-value position of remanufacturing improves (δ ≥ 0.88), the OEM’s remanufacturing
increases both CS and SS compared to the NR benchmark.
When the OEM does not remanufacture, the environmental impact is the same as our
base model and our insights carry over. However, contrasting the environmental impact of
OEM’s and IR’s remanufacturing generates an additional insight. Remanufacturing decreases
the environmental impact when e/E is smaller than e/E in Table 2.3. Thus a larger e/E
indicates that remanufacturing is more likely to reduce the environmental impact. Improving
cost-to-value ratio of remanufacturing (higher δ in the Table) decreases e/E when the IR is
remanufacturing and increases e/E when the OEM is remanufacturing. This suggests that
making remanufacturing more attractive can worsen the environmental impact when remanu-
facturing is done by the IR whereas it lessens the environmental impact when remanufacturing
5The NR benchmark is equivalent to the δ = 0.4 outcome.
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is done by the OEM itself.
2.7.2 Preemptive Collection
In our base model, the OEM competes with the IR using quality and quantity as strategic
levers. Here, in addition to using quality and quantity, we allow the OEM to collect and
dispose of cores to compete with the IR. As before, the OEM first chooses the quality level.
Then simultaneously, the OEM decides the number of cores to collect for disposal and the
new product quantity and the IR decides the remanufactured product quantity. The OEM
has priority in core collection (i.e., it has first access to cores) if the total demand for cores
exceeds the available cores. Even then, we show that the OEM may still rely on quality to
compete with the IR rather than collecting and disposing of cores. Similar to Ferguson and
Toktay (2006), we assume that the total collection and disposal cost the OEM incurs is hq2d
where qd is the quantity collected and h is a measure of how difficult and expensive it is to
collect cores. Due to the analytical complexity of this model, we conduct a numerical study.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the OEM’s quality choice and equilibrium regions for δ = 0.4 and
h = 0.04 when α varies from 0 to 1. In region Rd the OEM collects all available cores
and the regions R1 − R3, in which the OEM does not utilize preemptive collection, are the
same as those of our base model. We repeat the numerical study for all combinations of
δ = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9} and h = {0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.10, 0.11}
and observe that the figure is a representative outcome.
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Figure 2.5: Equilibrium quality when the OEM can collect and dispose the used cores (δ =
0.4, β = 1, h = 0.04)
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The Figure shows that when the cost-to-value ratio αδ is sufficiently high (0.59 ≤ α < 0.8),
the OEM uses quality to compete with the IR instead of preemptive collection (The IR does
not pose a threat when α ≥ 0.8). When 0.69 ≤ α < 0.8, the OEM deters the IR’s entry
by increasing quality. When 0.59 ≤ α < 0.69 the OEM lets the IR remanufacture but still
chooses a high quality level to weaken the IR. Drivers of these results are same as those in
the base model. When the cost-to-value ratio αδ is sufficiently small (0 < α < 0.59), the IR’s
competitive position is strong. In this case, the OEM collects and disposes of all available
cores to deter the IR’s entry. While doing so, the OEM also increases quality relative to the
NR benchmark to decrease the number of cores to be collected. Hence, the OEM utilizes the
preemptive collection and quality levers together to deter IR’s entry.
When the OEM uses quality to deter or compete with the IR (i.e., 0.59 ≤ α < 0.8), the
threat or actual entry can decrease the CS and SS compared to the NR benchmark. This
behavior is similar to our base model. For 0 < α < 0.59, the OEM uses preemptive collection
to deter the IR’s entry, and CS and SS are lower than the NR benchmark levels. This behavior
is also consistent with our base model where entry deterrence reduces CS and SS levels. In
Section A.2, we provide further details on our social welfare results.
In the numerical study we observe that when h is high (h ≥ 0.09), collecting all available
cores may not be viable. In this case, the OEM collects and disposes of a fraction of the
available cores and the IR remanufactures the remaining cores. On the other hand, when h is
very low, as intuition would suggest, the OEM collects and disposes of all cores.
2.7.3 Comparison of Competitive Levers
Through a numerical study, we now discuss how the OEM chooses to compete with the IR when
all three competitive levers, i.e., quality choice, remanufacturing in-house and preemptive col-
lection, are available. In our study, we considered all combinations of α ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.8, 0.9}
and h ∈ {0.04, 0.05, 0.06}. Table 2.4 is representative of our results.
Similar to our earlier results, the OEM’s choice depends on the remanufactured product’s
relative cost-to-value ratio αδ . Consistent with our insights from the base model, when the cost-
to-value ratio is high but the remanufactured product is still a competitive threat, the OEM
relies only on the quality lever to compete with the IR. Specifically, when δ = 0.5, the OEM
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δ s∗ q∗n q
∗
mr q
∗
d q
∗
ir
0.4 0.333 0.333 0 0 0
0.45 0.392 0.304 0 0 0
0.5 0.417 0.286 0 0 0.024
0.6 0.338 0.277 0.043 0.234 0
0.7 0.332 0.254 0.085 0.169 0
0.8 0.336 0.220 0.126 0.094 0
0.9 0.352 0.171 0.171 0 0
Table 2.4: Equilibrium when the OEM can remanufacture and preemptively collect (β = 1, α =
0.8, h = 0.04)
allows the IR to remanufacture but increases product quality relative to the NR benchmark to
undermine the IR’s competitive position. Likewise, when δ = 0.45, the OEM increases quality
relative to the NR benchmark to deter the IR’s entry. The IR is not a competitive threat when
δ ≤ 0.4.
When the remanufactured products’s relative cost-to-value ratio is low, that is, the IR
becomes a bigger competitive threat, the OEM uses in-house remanufacturing and preemptive
collection jointly to cause scarcity of cores. In particular, when δ ≥ 0.6, the OEM remanufac-
tures a fraction of the available cores and preemptively collects any remaining cores, deterring
the IR’s entry. Furthermore, the OEM remanufactures a larger proportion of collected cores
when δ increases indicating a higher perceived value for the remanufactured product. This
result is in agreement with our insight from the base model, in which the OEM decreases the
production of new product to limit the available cores when the IR becomes a bigger threat.
2.8 Extensions
2.8.1 Price Competition
Here, we study what happens when the OEM and the IR compete in prices. The following
proposition describes the equilibrium for the price competition game showing that the structure
of the equilibrium is the same as the quantity game.
Proposition 6. The following characterizes the equilibrium regions when the OEM and the
IR compete in prices.
R1p. If αδ ≥ 2, the IR cannot enter the market and the OEM acts like a monopoly.
R2p. If 4−δ2+δ ≤ αδ < 2, the IR is a threat and its entry is deterred by the OEM.
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R3p. If δ(10−δ)
(4−δ)2 <
α
δ <
4−δ
2+δ , the IR enters but does not remanufacture all available cores.
R4p. If 0 < αδ ≤ δ(10−δ)(4−δ)2 , the IR enters the market and remanufactures all available cores.
The equilibrium quality, new and remanufactured product prices and quantities are provided in
the proof of the proposition.
Regions R1p-R4p are the same as regions R1-R4 of our base model. Specifically, in region
R1p, the IR is not a threat due to its poor cost-to-value position. In region R2p, the OEM
chooses a higher quality level compared to the NR benchmark to deter the IR’s entry. In region
R3p, the OEM chooses a higher or lower quality level depending on whether it has the cost-to-
value advantage or disadvantage. Finally, in region R4p, the OEM follows a quantity limiting
strategy. Drivers of these results are the same as those in our base model. In region R2p, the
OEM’s price is smaller than the monopoly price for its chosen product quality. Different from
our base model, the OEM uses price in addition to quality to deter entry in region R2p.
It is well known that price competition is more intense than quantity competition and
leads to higher CS and SS (Singh and Vives, 1994). Consistent with this fact, we find that
CS and SS are higher than the NR benchmark when the OEM and the IR compete in prices
(More detailed analysis of the CS and SS under price competition is relegated to Section A.3).
Another artifact of the intense competition is that the new product quantity is always higher
than or equal to the NR benchmark. Therefore, remanufacturing by an IR always increases
environmental impact under price competition.
2.8.2 Alternative Remanufacturing Cost
Up to this point, we assumed that all remanufacturing related costs are subsumed in βαs2.
In this section we consider an additional cost term n that is independent of the quality level.
Specifically, the IR’s total unit remanufacturing cost becomes βαs2 + n.
We are able to characterize the equilibrium when the OEM has the cost-to-value advan-
tage, i.e, αδ ≥ 1, and we state our result in Proposition 7. However, when the IR has the
cost-to-value advantage, i.e, αδ < 1, the model is not analytically tractable; therefore we
resort to a numerical study. Figure 2.6 demonstrates the results for αδ < 1 as well as for
α
δ ≥ 1. While the Figure reports the result for one δ and n = {0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.06},
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we have run the numerical study for all combinations of δ ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.9}
and n ∈ {0.005, 0.010, 0.020, 0.025, 0.030, 0.035, 0.040, 0.045, 0.050} and found that they are all
consistent. We also study the impact of the quality independent remanufacturing cost on the
CS and SS in Appendix A (see Section A.4) and observe numerically that the insights from
Propositions 3 and 4 continue to hold.
Proposition 7. The following characterizes the equilibrium regions for αδ ≥ 1 when the IR
incurs an additional cost n per unit.
R1i. If αδ ≥ 2, or 2 > αδ > 1 and n ≥ 2δ−α9β , the IR cannot enter and the OEM acts like a
monopoly.
R2ai. If 2 > αδ ≥ 8−δ4+δ and 2δ−α9β > n, or 8−δ4+δ > αδ ≥ 54 and 2δ−α9β > n ≥ n0, the IR’s entry is
deterred by the OEM who chooses a quality level higher than the NR benchmark.
R2bi. If 54 >
α
δ ≥ 1 and 2δ−α9β > n ≥ n0, the IR’s entry is deterred by the OEM who chooses a
quality level lower than the NR benchmark.
R3i. If 8−δ4+δ >
α
δ ≥ 1 and n0 > n, the IR enters the market but does not remanufacture all
available cores.
The equilibrium quality, new and remanufactured product quantities, and n0 are stated in the
proof of the Proposition.
Regions R1i − R3i are same as the regions R1 − R3 in the base model. The Proposition
demonstrates all three regions that exist in our base model for αδ ≥ 1, namely R1 − R3,
continue to exist. In addition to these regions an additional region (region R2bi) where the
OEM deters the IR’s entry by choosing a quality level lower than the NR benchmark is also
possible when the cost-to-value ratio and the quality independent remanufacturing cost are
at moderate levels, i.e, −α+2δ9β > n ≥ n0. The OEM’s choice of low quality decreases the
demand for the remanufactured product but also decreases the remanufacturing cost. The
key point is that the quality independent component (n) of the remanufacturing cost does
not change when the OEM chooses a low quality level and therefore, the positive effect of
cost reduction on the IR’s profit is smaller when compared to the negative effect of demand
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reduction. This allows the OEM to deter the IR’s entry through decreasing quality in the
presence of the quality independent cost component. The Proposition also demonstrates that
when the quality independent remanufacturing cost is too high, i.e, 2δ−α9β ≤ n, the IR cannot
enter at all, as expected.
Figures 2.6a and 2.6b illustrate the equilibrium structure for n ∈ 0, 0.01, 0.02 and n ∈
0.05, 0.06 respectively. Figure 2.6a shows that when the IR has a strong cost-to-value position,
the OEM may continue to rely on reducing production and limiting core availability (region
R4i). However, as intuition suggests, region R4i gets smaller as n increases. In fact, when
n ≥ 0.02, R4i disappears. Figure 2.6 also shows that as n increases, the OEM relies more on
the quality lever to compete with the IR. However as n increases, the regions where the OEM
chooses a quality level higher than the NR benchmark shrink. In fact, for n ≥ 0.05, the OEM
always chooses a lower level of quality (if different from the NR benchmark level).
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Figure 2.6: Equilibrium quality level when the IR incurs quality-independent cost(δ = 0.4, β =
1)
2.8.3 Independent Quality Gap
In our base model the quality gap between the new and remanufactured product is proportional
to the product quality s. Here, we consider an alternative model in which the quality gap is
independent of product quality, specifically the value of remanufactured product is θ(s − φ)
for type-θ consumer, where φ shows the quality gap for the remanufactured product.
Due to the analytical complexity of this alternative model, we resort to numerical studies.
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Figure 2.7 shows the equilibrium quality and quantity as quality gap φ varies for α = 0.4. We
find the behavior in this figure to be robust by also checking other α ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}
values. The Figure identifies four regions similar to our base model (see Proposition 1). In
particular, in region R1, quality gap is sufficiently high and the IR is not a threat. In region
R2, the OEM deters the IR’s entry through its quality choice. In region R3, the quality gap
is sufficiently small and the IR remanufactures a portion of available cores. In region R4, the
quality gap is very small, and the OEM follows a quantity limiting strategy. This strategy
shift is evident in Figure 2.7b as the quantity drops discontinuously between regions R3 and
R4. Note that similar to our base model, when the IR is weak (large φ in this extension), the
OEM competes using the quality lever; in contrast when the IR is strong (small φ), the OEM
relies on limiting quantity.
Figure 2.7a demonstrates that the OEM always chooses a lower quality level compared to
the NR benchmark. This is the main difference between this extension and our base model.
Because the quality gap is independent of the quality level, increasing the quality of the
new product also increases the quality of the remanufactured product by the same amount.
Therefore, the OEM does not want to increase quality too much which would undermine the
relative significance of the quality gap. A lower quality level ensures that the OEM’s quality
advantage is sufficiently large relative to the remanufactured product’s perceived quality. When
the OEM chooses a much lower quality level than the NR benchmark, this negatively affects
social welfare and results in CS and SS levels lower than the NR benchmark (a more detailed
analysis is provided in Section A.5).
2.9 Concluding Remarks
We study how an OEM can use product quality as a competitive strategic lever along with
quantity against an IR. Even though there is evidence that OEMs take competition and re-
manufacturing into consideration in their product design decisions, this problem has not been
studied before. The relationship between quality and competition has been studied in the
economics and marketing literatures, but their results do not directly apply because the re-
manufacturing context is fundamentally different. By characterizing how the OEM competes
with the IR in equilibrium, we find that the OEM relies more on quality as a strategic lever
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Figure 2.7: Equilibrium quality and new product quantity when the perceptual quality gap is
independent of new product quality. ( α = 0.4, β = 1)
when it has a stronger competitive position , and in contrast, it relies more heavily on limiting
quantity of cores when it has a weaker competitive position.
A commonly-held belief is that remanufacturing is good for the environment and con-
sumers even though these relationships are not well understood, especially in industries where
predominantly IRs remanufacture. We study the effect of remanufacturing by an IR on total
environmental impact and consumer surplus. We find that unless the IR has a sufficiently weak
competitive position (so the OEM can deter entry) or a sufficiently strong one (so the OEM
switches its competitive strategy and limits product quantity), environmental impact can in-
crease when compared to the NR benchmark. Because when neither the OEM nor the IR has
a sufficiently strong competitive advantage, the competition between the two becomes more
intense yielding more quantity sold (new+remanufactured). On the consumer surplus side, not
only the IR’s entry threat but also its successful entry can cause a decrease in the consumer
surplus level. This is also in contrast with our monopoly remanufacturing benchmark which
shows remanufacturing by an OEM always benefits the consumers (Atasu and Souza (2012)
have a similar finding). Taken together, our findings regarding environmental impact and so-
cial welfare suggest that policy makers should be careful about promoting IR-remanufacturing
over OEM-remanufacturing.
Some limitations of our work are worth mentioning. We study a single period model due to
its tractability and to keep our focus on our research questions. This approach is plausible when
a product’s pay-off during its mature stage makes up a bulk of its total pay-offs. Indeed, most
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papers looking at firms’ quality choice consider stationary demand as we do (e.g., Atasu and
Souza 2012; Plambeck and Wang 2009; Netessine and Taylor 2006; Johnson and Myatt 2006).
The relation between the shape of a product’s life-cycle and its remanufacturing decisions can
be an interesting research question, which we do not study in this paper and leave for future
work. Furthermore, comparison of our results from the base model with results from extensions
where we consider alternative cost and consumer valuation functions for the remanufactured
product, indicate that whether the OEM chooses to increase or decrease the quality level
vis-a-vis the NR benchmark can be sensitive to the functional form assumed. Similarly, the
implication of remanufacturing on the social and consumer surplus, and environmental impact
can be sensitive to the form of competition (price vs. quantity). Future research on this issue
should be careful about these relations.
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CHAPTER 3
IS SERVICIZATION A WIN-WIN STRATEGY? PROFITABILITY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF SERVICIZATION
3.1 Introduction
There has been a significant structural economic shift to services from manufacturing in the
US and other advanced industrial countries over the last century. While the contribution
of manufacturing to the US economy has shrunk, the contribution of the service sector has
increased by over 200% in the post-1950 era (White et al. 1999). A recent report of the US
Department of Commerce (April 2013) shows that the service sector comprises 80.3% of the
US GDP (US Department of Commerce, 2013). Services also now constitute more than 80%
of the US employment (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).
The service economy itself has also been changing and adding new concepts in its struc-
ture. Traditional services, which generally rest upon the provision of labor and expertise, not
physical goods, are not the only kinds of services anymore. Some manufacturers have started
using their products as means for service delivery; not the end. These business models are
called product-service systems. Some of these product-service systems are of the more familiar
kind where the manufacturers sell services along with the products, such as warranties and
maintenance services for autos and other durable goods. In others, manufacturers sell services
instead of products. The latter type of product-service system is referred to as ‘servicization’.
While various notions of ‘servicization’ have been conceptualized (Toffel, 2002), we adopt the
commonly used definition of servicization where, in a servicization strategy, the manufacturer
sells the functionality of the product rather than the product itself, i.e., the manufacturer
owns and incurs the cost to operate the product while the customer pays for the use and the
value derived from the use of the product. Thus, the two distinctive features of serviciza-
tion, as compared to selling or leasing products, are: payments based on the amount of use
of a product and the inclusion of the operating cost including maintenance and supplies in
the service agreement. For example, Rolls Royce offers its customers power-by-hour contracts
where Rolls Royce retains the ownership of the engines, maintains them regularly, and the
customers only pay based on number of hours they use the engines. AB Electrolux installs
washing machines in a customer’s home, maintains and repairs them regularly, and charges
customers by the laundry load. Other examples of servicization include Interface Inc. (Modu-
lar Carpet), Caterpillar (Earth Moving), Bombardier (Transportation Services), Better Place
(Electric Cars). Hawken (2010) nicely summarizes the idea behind the servicization: ‘What
we want from these products is not ownership per se, but the service the products provide;
transportation from our car, cold beer from the refrigerator, news or entertainment from our
television.’
The arguments supporting servicization draws on two themes: profitability and environ-
mental benefits. From a profitability perspective, servicization can increase customer retention
and also provide higher margins. In an increasingly commoditized world, customers can easily
defect to a competitor with a similar product because manufacturers’ core products are in-
creasingly being imitated and produced at a lower cost. Because services are harder to imitate,
servicization can offer a way out of the commoditization problem and grant competitive advan-
tage to product manufacturers by locking out potential competitors. Servicization also offers
firms unique opportunities in terms of allowing for service differentiation. This can be done
through identifying the use needs of the different consumer segments and offering contracts
with different use levels. In some sense, servicization allows the firm to control the level of
product use by consumers. This lever allows the firm to segment the market more efficiently
and potentially increases the firm’s profit. Hence, customer segmentation of distinct market
segments is an important attribute of servicization that we capture in our model by allowing
the firm to offer different use-based contracts to different consumer segments.
From the environmental perspective, servicization encourages the manufacturer to take
more responsibility for their products because the firm retains the ownership of the product
under servicization. This potentially decreases the environmental impact of a product by
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incentivizing the firms to design more durable products (Toffel, 2002), and hence decreasing
the material use intensity. Thus, adoption of a servicization strategy can lead a firm to change
its product attributes, and, in particular, the durability of its products. A key feature of our
model is that product durability is an endogenous firm decision.
Despite these compelling arguments for servicization, many manufacturers are reluctant
to adopt servicization, and some have failed to implement it profitably. Ray Anderson, an
entrepreneur with an environmental focus, embraced the servicization idea at Interfaces, Inc.
However, Interfaces faced significant obstacles in implementing the servicization idea. The
challenges of selling this idea to a customer (University of Texas) have been documented in
a well-known case (Olivia and Quinn, 2003). Thus from a practical perspective, a firm is
unlikely to embrace servicization if it is not a profitable strategy, even though it might lead
to environmental benefits. In addition, it has also been argued that servicization does not
necessarily incentivize the profit maximizing manufacturers’ to design products with lower
environmental impact (White et al., 1999). Thus it is important to understand when servi-
cization simultaneously leads to an increase in profits and reduce environmental impact. The
primary goal of this paper is to analytically investigate the arguments for/against servicization
and characterize when servicization creates a win-win situation by increasing a firm’s profit
and decreasing environmental impact. In what follows, we outline some of the key features of
servicization that we capture in our analysis.
First, operating cost of a product impacts the profitability of servicization. Consumers’
operating cost might be higher or lower than the firm’s operating cost because consumers and
the firm may have different levels of effectiveness in operating the product. For example, in its
proposed contract with the University of Texas, Interface carpet stated a higher maintenance
cost per square feet than UT’s own established janitorial service (Olivia and Quinn 2003). On
the other hand, the firm may benefit from economies of scale and expertise and may have lower
operating cost. In addition, a lack of sense of ownership may lead to abuse of equipment, and
eventually increase the maintenance cost of the product under servicization. If the firm has
a very high relative operating cost (compared to the customer), then servicization may not
be as profitable as the traditional selling strategy. Thus, the relative difference in a firm and
consumer’s operating cost (relative operating efficiency) is an important factor that can affect
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the profitability of servicization, which we capture in our model.
Second, although, product durability has been seen as a sustainable product feature, higher
durability might have adverse effects on the environment. More durable products potentially
stays in the economy for a longer time with decreasing use efficiency. The environmental
impact may increase due to this drop in use efficiency and the longer use horizon. On the
other hand, more durable products can spread the environmental impact incurred during the
production and disposal of the product over a longer horizon which may decrease the overall
environmental impact. Therefore, the environmental impact depends on the trade-off between
the environmental impact incurred during the product use, production, and disposal. Hence,
we capture the environmental impact of a product in our model through the three life stages
of the product: production, use, and disposal.
Next, on the demand side, we allow heterogeneity by assuming that the consumers belong
to one of two segments with different product valuations. This heterogeneity allows us to
evaluate the impact of market segmentation on the profitability of servicization. In addition,
consumers’ product use level is endogenously determined in the equilibrium and depends on
the product characteristics and the consumer type.
Finally, on the supply side, we endogenize both the price and the product durability de-
cisions. Essentially, this provides the manufacturer two levers to control consumer purchase
and use behavior. Under selling, the manufacturer decides on the price for a single product
whereas it can offer different use based contracts tailored for two segments under servicization.
In contrast to selling, the firm incurs the operating cost under servicization.
A summary of our analysis and key findings are as follows: First, we analytically char-
acterize the equilibrium product durability and consumer product-use decisions under both a
selling and a servicization strategy adopted by the firm. We then analytically compare the
profits and environmental impact under these strategies. We show that a servicization strategy
can be more profitable for a firm even when it is operationally inefficient. This is because the
servicizing firm can utilize product use information in pricing to differentiate the consumer seg-
ments. A commonly held belief is that servicization increases the product durability because it
increases the firm’s responsibility toward its product. We show that this intuition is true when
the firm serves same consumer segments under selling and servicization strategies. However,
39
when the firm targets more consumer segments under servicization, product durability may
be lower than that of the selling strategy.
We find that whether servicization is greener and more profitable depends on the firm’s
relative operating efficiency and the relative environmental impact of a product in its use phase
as compared to the production and disposal phase. We find that, when the firm’s relative
operating efficiency is high, servicization can be more environmentally friendly for products
with low use impact relative to their production and disposal impacts. On the other hand,
when the firm’s relative operating efficiency is low, servicization can be more environmentally
friendly for products with high use impact relative to their production and disposal impacts.
We also show that servicization can be more profitable for the firm even when its relative
operating efficiency is low. However, we also show that servicization may lead to lower social
surplus even when a firm’s relative operating efficiency is high. Thus, while servicization as a
business strategy holds promise, it should be implemented with care.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 3.2, we highlight our
contribution to the current literature. In Section 3.3, we develop our model, and discuss the
assumptions. In Section 3.4, we analyze our model, and characterize the impact of servicization
on profitability and product durability. In Section 3.5, we discuss the impact of servicization
on the consumer and social surplus, and the environment. Finally, we extend our model to
two vertically differentiated products in Section 3.6, and discuss our concluding remarks in
Section 3.7.
3.2 Literature Review
Our work is primarily related to three streams of research: sustainability, contract theory and
durable goods.
A stream of research in sustainable operations literature studies the impact of various
business strategies and regulations on the profitability of firms and the environment: some
of these are related to e-waste regulations (Plambeck and Wang 2009), product architecture
choice (Agrawal and Ulku 2011), original equipment manufacturer-versus-independent reman-
ufacturer product recovery (O¨rsdemir et al. 2013; Ferrer and Swaminathan 2006), product take
back legislations (Atasu et al. 2009b; Atasu and Subramanian 2012), carbon emissions (Drake
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et al., 2012). We contribute to this literature by explicitly comparing the profitability and the
environmental impact of servicization with those of selling. Agrawal et al. (2011b) identify the
conditions when leasing is a win-win strategy for the firm and the environment. They show
that leasing may be environmentally undesirable despite remarketing of all used products, and
may be environmentally superior despite premature removal of used products. However, in this
paper operating cost is not a part of the model because it is implicitly assumed that consumers
are primarily responsible for the operating cost under both leasing and selling. In servicization
context, contrary to leasing, it is important to model the operating cost because under selling
consumers incur the operating cost whereas under servicization the firm incurs the operating
cost. We characterize the impact of relative operating cost on the profitability, the product
durability, social surplus and environmental impact when the firm uses servicization strategy.
There have been many conceptual and case studies on servicization (Toffel, 2002; White
et al., 1999; Stoughton et al., 2009). These studies have been very useful in defining the
value of servicization for both the firms and the environment conceptually. In our work, we
research some of these anecdotal evidences and conceptual ideals provided in these works for
servicization by approaching the problem in an analytical way.
An emerging stream of papers has studied the different aspects of servicization. Avci
et al. (2012) studies how the adoption and environmental impact of electric vehicles change
when the consumers are charged based on how much they drive rather than paying for the
battery upfront. They find that servicizing the battery may increase the electric car adoption
but also increase the total environmental impact. Agrawal and Bellos (2013) studies impact
of pay-per-use contracts on the environmental impact. They find that servicization without
pooling increases the environmental impact due to production but results in less consumer use.
On the other hand, servicization with pooling decreases the production impact but increases
the consumer use. We contribute to this literature in various ways. First, we endogenize
the business model choice by explicitly comparing the profitability of servicization and selling
strategies which allow us to characterize when servicization creates a win-win situation for
both the firm and the environment. Second, we allow the servicizing firm to differentiate
consumer segments based on their product use needs through a menu contract. We find that
this ability may have detrimental implications on product durability and the social surplus.
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Finally, these papers focus on the products and product features where business model choice
may change the consumer’s product use intensity (consumer product use per unit of time).
They assume that product lifecycle length is fixed but product use intensity may change based
on the business model and product characteristic. In other words, consumers may use the
product more or less frequently over a fixed length of use phase depending on whether they
purchased the equipment itself (selling) or service of the equipment (servicization). On the
contrary, we mainly focus on the products with low discretionary use and product feature (i.e.,
product durability) that is less likely to change the consumer use intensity but the product
lifecycle length is endogenously determined by the consumers’ chosen use level. We explain this
distinction in more detail when we introduce our environmental impact metric in Section 2.6.
In contracting literature a number of papers research the impact of performance based
contracts (PBC), a variant of servicization, on the product design and supply chain align-
ment. Kim et al. (2007) determine the optimal contract when the customer can offer contracts
contingent on the performance of the equipment. They find that in a supplier-customer envi-
ronment as product matures, optimal contracts assume less cost sharing but more performance
incentives. Kim et al. (2010) show that infrequent system disruptions may create inefficiencies
for PBC. Guajardo et al. (2012) empirically find that PBC increases the product reliability.
We contribute to this literature by explicitly considering the environmental impact of servi-
cization. Yadav et al. (2003) and Corbett and DeCroix (2001) study the impact of shared
saving contract for indirect materials on aligning the incentives in the supply chain. Corbett
and DeCroix (2001) find that the goal of maximizing profits and minimizing consumption is
not generally aligned. In these papers, the focus is on the indirect materials which are at
best indirectly related to the quantity of final products. However, in our case, the focus of
servicization is the final product itself, and we consider the impact of servicization business
model on the product design by endogenizing the product durability.
In durable goods literature, several problems on the profitability of employing leasing ver-
sus selling have been explored. Some of those are effect of product depreciation rate (Desai
and Purohit 1998), competition (Desai and Purohit 1999), channel structure (Bhaskaran and
Gilbert 2009), and presence of a complementary product (Bhaskaran and Gilbert 2005). How-
ever, these works are neither concerned with the environmental impact of different strategies
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nor with the operating cost. Our contribution to this literature is two folds. Firstly, we
endogenize the product durability and research the impact of operating cost and market seg-
mentation on the product durability under different strategies. Secondly, we explicitly compare
the environmental impact of servicization with selling strategy.
3.3 Model Overview
We consider a monopolist which produces a single product and it either sells or servicizes its
product to the consumers. In the following, we introduce the consumer and product charac-
teristics, and then discuss consumers’ and firm’s decisions. Table B.1 in online appendix B.3
summarizes the parameters and decision variables of our model.
3.3.1 Consumer and Product Characteristics
Consumers differ in their valuation of the product. There are two consumer segments, θi,
i = H,L, where θH and θL show the valuations of high and low end segments, respectively.
We assume αθH = θL where α ∈ (0, 1) and θL = θ. The mass of potential customers is M and
β ∈ (0, 1) shows the fraction of θH consumers.
Here, θi represents consumer segment i’s utility from the first use, then the product’s utility
deteriorates with each use. The deterioration rate depends on the product durability, δ, that
is, it will be slower for products with higher levels of durability. Specifically, the consumer
marginal utility per unit use is θi − tδ , i = H,L, where tδ shows the drop in marginal utility
after t units of use.
There is a cost of operating the product. This cost includes the maintenance and all other
costs incurred to keep the product operational. When the consumers own the product (which is
the case under selling), the consumers incur the operating cost; otherwise, when the firm owns
the product (which is the case under servicization), the firm incurs the operating cost.1 For
copiers the operating cost includes maintenance, toners, papers etc. For instance, University
of California Davis and Oregon State University have adopted servicization contracts for their
copier needs (U.C.D, 2014; O.S.U, 2014). The consumers and the firm may differ in their
1If we relax this assumption and assume that consumers bear a part of the operating cost under servicization,
our results remain unaltered.
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operational efficiency to operate the product, that is, for the same amount of use the firm can
incur higher or lower total operating cost than the consumers. For example, in its failed deal
attempt with University of Texas at Houston, Interface carpet stated a higher maintenance
cost per square feet than UT’s own established janitorial service, (Olivia and Quinn 2003).
Furthermore, as Bardhi and Eckhardt (2012) points out, when a consumer does not own the
product, her use behavior toward the product changes. When a consumer owns the product
she has incentive to use the product properly because misuse of the product will increase her
product maintenance cost. This incentive disappears in servicization model as the firm bears
the operating cost, as a result the firm may incur a higher operating cost for the same use
level. On the other hand, the economies of scale may lower operating cost for the firm.
Since more durable products require less maintenance and are expected to lose their energy
efficiency slower, we assume that the operating cost is decreasing in product durability δ. In
addition, we assume that total operating cost is increasing in use τ in a convex manner. Because
as the product is used more it may require more frequent repairs and may lose material and
energy efficiency. In order to capture all these features, we use the following operating cost
functions: when the consumer or the firm owns the product, they incur an operating cost
mcτ2
2δ , i = c, f , where mc and mf denote the operating cost parameters, respectively. mc can
be lower or higher than mf as explained above. We study an alternative cost model through
a numerical study in the Appendix B, where the operating cost is not correlated with product
durability. We show that our key results continue to hold.
3.3.2 Consumer and Firm Decisions
In this section, we introduce the consumers’ and firm’s problems first for selling strategy, then
for servicization strategy.
In selling strategy, on the demand side, each consumer first decides whether to purchase
the product. If type θi consumer buys the product, she then determines her level of use τ , to
maximize her utility:
Ur(θi) = max
τ
∫ τ
0
(θi − t
δ
)dt− mcτ
2
2δ
− p. (3.1)
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Marginal utility per unit use is integrated over use to obtain consumer’s utility in equa-
tion (3.1), then total operating cost mcτ
2
2δ and the product price p are deducted. Once the
marginal utility per unit use, the product provides, drops below the marginal operating cost
per unit use, the consumer stops using the product, and the product is disposed. There is no
disposal cost or salvage value.
On the supply side, the firm determines the product durability δ. We assume that pro-
duction cost is convex in product durability and is equal to cδ2, where c is a positive scaling
parameter. The firm then sets the selling price p. Because the high valuation segment has a
higher willingness-to-pay serving only the low valuation segment is never optimal. Let pi∗r,B
and pi∗r,H denote the manufacturer’s optimum profit when it sells to both segments and only to
θH segment, respectively. If pi
∗
r,B ≥ pi∗r,H , the manufacturer sells to both segments; otherwise
it sells only to high valuation segment. pi∗r,B and pi
∗
r,H are given by:
pi∗r,B = maxp,δ(p− cδ2)M, (3.2)
s.t Ur(θL) ≥ 0.
pi∗r,H = maxp,δ(p− cδ2)Mβ, (3.3)
s.t Ur(θH) ≥ 0.
We normalize the reservation utility of both segments to zero. If the firm sells to both
segments, low valuation segment θL must receive at least its reservation utility, i.e., Ur(θL) ≥ 0.
Similarly, if the firm sells only to the high valuation segment θH , high valuation segment must
capture at least its reservation utility, Ur(θH) ≥ 0.
In servicization strategy, on the demand side, the consumers choose one of the contract
options offered by the firm, including not receiving any service. Each contract option specifies a
use-price pair, i.e., (τi, Fi), i = H,L. Consumers choosing the contract (τi, Fi) use the product
for τi units and pays the firm Fi.
On the supply side, the firm determines the product durability δ and the parameters of
the menu contract (τi, Fi), i = H,L. Similar to selling strategy, because the high valuation
segment has a higher willingness-to-pay, inducing only the low valuation segment to purchase
the service is never optimal. If the firm induces both segments to purchase the service, the
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menu must satisfy the following individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints.
IRi :
∫ τi
0
(θi − t
δ
)dt− Fi ≥ 0, i : H,L (3.4)
ICi :
∫ τi
0
(θi − t
δ
)dt− Fi ≥
∫ τj
0
(θi − t
δ
)dt− Fj , i 6= j, and i, j : H,L. (3.5)
Otherwise, if the firm induces only high valuation segment to accept the offer, then the con-
tract only needs to satisfy individual rationality constraint of the high valuation segment, i.e.,
Uv(θH) ≥ 0. Let pi∗v,B and pi∗v,N denote the manufacturer’s optimum profit when it serves both
segments and only the θH segment, respectively. Then,
pi∗v,B = max
δ,Fi,τi,i=H,L
∑
i=H,L
(Fi − mfτ
2
H
2δ
− cδ2)Qi, (3.6)
s.t, IRi, ICi i = H,L.
pi∗v,H = max
δ,FH ,τH
(FH − mfτ
2
H
2δ
− cδ2)QH , (3.7)
s.t, IRH .
where QL = (1−β)M and QH = βM . The firm serves both segments if pi∗v,B ≥ pi∗v,H ; otherwise,
it serves only θH segment.
3.4 Analysis
In this section, we first characterize the equilibrium choices of consumers and the firm. Then,
we compare the equilibrium decisions under selling and servicization strategy to tease out the
implications of servicization on profitability, and product durability.
3.4.1 Equilibrium
The next proposition describes the equilibrium decisions of the firm and the consumer for
both selling and servicization strategies. As it will be evident αβ plays a critical role in the
characterization of equilibria. It shows the relative profitability of serving low-end segment.
Increasing αβ indicates either the valuation or the mass of the low end segment increases.
Therefore, when this ratio increases, the profitability of serving low-end segment increases,
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Strategy Regions δ∗ τ∗ pi∗
Selling
R1 α
2θ2
4c(1+mc)
τ∗H =
θδ∗
1+mc
, τ∗L =
αθδ∗
1+mc
a4θ4M
16c(1+mc)2
R2, R3 θ
2
4c(1+mc)
τ∗H =
θδ∗
1+mc
, τ∗L = 0
θ4M
16c(1+mc)2
Servicization
R1, R2
(α2+β−2αβ)θ2
4c(1−β)(1+mf ) τ
∗
H =
θδ∗
1+mf
, τ∗L =
(α−β)θδ∗
(1−β)(1+mf )
(α2+β−2αβ)2θ4M
16c(1−β)2(1+mf )2
R3 θ
2
4c(1+mf )
τ∗H =
θδ∗
1+mf
, τ∗L = 0
θ4M
16c(1+mf )2
Table 3.1: Equilibrium product durability, product use and firm profits under selling and
servicization strategy.
and vice versa.
Proposition 8. The following characterizes the equilibrium regions. The optimum product
durability, product use and firm profits are provided in Table 3.1.
(R1) When 1
β3/4
≤ αβ , the firm serves both segments under both selling and servicization strate-
gies. (R2) When γ(α, β) ≤ αβ < 1β3/4 , the firm serves high valuation segment under selling
strategy and both segments under servicization strategy.
(R3) When 0 < αβ < γ(α, β), the firm serves only the high valuation segment under both selling
and servicization strategies. γ(α, β) is characterized in the proof of the proposition.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium regions under selling and servicization strategies.
Figure 3.1 graphically depicts the equilibrium regions in Proposition 8. Note that the
equilibrium regions depend on only αβ ratio. As we move from R1 to R3,
α
β ratio decreases,
and serving the low end segment becomes relatively less profitable. In fact, the firm abandons
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low end consumer segment when αβ ratio is smaller than a certain threshold. This happens
because when the firm serves both segments, the low end segment only receives its reservation
utility, but the high end segment receives an additional informational rent, which increases
as αβ ratio decreases. In this case, either β increases, and hence the relative market size of
consumers receiving informational rent increases, or α decreases, and hence the firm needs to
decrease its price to appeal to the low-end segment. When the informational rent becomes too
high, it is more profitable for the firm to serve only the high-end consumers.
Note that the firm is more likely to abandon low-end segment under selling strategy com-
pared to servicization. When αβ ratio is moderate as in R2, the firm serves both segments when
it owns the product, but serves only the high-end segment when it sells the product. This
result follows from the fact that servicization strategy enables the firm to control consumers’
use levels. Thus, the servicizing firm can induce the consumer segments use the product at a
more efficient level from a profitability perspective, and extract a higher portion of the con-
sumer surplus. Therefore, the firm can continue to serve the low-end consumer segment. Note
that the result is independent of the consumer and the firm’s operating costs and continues to
hold even when firm has a high operating cost.
Table 3.1 shows that regardless of the targeted segments product durability decreases when
its operating cost increases: consumers’ and firm’s operating costs respectively in selling and
servicization strategies. Essentially, the benefit of extending the product’s useful lifetime by
improving its durability is lower when the operating cost is higher.
Table 3.1 shows that when the firm sells its product, the optimal durability choice does
not depend on relative size of the segments, which is determined by β. In contrast, when the
firm servicizes the product the optimal durability may depend on the size of each segment.
Essentially, when the firm sells the product, it cannot differentiate among customers based on
their use levels. In this case, optimal product configuration is determined by the lowest segment
that the product needs to attract. In contrast, the firm can offer differentiated offerings based
on use levels in the case of servicization. When β increases, high segment becomes relatively
more important, and the firm wants to create a bigger separation between the two segments
by increasing the use level of high segment and decreasing it for low segment. Thus, the firm
improves product durability to extend the use level of high segment.
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Variable α β
f1 ↑ ↓
f2 ↓ ↑
Table 3.2: Comparative statics in Proposition 3 for f1 and f2. f1 and f2 are explicitly stated
in the proposition
3.4.2 Profitability
In this section, we study how servicization affects the profitability. As it will be evident,
r , 1+mc1+mf ratio, simply referred to as the relative efficiency of servicization plays an important
role in our result. When r decreases, relative profitability of servicization decreases and vice
versa for selling. This is because decreasing r indicates either the firm’s operating cost goes
up or the consumer operating cost goes down. The next proposition compares profitability of
selling and servicization strategies.
Proposition 9. (Profitability) Servicization is more profitable than selling strategy if and only
if
(i) r > α
2(1−β)
α2+β−2αβ , f1 in R1.
(ii) r > (1−β)
√
β
α2+β−2αβ , f2 in R2.
(iii) r > 1 in R3.
In addition, f1, f2 < 1. Table 3.2 shows how f1 and f2 change with α and β.
Recall that regions R1-R3 are characterized in Proposition 8, and they depend only on
the αβ ratio. Because f1, f2 < 1, the proposition indicates that the firm may find it attractive
to keep the ownership and servicize its product even when consumers are more efficient in
maintaining the product, that is, when they have a lower operating cost. This happens when
the low end segment is sufficiently profitable (αβ is sufficiently high) so that the firm chooses
to serve both segments under servicization.
Servicization can be more profitable even when it is operationally inefficient, because it
allows the firm to track and control consumer use levels and utilize this information in pricing
to extract more surplus from consumers. Therefore, ability to utilize use levels can give
servicization a pricing advantage.
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Figure 3.2 shows the relative operating efficiency threshold above which servicization be-
comes more attractive. The figure shows that servicization is more likely to be attractive when
α
β ratio is moderate and the threshold has its minimum at R1-R2 boundary. Essentially pric-
ing advantage of servicization as a result of utilizing use levels becomes more valuable when
the gap between valuations of low and high end segments (i.e., 1 − α) and relative mass of
high end segment (i.e., β) increase. Therefore, in R1, where both segments are served under
both strategies, decreasing αβ ratio makes servicization relatively more attractive. However,
in R2, when low end segment is served only under servicization strategy, a smaller αβ makes
low end segment to be relatively less profitable, which in turn makes selling more attractive.
When αβ ratio is too small, only high end segment is served under both strategies. In this case,
servicization does not have a pricing advantage, and relative operating efficiencies determine
the optimal choice: When the firm has a lower operating cost, r > 1, servicization is more
profitable. When α = 0.8 or β = 0.3 (these are the parameters used in Figure 3.2), even when
the firm and consumers have the same operating efficiencies, we found that servicization may
increase the firm’s profit up to 10%.
Our results show that servicization can be preferable even when it is operationally less
efficient. Indeed servicization can have a higher cost as in Interface carpet example. Firms
who are new to servicization may not be as operationally efficient as their consumers since
building expertise and improving the processes of servicized offerings require time (Heal, 2008).
Our results may also offer one possible explanation as to why Interface’s servicization
experiment did not succeed. In addition to its high operating cost, its contract design may
have prevented servicization to be more profitable for Interface. Interface offered only one type
of contract that fixed the product use length to 7 years in their Evergreen Lease program. This
was required due to accounting restrictions on operating leases in some cases. However, even
when UT Dallas, a tax exempt institution, requested a 10-year contract. Interface declined this
offer (Heal, 2008). Electrolux, in its failed servicization attempt with its washing machines,
followed a similar strategy and instead of segmenting the market, charged a single pay-per-use
price from its customer. Our results show that utilizing use levels to segment the market can
greatly increase profitability of servicization, and Interface and Electrolux could have benefited
significantly by offering a menu of use length durations.
50
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
relative valuation of low segment HΑL
Th
re
sh
ol
d
H%
L
R1 R2 R3
(a)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
relative size of high segment HΒL
Th
re
sh
ol
d
H%
L
R1R2R3
(b)
Figure 3.2: The minimum operating efficiency above which servicization is more profitable
than selling strategy. (β = 0.3 in (a) and α = 0.8 in (b))
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3.4.3 Product Durability
It has been widely argued that because the firm is responsible for the maintenance of the
product, servicization would encourage firms to invest in product durability so that the product
would need less frequent repairs (White et al. 1999; Stoughton et al. 2009; Toffel 2002). While
these papers provide only qualitative arguments, here, we consider a quantitative model. We
find that servicization indeed increases product durability in many cases. However, we show
this conjecture need not be always true: Servicization can decrease product durability.
Our model captures how servicization affects the firm’s pricing policy. Ability to utilize use
levels in pricing enables the firm target more consumer segments which may result in choosing
a lower durability level. In a non-regulatory setting, the firm will adopt servicization only if
it leads to higher profits than selling strategy. Therefore, we study the impact of servicization
on product durability when servicization is more profitable. Next proposition summarizes our
results.
Proposition 10. (Durability) When servicization is preferred over selling strategy, serviciza-
tion increases product durability except when r < 1−β
α2+β−2αβ in R2. In addition,
1−β
α2+β−2αβ > 1.
The Proposition demonstrates that when servicization is attractive in regions R1 and R3,
it always increases product durability. However, there are different dynamics in place in these
regions. In R3, only high segment is served under both strategies, and servicization is chosen
only when r > 1, i.e., when consumers have a higher operating cost. Therefore, servicization
results in a lower operating cost and makes it attractive to extend the useful lifetime of the
product by increasing its durability. In contrast, in R1, servicization can be preferred even
when the firm has a higher operating cost, r < 1. Here, both segments are served under both
strategies. Because servicization enables segmentation based on use levels, the firm can extract
a significantly higher surplus from high end segment, therefore, benefits more from extending
the use level by increasing product durability.
In R2, different from R1 and R3, the firm does not serve the same consumer segments
under servicization, and it can result in a lower product durability. In particular, low segment
is served only under servicization, which may make it optimal to choose a less durable product.
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However, a sufficiently strong operating efficiency (i.e., r > 1−β
α2+β−2αβ ) may overcome this
effect, and the servicization can still result in a more durable product despite targeting more
consumer segments.
Increased product durability has been considered as a key goal to decrease environmental
burden of products Toffel (2002). However, our results in section 3.5.2 show that higher prod-
uct durability as a result of servicization may not necessarily improve environmental impact.
The relative significance of use, production and disposal related components of environmental
impact, and relative operating efficiency of servicization are critical.
3.4.4 Use Decisions
We next focus on the use decisions. The following proposition compares the use levels under
selling and servicization.
Proposition 11. (Use Decisions) When servicization is preferred over selling,
(i) in R1, servicization increases the use levels of both segments when r >
√
α3(1−β)2
(α−β)(α2−2αβ+β) .
It decreases the use levels of both segments when
√
α2(1−β)
α2−2αβ+β > r. Otherwise, when√
α3(1−β)2
(α−β)(α2−2αβ+β) > r >
√
α2(1−β)
α2−2αβ+β , it increases the use level of the high segment but de-
creases the use level of low end segment.
(ii) in R2, servicization always increases the use level of low end segment. It increases the
use level of high end segment when r >
√
1−β
α2−2αβ+β . Otherwise, when
√
1−β
α2−2αβ+β > r, it
decreases the use level of high segment.
(iii) in R3, servicization always increases the use level of the high end segment, and does not
alter the use level of low end segment.
Region R1 can be broken down into three regions with respect to the relative operating
efficiency of firm. When the relative operating efficiency is low, the servicizing firm reduces
the use levels for both segments compared to selling. On the other hand, when the relative
operating efficiency of firm is high, servicizing firm offers higher use levels for both segments.
Essentially, lower operating cost per unit of use allows servicizing firm to increase the use levels
but higher operating cost per unit of use discourages higher use level offerings. When the
firm has a medium relative operating efficiency, servicization affects the use levels of different
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segments in the opposite direction. Use level of high end segment increases but use level of
low end segment decreases. This is because the firm distorts the low end segments use level
downward in order to achieve segmentation, and the relative operating efficiency is not high
enough to overcome this negative effect on use level in this region. However, high segment
always receives its preferred use level which is higher under servicization for this range of
relative operating efficiencies.
In R2, low-end segment is served only under servicization, and hence, servicization increases
the use level for this segment. In this region, use level of high end segment increases under
servicization only if relative operating efficiency is high enough. The intuition is similar to the
one given for R1. Finally, in R3, segmentation does not play a role in use levels because the
firm only serves high end segment under both selling and servicization. The relative operating
efficiency of firm becomes the only factor that affects the use level of high end segment relative
to selling strategy. Therefore, servicization increases the use level of high end segment when
the relative operating efficiency of firm is higher than 1, and this condition is always satisfied
when servicization is more profitable than selling in R3.
3.5 Environmental and Social Implications of Servicization
In this section, we study the impact of servicization on the consumer and social surplus, and
the environment.
3.5.1 Consumer and Social Surplus
The consumer surplus (CS) is given by
CSr =
∑
i=L,H
∫ τ∗i,r
0
(θi − t
δ
)dt− mc
2δ
τ∗2i,r − p, (3.8)
CSv =
∑
i=L,H
∫ τ∗i,v
0
(θi − t
δ
)dt− Fi, (3.9)
for selling in equation (3.8) and for servicization in equation (3.9), where τ∗i,r and τ
∗
i,v show
type-θi equilibrium use levels in these strategies, respectively. The social surplus (SS) is the
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sum of the consumer surplus and the firm’s profit. Next proposition compares the CS generated
by selling and servicization strategies. Note that regions R1-R3 are defined in Proposition 8.
Proposition 12. (Consumer Surplus)
(i) In R1, servicization increases the CS if and only if r >
√
α2(1+α)(1−β)2
2(α−β)(α2+β−2αβ) , h(α, β).
In addition, h > 1.
(ii) In R2, servicization always increases the CS.
(iii) In R3, servicization does not alter the CS.
The proposition demonstrates that in R1, servicization increases the CS only if servicizing
firm has high enough operating efficiency. In fact, the firm’s operating cost has to be strictly
lower than the consumer operating cost (h > 1). This result indicates that consumers may
prefer to own the product and incur a higher per unit use operating cost rather than purchasing
the service from a more efficient firm when h > r > 1. Essentially, when the firm can
manipulate the use levels of the product, it can extract a higher portion of the consumer
utility. This effect can only be overcome if relative operating efficiency of servicization is
sufficiently high, i.e., r > h. The proposition shows that, servicization can have a detrimental
impact on the CS, when the relative profitability of low-end segment is high enough so that
the firm always serves both segments (region R1).
In R2, servicization always increases the CS. Note that the firm serves only the high end
segment under selling strategy in this region. Hence, it extracts the entire consumer surplus.
On the other hand, the firm serves both segments under servicization strategy, and the high
end segment can still achieve a positive surplus. Recall that this region emerges because the
servicizing firm can control the use levels, which enables it to continue to serve the low end
segment. Therefore, as opposed to R1, where increased control over product use levels has
a detrimental effect on consumer surplus, in R2, utilizing use levels in pricing increases the
CS. Finally, in R3, since the firm serves only the high end segment under both strategies, the
CS is always zero. Overall, when servicization and selling have the same operating efficiency,
servicization improves the CS, only if it extends the market coverage. Now, let us consider the
impact of servicization on the social surplus.
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Proposition 13. (Social Surplus) When servicization is preferred over selling strategy, ser-
vicization increases the SS except when r < k1(α, β) in R1. Furthermore, k1(α, β) < 1 if and
only if σ(β) > α.The expressions for k1 and σ are explicitly characterized in the proof of the
proposition.
Intuition suggests that whenever the firm’s operating cost is smaller than those of con-
sumers (r > 1), the servicization should improve the SS because shifting the operating cost
burden to the firm should improve overall efficiency in the system. However, contrary to this
intuition, Proposition 13 shows that servicization may decrease the SS even it has a better
operating efficiency than selling. This case happens when the firm serves both segments under
both selling and servicization, and σ(β) < α. This result indicates that social planner may
prefer selling over servicization even when the consumers have inferior operating efficiency.
The outcome deviates from the social optimum due to two factors: product durability choice
and consumers’ use levels. On one hand, when servicization is chosen, the firm’s product
durability choice is closer to socially optimum compared to firm’s choice under selling in R1.
2 On the other hand, the servicizing firm distorts the use level offered to the low-end segment
away from the socially optimum level to make this option less attractive for high segment,
so it can charge a higher price to the high-end segment. In contrast, when the firm sells the
product, consumers always use the product at socially optimal level given the chosen product
durability.
Because the firm determines its product durability choice based on low-end segment in the
case of selling, it moves further away from the social optimum as the gap between customer
valuations widens, i.e., α gets smaller. When the gap between the segments is low, i.e.,
α > σ(β), product durability is not too far from the social optimum, and inefficient use level
of servicization dominates. Therefore, servicization may decrease the SS even when the firm
has a better operating efficiency than the consumers.
In region R2, a servicizing firm serves more consumer segments than a selling firm, that
is, the low-end segment is served only by the servicizing firm. The high end segment can
capture positive CS. Thus, servicization always result in a higher SS in R2 as long as it is more
2This can be shown by comparing the product durability choices in Proposition 8 and Proposition 23 in the
online appendix
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profitable. In region R3, only the high end segment is served in both cases. Therefore, the CS
is always zero, and the SS is equal to firm’s profit. In this region, servicization increases the
SS, when it is more profitable.
3.5.2 Environmental Impact
Here, we first describe our environmental impact metric. We then study how servicization
affects the environment using this metric. We follow the convention in the literature to quantify
total environmental impact (Atasu and Souza, 2012; Agrawal et al., 2011b). One unit of
product entails environmental impact over three life cycle phases: production, use and disposal.
Environmental impact during the production and disposal phases are denoted by ep and ed,
respectively. Environmental impact during the use phase is convex increasing in product use
level τ , and it is given by euτ
2
i . Convexity is assumed because the product’s resource efficiency
may decrease with use, which may increase per unit use environmental impact (Intlekofer,
2009; White et al., 1999). Adding up these three components, the total environmental impact
due to segment i’s consumption is given by Qi(ep + ed + euτ
2
i ).
We focus on the products with low discretionary use. Furthermore, we assume that product
features, e.g., product durability and price, do not change the consumer use intensity, i.e.,
product use per unit of time. For example, if a consumer uses a Xerox copier to copy a certain
number of pages per month, that rate does not change regardless of price and durability of the
product. In contrast, product lifecycle length is endogenously determined by the consumers’
chosen use level of the product. For example, when the consumers’ chosen use level is high, the
consumer will keep the product for a longer time. Therefore, products may have different use
durations. We need an environmental impact metric which can provide a fair comparison of
products possibly with different use durations. Hence, we compare how much environmental
impact products cause per-unit of the time they stay in the economy, and we call this metric
environmental impact per-unit-time metric, defined as the total environmental impact divided
by the use duration and summed over all segments. It is given by,
Ek =
∑
i=H,L
(euτ
2
i + ep + ed)Qi
τi
, k = r, v. (3.10)
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In equation (3.10), use duration is assumed to be proportional to the use level τi following our
assumption that consumer use intensity is constant.
Total environmental impact metric, i.e.,
∑
i=H,L(euτ
2
i +ep+ed)Qi has been used in Agrawal
and Bellos (2013); Avci et al. (2012) to assess the environmental performance. These papers
fix product use duration, instead consumers choose product use intensity based on product
characteristics. This assumption is appropriate when a product has high discretionary use,
and hence, consumers are likely to alter their consumption intensity based on price or other
product characteristics. However, products such as Interface carpet, Xerox copiers and Elec-
trolux washing machines, have low discretionary use and consumers’ use intensity does not
significantly depend on the product characteristics. Instead, product characteristic may alter
the product use duration. For example, consumers may not use a more durable product more
intensely, but they may use it for a longer time (Koenigsberg et al., 2011). This argument is
also supported in White et al. (1999).
Environmental impact per-unit time metric, Ek, consists of two main components: euτi
per unit time use impact and
ep+ed
τi
per unit time production and disposal impacts. Products
can be classified based on the phase in which they entail most of their environmental impact:
Environmental impact during the use phase dominates (i.e., high euep+ed ) for some products, such
as automobiles, refrigerators, washing machines. In contrast, environmental impact during
production and disposal phase dominates (i.e. low euep+ed ) for some other products, such as
carpets, computers. In order to facilitate the discussion, we refer to euep+ed ratio as the relative
use impact of a product in the remainder of this section.
The next proposition compares the environmental impact of servicization and selling strate-
gies. Our goal is to identify the conditions that make servicization a win-win strategy. Hence,
the proposition focuses on the region in which servicization is more profitable than selling
strategy.
Proposition 14. (Environmental Impact) When servicization is preferred over selling,
(i.) in R1, servicization is more environmentally friendly than selling if and only if
(i.a) g1 ,
√
α(1−β)(α+β−αβ)
α2+β−2αβ > r and
eu
ed+ep
> ∆1, or
(i.b) r >
√
α3(1−β)(1+(−2+α)β)
(α−β)(1+(−1+α)β)(α2+β−2αβ) , g2 and
eu
ed+ep
< ∆1.
In addition, g2 > g1 > f1.
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Figure 3.3: How servicization can improve environmental impact?
(ii) in R2, servicization is more environmentally friendly than selling if and only if r >√
(1−β)(1+(−2+α)β)
(α−β)β(α2+β−2αβ) , g3 and
eu
ed+ep
< ∆2.
(iii) in R3, servicization is more environmentally friendly than selling if and only if eued+ep <
∆3.
The expressions for ∆1, ∆2, and ∆3 are stated in the proof of the proposition.
Before explaining the details of the proposition, we first how servicization can decrease
environmental impact of a single segment pictorially by Figure 3.3. The figure shows that
selling strategy leads to overuse of the product from an environmental perspective. Serviciza-
tion can decrease the environmental impact of this product only if it decreases the use level.
However, τ∗e (=
√
ep+ed
eu
) must be low enough such that decreased use level under servicization
cannot go further away from τ∗e . This means that product must have high enough relative
use impact. Same logic applies if selling leads to underuse of the product. In that case, ser-
vicization decreases the environmental impact only if it increases the use level, and τ∗e is high
enough (low enough relative use impact). Note that although the figure illustrates the change
in environmental impact for a single segment, overall change would depend on the changes in
both segments.
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Figure 3.4: When servicization can improve both profitability and environmental impact?
In order to asses when servicization jointly improves profitability and environmental im-
pact, we need to consider two factors: relative operating efficiency of servicization and relative
use impact of the product. Figure 3.4 illustrates when servicization becomes a win-win strat-
egy based on these two factors. In R1, when the relative operating efficiency of servicization is
low enough (Proposition 14.i.a), servicization is environmentally preferable for products with
sufficiently high values of relative use impact, i.e., euep+ed > ∆1. The rationale behind this
result is as follows: When the relative operating efficiency of servicization satisfies g1 > r,
the firm tends to shorten product use duration offered to both segments compared to selling
strategy because it is costlier for the firm to operate the product for longer durations. This
change in turn decreases the use impact, which is a weighted average of use durations, i.e.,
βτ∗H,v + (1 − β)τ∗L,v, in contrast, increases the production and disposal impacts, which are
proportional to βτ∗H,v
+ 1−βτ∗L,v . As a result, the use impact decreases but production and disposal
impacts increase. Thus, servicization is greener only if the product has sufficiently high use
impact relative to production and disposal impacts. For example, washing machines, cars and
printers fall into this category.
On the other hand, when the relative operating efficiency of servicization is high, i.e., r > g2
as in Proposition 14.i.b, servicization is greener for products with sufficiently low relative use
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impact, i.e., euep+ed < ∆1. When servicization has high enough relative operating efficiency,
the firm tends to increase the product use levels offered to both segment compared to selling
strategy because it is cheaper for the firm to operate the product. In this case, servicization
increases the use impact, which is proportional to βτ∗H,v + (1 − β)τ∗L,v, while decreasing the
production and disposal impacts, which are proportional to βτ∗H,v
+ 1−βτ∗L,v . Hence, servicization
is greener for products with sufficiently low use impact relative to production and disposal
impacts (e.g., carpets and laptops). It is interesting to note that although, servicization
increases the product durability in R1 as shown in Proposition 10, it may still reduce product
use levels for low-end segment. Therefore, more durable products are not necessarily used for
a longer duration. This result is a consequence of downward distortion of low-end segment’s
product use level.
The proposition also implies that when the relative operating efficiency of servicization is at
a medium range as in g2 > r > g1, servicization always increases both use, and production and
disposal related impacts, and hence servicization increases the overall environmental impact for
all product types. For this range of r values, while servicization increases the product use level
of the high-end segment, it decreases the product use level of the low-end segment compared
to selling strategy in a way that the use impact increases due to the high-end segment, and
the production and disposal impacts increase due to the low-end segment. The increase in
high-end segment’s use level is due to higher product durability. The reduction in low-end
segment’s use level is mainly due to firm’s desire to segment the market by distorting the
low-end segment’s use level away from the socially optimal level. This result shows that the
firm’s increased control over the product may adversely affect the environment regardless of
the product type when the relative operating efficiency is moderate.
In R2, servicization can be a win-win strategy for products with sufficiently low relative use
impact, i.e., low euep+ed , when servicization has high enough relative operating efficiency. The
intuition for this results is similar to that of part i.b. In this region, however, when servicization
is more profitable, it always increases the environmental impact for high relative use impact
products. Environmental impact for high relative use impact products decreases only if the
firm reduces the use durations offered to both segments sufficiently such that use impact under
servicization is lower than the use impact under selling, i.e., βτH,v + (1− β)τL,v < βτH,r. This
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requires that the firm must have low enough relative operating efficiency. However, in this
case, operating efficiency must be too low, because more consumers use the product under
servicization, and at these operating efficiency values servicization is not profitable anymore.
Therefore, servicization cannot be both environmentally friendly and profitable for high relative
use impact products in R2. This result shows that when servicization increase market coverage,
it adversely impacts the environmental performance for high relative use impact products in
this region.
In R3, the firm always serves only the high-end segment, and servicization is more profitable
than selling strategy, when r > 1. In this case, Table 3.1 indicates that high-end segment
uses the product for a longer duration under servicization. As a result, servicization is more
environmentally friendly when the product has sufficiently low relative use impact.
Our results also contrast with the popular argument that higher product durability de-
creases the environmental impact. We found that product durability, by itself, does not de-
termine the environmental impact: Product type (relative use impact of the product) should
be taken into account as well. One might also argue that a more durable product should
reduce the environmental impact for high production and disposal impact products since it
would extend the product use duration. However, in R1, we show that environmental impact
may increase for high production and disposal impact products even when servicization results
in higher product durability. Therefore, product durability cannot be a good proxy for the
environmental impact. One needs to look at the product type and relative operating efficiency
of servicization jointly to assess the environmental benefits of servicization.
3.6 Product Line
We have shown that ability to price based on use volume may provide servicization an edge
over selling when the firm produces a single product. However, in practice, firms can sell a
product line to segment the market. For example, Interface sells carpets made of type 6 and
type 6, 6 fiber, and type 6, 6 is known to be more durable. In order to study the impact of
different segmentation practices on the profits, here, we allow the firm to sell two products
with different product durabilities, and compare the profitability of selling two products and
servicizing single product. We denote high and low product durability δH and δL in selling
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Strategy Regions δ∗ τ∗ pi∗
Selling
R1, R2 δ∗H =
θ2
4c(1+mc)
, δ∗L =
(−α2+β)θ2
4c(−1+β)(1+mc) τ
∗
H =
θ3
4c(1+mc)2
, τ∗L =
α(α2−β)θ3
4c(1−β)(1+mc)2
M(α4+β−2α2β)θ4
16c(1−β)(1+mc)2
R3 δ∗ = θ
2
4c(1+mc)
τ∗H =
θδ∗
1+mc
, τ∗L = 0
θ4M
16c(1+mc)2
Table 3.3: Equilibrium product durability, product use and firm profits under selling strategy
when the firm can sell two vertically differentiated products.
strategy, respectively. Next proposition describes the equilibrium for selling and servicization
strategies.
Proposition 15. Suppose the firm can sell two vertically differentiated products with different
durabilities. The following characterizes the equilibrium. The optimum product durability,
product use and firm profits for selling strategy are provided in Table 3.3 and for servicization
strategy in Table 3.1.
R1pl When γ(α, β) ≤ αβ , the firm serves both segments under both selling and servicization
strategies. γ(α, β) is characterized in the proof of the Proposition 8.
R2pl When
√
β ≤ αβ < γ(α, β), the firm serves high valuation segment under servicization
strategy and both segments under selling strategy.
R3pl When αβ <
√
β, the firm serves high valuation segment under both selling and servicization
strategies.
The equilibrium structure is similar to that of single product scenario. That is, it depends
on the relative profitability of low-end segment, i.e., αβ . As we move from R1
pl to R3pl, serving
the low-end segment becomes less attractive and the firm stops serving low-end segment when
the αβ is small enough. Furthermore, as expected, when the firm sells two products, it is more
likely to serve low-end segment compared to single product case. More interesting insight
emerges when we compare segmentation strategies under selling and servicization. When the
firm sells two vertically differentiated products, the firm is more likely to serve both segments
compared to servicization, i.e.,
√
β < γ(α, β). This suggests that customizing the product
design is more effective in segmentation than customizing the product use levels. To see
the impact of this dynamic on profitability, we next compare the profitability of selling and
servicization.
Proposition 16. Suppose the firm can sell two vertically differentiated products. Servicization
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is more profitable than selling strategy if and only if
(i) r >
√
(1−β)(α4+β−2α2β)
(α2+β−2αβ)2 , h1(α, β) in R1.
(ii) r >
√
α4+β−2α2β
(1−β)β , h2(α, β) in R2.
(iii) r > 1 in R3.
In addition h1, h2 > 1.
The proposition shows that when the firm can sell a product line, servicization is more
profitable only when the firm has a higher operating efficiency than the consumers. Otherwise,
selling strategy is more profitable. Although, servicizing firm can customize the use levels for
each individual consumer segments, the level of customization is limited because same product
is offered to both consumer segments. On the other hand, selling firm can control the consumer
use levels more freely by designing two products.
Although selling a product line is more profitable for the same operating efficiencies, in
practice, the firm may have a higher operating efficiency. In that case, servicization may,
in fact, be more profitable. Figure 3.5 illustrates how the profit gap between two strategies
change with respect to the mass of the high-end segment (which is a proxy for the relative
profitability of low-end segment, i.e., αβ .):
%∆ = 100× pi
pl
r − piv
piplr
,
where piplr and piv represents the profits of selling a product line and servicization, respectively.
In Figure 3.5a, selling strategy is more attractive than servicization since selling and servi-
cization strategies have same operational efficiencies as indicated in Proposition 16. However,
the advantage of selling strategy over servicization is small, unless the relative profitability
of low-end segment is moderate, that is, αβ ratio is close to the boundary between R1
pl and
R2pl regions. In fact, higher operating efficiency of the firm may overcome the additional
segmentation benefit of selling and servicization may yield a higher profit when αβ ratio is suffi-
ciently high or low. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.5b: servicization is more profitable when
β > 0.28 or β < 0.02; otherwise, selling is more profitable. Essentially, selling a product line is
more effective when the low-end segment has a low profitability potential (low α and high β).
Therefore, in R1pl, the profit gap between selling and servicization increases as αβ decreases.
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Figure 3.5: Relative profititability of servicizing a single product to selling two differentiated
products. (α = 0.6)
However, in R2pl, servicizing firm serves only the high-end segment and lower profitability of
low-end segment only hurts the selling firm.
Firms can achieve segmentation by designing and selling differentiated products. Our re-
sults in this section shows that servicization can be an alternative to this strategy. Segmenting
the market through servicization can be more valuable when the fixed cost of designing an
additional product variant is very high. Furthermore, many manufacturing firms already have
an established aftermarket services infrastructure to provide variety of services to their cus-
tomers. For these firms, segmentation by servicization can be a more attractive and cheaper
business practice compared to designing and selling additional product variants.
3.7 Conclusion
We study when servicization increases profitability and product durability, and decreases the
environmental impact. Even though there are anecdotal evidences that servicization has po-
tential to achieve these outcomes, this problem has not been studied before. By characterizing
the equilibrium decisions of a monopolist serving a heterogeneous consumer base with endoge-
nous product use and product durability, we show that servicization can be more profitable
even when it is operationally inefficient. This is because servicizing firm can utilize product
use information in pricing to differentiate the consumer segments.
A commonly held belief is that servicization increases the product durability because it
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increases the firm’s responsibility toward its product. We show that this intuition is true when
the firm serves same consumer segments under selling and servicization strategies. However,
when the firm targets additional consumer segments under servicization, product durability
may be lower than that of selling strategy.
In order to asses the environmental impact of servicization, we need to consider two factors:
relative operating efficiency of servicization and relative use impact of the product. When the
relative operating efficiency of servicization is high, servicization can be more environmentally
friendly for products with low use impact relative to their production and disposal impacts. On
the other hand, when the relative operating efficiency of servicization is low, servicization can
be more environmentally friendly for products with high use impact relative to their production
and disposal impacts.
We also study the impact of servicization on the consumer and the social surplus. We show
that servicization may decrease both the consumer and the social surplus even when the firm
is more efficient in maintaining the product than consumers.
It is worth mentioning some of the limitations of our work. Although in some examples
of the servicization pooling the resources may be an option (such as ZipCar), we do not
consider resource pooling. With resource pooling, the firm can serve more consumers with fewer
products. However, resource pooling is not feasible in many other examples of servicization
such as in carpets (Interface Inc.). Finally, we do not consider the product recovery options
such as remanufacturing and recycling. In reality, the firm can undertake these activities to
decrease its production cost or reach out secondary markets.
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CHAPTER 4
RESPONSIBLE SOURCING VIA VERTICAL INTEGRATION: THE
IMPACTS OF SCRUTINY, DEMAND EXTERNALITY, AND CROSS
SOURCING
4.1 Introduction
Deadly collapse of the Rana Plaza factory in Bangladesh (New York Times, 2013), allegations
of sweatshop and child labor at factories of Nike suppliers (Daily Mail, 2011) are all examples
of news that brought much media attention to firms’ sourcing practices in emerging economies.
A major advantage, if not the most important one, of sourcing from emerging economies, is
the lower operating and labor costs. It is not uncommon that such cost advantages come at
the expense of social responsibility compliance. Suppliers may engage in unethical practices
to lower costs and squeeze more profits. Ineffective regulatory enforcements in these countries
also fuel noncompliance.
In recent years, rising awareness among the general public about corporate social respon-
sibilities makes it inevitable for firms to take into account consequences of practices of their
suppliers. The publicity of social responsibility violations may impact not only a firm’s image,
but also that of other firms in the industry, partly due to the general opinion that firms in
one industry tend to procure from the same set of suppliers, which are often concentrated
in a few countries. In fact, in some cases a critical input to the production process is only
available from a specific geographic region. For example, ebony wood is widely used in the fin-
gerboards of high-end guitars. Unfortunately, ebony is an endangered species, and can only be
harvested in bulk in one country—the small eastern African country of Cameroon. Therefore,
a responsibility violation at one firm may tarnish the images of other firms in the industry,
and driving down demand for all, even in the absence of any concrete evidence. We refer to
this phenomenon as the negative externality of a violation. On the other hand, when one
firm’s violation is exposed, disappointed consumers may potentially switch to other competing
firms, leading to increased demand for competitors. We refer to this phenomenon as the poise
externality of a violation. Interestingly, when governments and NGOs publish audit reports,
they may influence the nature of the violation externality by either emphasizing the practice of
the entire industry, or targeting a specific firm’s practices. It is unclear whether governments
and NGOs should create positive or negative externalities.
A common way to mitigate supplier responsibility risks is to increase auditing efforts (Dis-
telhorst et al., 2014). However, using data from Nike’s audits of its suppliers, Locke et al.
(2007) found that auditing is ineffective in improving suppliers’ labor standards. In this chap-
ter, we propose another strategy—vertical integration. For example, Taylor Guitars, a major
guitar manufacturer, purchased an ebony mill in Cameroon to ensure that ebony is harvested
in an environmentally sustainable way (Los Angeles Times, 2012). In addition to ensuring
compliance in the sourcing process, vertical integration also offers the possibility of supply-
ing component to competitors. a firm may benefit from doing so in two ways: first, it is an
additional revenue source. Second, in the case of negative violation externality, the firm can
protect its own brand from being tarnished due to a competitor’s malpractice. Modeling the
above aspects, in this chapter, we aim to answer the following questions:
1. How do probabilities of detection and violation externalities influence manufacturers’
responsibility decisions?
2. What is the impact of cross sourcing on firms’ operational and compliance decisions?
This chapter contributes to the growing body of literature on socially responsible sourcing.
Guo et al. (2014) study the sourcing decision of a buyer choosing between responsible and risky
suppliers. They find that efforts to improve responsibility that focus on consumers may actually
encourage risky sourcing. Plambeck and Taylor (2012) and Chen and Lee (2014) investigate
the mechanisms that may incentivize suppliers to comply with responsibility standards. We
contribute to this stream of research by exploring vertical integration as a strategy to promote
socially responsible sourcing, and by considering the impacts of both negative and positive
externalities.
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4.2 Model
We study the vertical integration and CSR decisions of manufacturers in two competing sup-
ply chains selling a product to a consumer market. Each supply chain consists of a man-
ufacturer (i = A,B) and a supplier (i = A,B). Each manufacturer may source a critical
component/product from an outside supplier. We assume that firm A has vertical integration
capabilities. Firm B cannot vertically integrate and has to procure from an outside supplier.
The terms manufacturer (she) and supplier (he) are used to describe the flow of the material
through the supply chain. The manufacturer may not have any production capability and
supplier may fully carry out the entire production process. We analyze the impact of indus-
try structure, driven by the manufacturers’ vertical integration/disintegration decisions, and
the impact of CSR externality on the manufacturers’ choice of social responsibility. Next, we
describe our demand model, CSR externality, and firms’ characteristics and decisions.
The available outside suppliers are not reliable and they may not follow the social respon-
sibility standards. A violation may be detected with an exogenous probability σ ∈ (0, 1). The
probability of detection σ depends on how aggressive the NGOs or governments in their au-
diting efforts to identify the violations. Firm A can avoid responsibility violations, i.e., σ = 0,
by vertical integrating and investing in CSR. It still faces the same probability of detection
σ ∈ (0, 1) as in the disintegrated supply chain case, if it vertically integrates but does not
invest in CSR. The wholesale price of the procured component from outside suppliers is w. If
firm A vertically integrates, it incurs a fixed cost f . Firm A, once vertically integrated, can
continue to cut corners to increase its profit margin or choose to comply with environmental
and labor standards. In the former case, it incurs a marginal cost of production, for the critical
component, normalized to 0. In the latter case, the cost is cr > w.
Firms sell the product to a market of fixed total size 2Q at an exogenous price p. Firms have
equal market share Q if no violation is detected in the industry. If a firm sources from a supplier
that experiences a violation, there are two potential consequences on the consumer demand:
i) a decrease in the firm’s demand, ii) a decrease/increase in the competitor’s demand. The
former results from a fraction of consumers abandoning the firm after the violation detection
at its supplier. Examples include but not limited to: Apple, Nike and Mango. Specifically,
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we assume that the consumer demand for the firm becomes (1 + β)Q where β ∈ (−1, 0). The
latter derives from indirect impact of a violation on the competitor’s demand. This indirect
impact can be positive or negative. It will be positive if some of the consumers exited the
firm’s market switch to the competitor. It can be negative if the violation hurts the industries
reputation. For example, after a mercury spill in Peru by a transportation contractor for
Newmont Mining Corporation. BHP Billiton is affected by increased hostility toward mining
companies although it does not have any connections to Newmont (Puffer and Wesley, 2012).
More specifically, we assume that the demand of the competitor becomes (1 + α)Q, where
α ∈ (β,−β). α > β because the indirect impact cannot be stronger than the direct impact.
α < −β because number of customers switching to the competitor cannot be larger than the
number of customers abandoning the firm. However, if a violation is detected at the both
supply chains, then the demands of both firms become (1 + β)Q.
The sequence of events is as follows: First, firm A decides whether to vertically integrate
or stay disintegrated. If firm A vertically integrates, it decides whether to become responsible
or stay normal. After these strategic decisions, a violation may be detected at each of the
suppliers with probability σ. Finally, the manufacturers produces, and consumers arrive and
purchase the product.
In Section 4.4, we allow vertically integrated firm to sell the component to its competitor.
More specifically, if firm A vertically integrates, then it has the option to sell to firm B at a
wholesale price of wc which is a decision variable. This stage takes place after firm A decides
on its responsibility choice. Then, the firm B decides whether to source from the integrated
manufacturer or from outside supplier. Selling a critical component to your competitor may
be viable strategy in some industries. For example, Taylor guitar has been selling ebony to
Gibson guitar after purchasing the Cameroon’s largest ebony mill. Similarly, Samsung, which
is a major competitor of Apple, is the main supplier of microprocessor chips for Iphone and
Ipad. We compare the cases where cross sourcing is viable and not viable to determine how
different industry dynamics may impact CSR.
Let (D,N), (V,N), (V,R) denote the three possible strategies available to a firm where
first index refers to supply chain structure and second index refers whether the supplier is
responsible or normal. We use V if a firm is vertically integrated, and D if it stays disintegrated.
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We use N if the supplier is prone to responsibility violations, and R if the supplier is fully
compliant with the environmental and labor standards. Note that if a firm is disintegrated,
the available suppliers are only the normal ones. Let pii.|. denote firm i’s profit given the
competitor’s strategy. Then, we can write the profit functions for these three strategies as
follows:
piidn|dn = pi
i
dn|vn = (p− w)Q(σ2(1 + β) + σ(1− σ)(1 + β) + (1− σ)σ(1 + α) + (1− σ)2) (4.1)
piidn|vr = (p− w)Q(σ(1 + β) + (1− σ)) (4.2)
piivn|dn = pQ(σ
2(1 + β) + σ(1− σ)(1 + β) + (1− σ)σ(1 + α) + (1− σ)2)− f (4.3)
piivr|dn = (p− cr)Q(σ(1 + α) + (1− σ))− f (4.4)
4.3 Optimal Strategy In the Absence of Cross Sourcing
This section presents the optimal strategy of firm A when cross sourcing is not an option.
We solve the model using backward induction. In order to eliminate the trivial cases, we
assume that fixed cost f is small enough such that staying disintegrated does not dominate
(V,N) and (V,R). Specific threshold values on the fixed cost are stated in Appendix C. We
also assume cost of responsible sourcing is small enough, i.e., cr < − βp2(β+2) . This condition is
slightly stronger than the condition that ensures that staying normal after vertical integration
does not dominate responsible sourcing. These two assumptions essentially eliminates the
uninteresting cases. Finally, we make the technical assumption that β > −12 which means
that a firm does not lose more than half of its consumer base. Although, this is mainly for
tractability purposes, it is also practically meaningful because it is not very likely that a firm
would lose more than the half of its market after publicity of a responsibility violation.
Next proposition establishes the optimum strategy of firm A when externality is strongly
negative, i.e., β < α < βp+crp−cr ,. Proposition 18 gives the optimum strategy for weakly
negative and positive externality, i.e., min{ cr+β(p−w)p−cr ,
β(p−w)
−cr+2p+w} < α < −β. Note that
βp+cr
p−cr < min{
cr+β(p−w)
p−cr ,
β(p−w)
−cr+2p+w} and they are both negative values. These two extreme
cases are sufficient to highlight the fundamental differences on optimal strategy for different
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α values. As α increases from βp+crp−cr to min{
cr+β(p−w)
p−cr ,
β(p−w)
−cr+2p+w} (when α is moderately neg-
ative), the optimal strategy slowly changes from one extreme case to another, and does not
provide any additional insights. Nevertheless for completeness, the optimal strategy for this α
range is stated in the Appendix C.
Proposition 17. Suppose β < α < βp+crp−cr ,
(1.) When f ≤ Qw(1 + β), for σ1vr,vn ≤ σ ≤ σ2vr,vn, firm A chooses (V,R), and for
0 < σ < σ1vr,vn and σ
2
vr,vn < σ < 1 chooses VN.
(2.) When Qw(1 + β) < f < f1, for σ
1
vr,vn ≤ σ ≤ σ2vr,vn, firm A chooses (V,R), for
0 < σ < σ1vr,vn and σ
2
vr,vn < σ ≤ σ2vn,dn chooses (V,N), and for σvn,dn < σ < 1 firm chooses
(D,N).
(3.) When f1 ≤ f < f2, for σ1vr,vn ≤ σ ≤ σvr,dn, firm A chooses (V,R), and for 0 < σ <
σ1vr,vn, firm chooses (V,N), and for σ
2
vr,dn < σ < 1 chooses (D,N).
(4.) When f2 ≤ f < min{Qw, fm}, for σ1vr,dn ≤ σ ≤ σ2vr,dn, firm A chooses (V,R), and for
0 < σ ≤ σvn,dn chooses (V,N), for σvn,dn < σ < σ1vr,dn and σ2vr,dn < σ < 1 chooses (D,N).
Figure 4.1 depicts the proposition graphically. The proposition reveals several interesting
insights. Neither responsibility decision nor supply chain strategy are necessarily monotone
in probability of detection σ. When fixed cost is small, it is more profitable to vertically
integrate for firm A. However, whether it will choose responsible sourcing depends on the
probability of detection. Lower probability of detection leads to normal sourcing because
the firm has less incentive for responsible sourcing. As probability of detection σ increases,
responsible sourcing becomes the optimal strategy because the possibility that a violation
would be public and potential consumer would exit firm A’s market increases. However,
when probability of detection is very high, firm A revert to normal sourcing. This is counter
intuitive because one would expect that higher probability of detection should discourage firms
from noncompliance with the environmental and labor standards. In fact, this is true when
externality α is weakly negative or positive that we show in Proposition 18. The intuition for
this is that high probability of detection makes compliance with the labor and environmental
standards less effective in protecting the brand image. This is because even firm A chooses
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to meet the compliance standards, the competitor is very likely to be caught, and this would
in turn hurt firm A because of strong negative externality. As a result, firm A benefits from
compliance when probability of detection is at a medium range. Otherwise, firm A is better
off not meeting the compliance standards.
As fixed cost of vertical integration increases, staying disintegrated may be an optimal
strategy. Interestingly, when f < f2, firm A chooses (D,N) only if probability of detection is
very high, as parts (2.) and (3.) of the proposition state. Essentially, (D,N) replaces (V,N) at
high probability of detection values for this region as fixed cost f increases. The advantage of
(V,N) over (D,N) is that the firm can produce at a cheaper rate . This advantage decreases
as probability of detection increases. As a result, (D,N) becomes more profitable at high
probability of detection values.
Part (4.) of the proposition shows that not only responsibility choice but also the supply
chain structure may not be monotone in the probability of detection when fixed cost f is high.
Staying disintegrated is optimal for medium-low and high probability of detection values, but
vertical integration is optimal for low and medium-high probability of detection values.
The relative weight of impact of a violation and production cost leads to this optimal
structure. When probability of detection is not high, impact of a violation, either at the firm’s
own supply chain or its competitor’s supply chain, has less impact on the firm’s expected profit
than the production cost. Therefore, the firm does not source responsibly. When it comes
to choosing between (V,N) and (D,N), as explained above, increasing probability of detection
decreases the cost advantage of vertical integration. Because of this, staying disintegrated is
more profitable for medium-low probability of detection values but vertical integration is more
profitable for low probability of detection values.
When probability of detection is high, the impact of a violation becomes the prominent
concern for firm A’s profit. Hence, firm A can benefit from choosing responsible sourcing
when probability of detection is not too high. When probability of detection is very high
strong negative externality undermines the benefit of being responsible, as a result firm chooses
(D,N).
Overall, the proposition suggests that higher probability of detection may decrease the
incentives for compliance when externality is strongly negative. Therefore, increasing NGO
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or government efforts to detect the violations of labor and environmental standards may lead
to unintended consequences if violations at one firm result in shrinks the other firm’s market
significantly. Next, we research the optimal strategy when externality is weakly negative or
positive.
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Figure 4.1: Firm A’s optimal supply chain structure and its responsibility decision when
externality is strongly negative. Dashed lines show the thresholds on fixed cost. (p = 3, w =
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Proposition 18. Suppose min{ cr+β(p−w)p−cr ,
β(p−w)
−cr+2p+w} < α < β,
(1.) When f ≤ f2, for σ1vr,vn ≤ σ < 1, firm A chooses (V,R), and for 0 < σ < σ1vr,vn
chooses (V,N).
(2.) When f2 < f < Qw, for σ
2
vr,dn ≤ σ < 1, firm A chooses (V,R), for 0 < σ ≤ σvn,dn
chooses (V,N), for σvn,dn < σ < σ
2
vr,dn, chooses (D,N).
Figure 4.2 illustrates the proposition. When fixed cost is low, vertical integration is al-
ways the optimal strategy. The firm chooses between (V,R) and (V,N). When probability of
detection is low, the firm prefers normal sourcing because low probability of detection does
not provide strong incentives to invest in responsibility. In fact, as probability of detection
increases, the incentive becomes stronger and the firm chooses responsible sourcing.
When we compare Proposition 17 and 18, we see that when externality is weakly negative or
positive, unlike strongly negative externality, high probability of detection always incentivizes
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compliance. To understand this difference we need to look how the direction and strength
of externality impacts firm A’s decisions. Positive externality always encourages compliance
because if firm B gets caught, firm A benefits from influx of consumers to its market. Even the
externality is negative, if it is weak, the firm prefers compliance at high probability of detection
values because the negative impact due to a violation at the competitor’ supply chain is much
smaller than the negative impact due to a violations at its own supply chain.
Our results in this section establishes how CSR externality plays a role in firm’s choice
of vertical integration vs. disintegration, and compliance vs. non-compliance. In the next
section, we research how these results change when firm A can sell the critical component to
firm B if it vertically integrates.
4.4 Equilibrium With Cross Sourcing
In this section, we extend our model and assume that firm A can sell the critical component
to its competitor firm B when it vertically integrates with its supplier. We refer to this
strategy as cross sourcing. In this case there are 5 different possible equilibrium outcomes.
For brevity, Proposition 19 presents the result for f = 0. Then, we use Figure 4.4 to show how
increasing fixed cost f impacts the equilibrium structure. We refer readers to Appendix C
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Equilibrium (V,N)c (V,R)c
wc
αp(σ−1)σ+σw(α+β)+ασ2(−w)+w
βσ+1 w − βσ(p− w)
Table 4.1: Equilibrium wholesale price
for the complete analytical characterization with a nonnegative fixed cost. If cross sourcing
arises in the equilibrium, we attach subscript c to the descriptions of the equilibrium. For
example, (V,R)c means firm A vertically integrates, complies with the environmental and labor
standards, and sells to firm B. This notation is also sufficient to describe firm B’s equilibrium
structure, which is (D,R)c in this case, hence we will use only firm A’s equilibrium outcome
to describe a particular equilibrium.
Proposition 19. Suppose that vertically integrated firm A can sell the critical component to
firm B. The equilibrium wholesale prices are provided in Table 4.1. The following characterizes
the equilibrium regions.
(1.) When β < α ≤ α1, for σvrc,vn ≤ σ < 1, firm A chooses (V,R)c, and for 0 < σ < σvrc,vn
chooses (V,N)c.
(2.) When α1 < α ≤ α2, for σvrc,vn ≤ σ < 1, firm A chooses (V,R)c, for 0 < σ ≤ σvnc,vn
chooses (V,N)c, and for σvnc,vn < σ < σvrc,vn chooses (V,N).
(3.) When −α2 < α ≤ −cr+(−β)(p−w)+wp−cr , for σvrc,vr ≤ σ < 1, firm A chooses (V,R)c, for
σvr,vn ≤ σ < σvrc,vr chooses (V,R), for 0 < σ ≤ σvnc,vn chooses (V,N)c, and for σvnc,vn < σ <
σvr,vn chooses (V,N).
(4.) When −cr+(−β)(p−w)+wp−cr < α < −β, for σvr,vn ≤ σ < 1 chooses (V,R), for 0 < σ ≤
σvnc,vn chooses (V,N)c, and for σvnc,vn < σ < σvr,vn chooses (V,N).
Furthermore, α1, α2 > 0.
Figure 4.3 depicts the proposition graphically. The proposition indicates that when ex-
ternality is negative or weakly positive firm A always finds it profitable to sell to its com-
petitor. To understand this we need to look how risk and expected sales associated with
it change by cross sourcing. If firm A vertically integrates but does not become responsi-
ble, and does not sell to firm B, in this case expected sales of both firm A and firm B are
E[Si(V,N)] = Q(−ασ2 + (α + β)σ + 1) where E[Sij ] denotes the firm i’s expected sales to the
market for equilibrium structure j. Instead if firm A is to sell to firm B, their expected sales
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Figure 4.3: Equilibrium when firm A can sell to firm B and f = 0. (p = 3, w = 18 , cr =
1
4 , Q = 1, β = −38)
would be E[Si(V,N)c ] = Q(1+σβ). Firstly, suppose that externality is negative. It is straightfor-
ward to see that E[Si(V,N)c ] > E[S
i
(V,N)]. This shows that by selling to firm B, firm A increases
the expected sales, by decreasing the violation risk, of both itself and firm B. Therefore, firm
B prefers to procure from firm A by paying a premium (wc > w if and only if externality is
negative), and firm A prefers to sell to firm B because it can both decrease the violation risk
and benefit from extra revenue stream due to component sales.
Similar insights holds when firm A decides to comply with the environmental and labor
standards. In this case E[SA(V,R)c ] = Q > Q(1 + ασ) = E[S
A
(V,R)] and E[S
B
(V,R)c
] = Q >
Q(1 + βσ) = E[SB(V,R)]. Therefore, cross sourcing increases the expected sales for both firm A
and B as long as externality is negative. Therefore, firm A finds selling to firm B, and firm B
finds procuring from firm A more profitable.
When we compare this region to the one in Proposition 17, we observe that when externality
is negative, at high probability of detection values, non-compliance cannot be an equilibrium
anymore. Furthermore, firm A does not only comply with the law but also helps the entire
industry become responsible. Hence, whether it is beneficial to increase the pressure on firms
depends on the industry dynamics. If cross sourcing is a viable option, then for NGOs and
governments auditing the suppliers more frequently and increasing the chances to find the
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violation always increases the compliance. Otherwise, it decreases the compliance.
When externality is positive, it is easy to see from inequalities above, cross sourcing always
decreases the expected sales of firm A. Then, the question is why cross sourcing always take
place when α is weakly positive. Although, cross sourcing decreases the expected sales, it
provides additional revenue opportunity to firm A. However, when externality exceeds a certain
threshold, i.e., α > α1, the reduction in expected sales may be too large to justify the additional
revenue. In that case, firm A may be better off not selling to firm B, but instead capturing
the consumers that defect firm B in the case of a violation.
When α1 < α ≤ −cr+(−β)(p−w)+wp−cr , we observe that (V,N) and (V,R) may arise in the
equilibrium at medium probability of detection values. Interestingly, too low and too high
probability of detection σ lead to cross sourcing. When probability of detection is too high, it
is more profitable for the compliant firm A to sell to firm B because firm B is willing to accept a
higher wholesale price wc to avoid the detection risk. Note that wc is increasing in σ when the
equilibrium is (V,R)c. When probability of detection is too low, firm A prefers not to comply
with the environmental and labor standards. In this case, cross sourcing decreases the expected
sales of both firms, as explained before, because the externality is positive. However, firm A
benefits from additional sales to firm B and firm B benefits from purchasing at a lower rate,
i.e., w < wc. Which of these two opposite forces has more value depends on the probability
of detection. Note that limσ→0E[Si(V,N)] − E[Si(V,N)c ] = 0 and this difference increases as σ
increases when σ < σvr,vn. Therefore, when probability of detection is too low, the additional
revenue due to cross sourcing is higher than the reduction in expected sales, and firm A sells
to firm B.
Finally, when α > −cr+(−β)(p−w)+wp−cr , the proposition shows that cross sourcing does not
arise when firm B is responsible. This is because the size of consumers who may defect from
firm B’s market to purchase from firm A is to high that firm A would not prevent this by
selling to firm B.
Figure 4.4 illustrates how the equilibrium changes when fixed cost is nonnegative. When
fixed cost is sufficiently high, for firm A staying disintegrated can be a viable strategy. The
graphs show that when α is positive, and probability of detection is at a medium level (D,N)
may arise in the equilibrium. This structure is somewhat similar to Proposition 18, and the
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4 , Q = 1, β = −38)
intuition is similar to the one given for this proposition. Contrary to the without cross sourcing
model, in this case (D,N) cannot be in the equilibrium when externality is negative because
benefits of cross sourcing outweighs the fixed cost. Note that we have assumed that fixed cost
is low enough such that (D,N) does not dominate (V,N) or (D,N). Therefore, these insights
holds as long as fixed cost is not too high. Otherwise, too high fixed cost would make any
vertical integration strategy worse off.
4.5 Discussion
In this section we further discuss our results to see how different parameters affect CSR.
One of the factors that governments and NGOs can influence is the probability of detection
σ. Governments can increase the probability of detection by increasing their auditing effort
while NGO can be more aggressive in their research to evaluate a firm or an industry. In
the previous section, we commented on how these efforts can impact CSR. We showed that
higher probability of detection may disincentivize compliance when cross sourcing cannot be
employed and the externality α is strongly negative.
Another factor that governments and NGOs may influence is the externality. They can do
so by structuring the violation announcements. For example, the following is a quote from a
report on Amazon forests in Brazil released by Greenpeace:
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“The cattle sector in the Brazilian Amazon is the largest driver of deforestation in the
world, responsible for one in every eight hectares destroyed globally. Efforts to halt global
deforestation emissions must tackle this sector.”
Greenpeace blames the entire cattle industry without making a distinction among any of
the suppliers or their buyers. Such an announcement would be expected to create a negative
externality. On the other hand, announcement could be made in a more distinguishing fashion
to highlight the firms complying and not complying with the environmental and labor stan-
dards. This may potentially create a positive externality for presumably compliant firms. To
see which way strategy incentivizes firms to comply we analyze how externality changes the
firms actions. Next proposition presents the results when cross sourcing cannot be employed.
Proposition 20. Suppose that cross sourcing is not a viable strategy, then increasing exter-
nality increases the likelihood of compliance.
When it is not feasible for firm A to sell to firm B, decreasing externality reduces the size
of the region where firm A complies with the environmental and labor standards. Negative
externality discourages the compliance because firm A cannot reap the fruits of compliance.
Therefore, in order to encourage compliance government agencies and NGO should highlight
the firm that comply with the environmental and labor standards. However, this holds when
vertically integrated firm cannot sell the components to its competitors. Now we turn our
attention to the case where firm A may sell the component to its competitor.
Proposition 21. Suppose that cross sourcing is a viable strategy, then increasing externality
increases the likelihood that both firm would comply with the environmental and labor standards
if and only if β < α ≤ 4β2w(2p−w)(2cr−p)(p−w)(4cr−w)(4cr+4βp−(2β+1)w) , or
4β2w(2p−w)(2cr−p)
(p−w)(4cr−w)(4cr+4βp−(2β+1)w) < α ≤ α1
and f < f1.
Note that 4β
2w(2p−w)(2cr−p)
(p−w)(4cr−w)(4cr+4βp−(2β+1)w) is positive. Cross sourcing leads to more subtle
results compared to Proposition 20. As long as externality is not strongly positive, increasing
externality increases the chance that firm A would be compliant and would sell to firm B. This
behavior would make the entire industry comply with the environmental and labor standards.
However, when externality is strongly positive, increasing externality may in fact reduce firm
A’s incentives to sell to firm B which in turn leaves firm B with the only option to procure from
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a supplier with questionable practices. This also contrast with our previous results where we
show that increasing externality always increases the compliance when cross sourcing cannot
be employed.
To understand the intuition, suppose that α is low enough and only (V,N)c and (V,R)c
can arise in the equilibrium (This is true when β < α ≤ 4β2w(2p−w)(2cr−p)(p−w)(4cr−w)(4cr+4βp−(2β+1)w) , or
4β2w(2p−w)(2cr−p)
(p−w)(4cr−w)(4cr+4βp−(2β+1)w) < α ≤ α1 and f < f1). In this case, as externality α increases,
the wholesale price that firm B is willing to accept decreases if firm A does not comply with
the law, i.e., dwcdα < 0. This is because firm B becomes less concerned about the spillover from
firm A’s irresponsible behavior. However, when firm A is responsible, firm B does not face any
externality threat, and hence, increasing externality does not affect the wholesale price under
(V,R)c equilibrium. This causes (V,R)c region expand, and (V,N)c region to shrink.
On the other hand, when externality is strongly positive, firms prefers to capture the
defecting consumers from their competitors in the event of a violation detection. As a result,
cross sourcing becomes less valuable for both firms, and (V,R)c region shrinks.
4.6 Conclusion
Globalization has led many firms to outsource their production to emerging economies. Sourc-
ing from emerging economies may have direct cost benefits. However, this cost benefit may
come in the expense of corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR violation hurts the brand
image of a company and may reduce its market size. CSR violation may also affect the com-
panies that have nothing to do with the company where the violation is found. This effect
can be positive or negative. If the consumers believes that the violation is prevalent in the
industry, it would be negative. Otherwise, if they conclude that the violation is specific to a
firm, the effect would be positive because more consumer would prefer to buy from trustworthy
company. In some cases, the only way to prevent these CSR violations and their impact on
demand is to vertically integrate with your supplier. We research these different dynamics to
see when firms vertically integrate to prevent/benefit from industry-wide CSR violations.
Our results indicate that whether governments and NGOs should be more aggressive
against the firms depends on the externality and viability of the cross sourcing. When cross
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sourcing is not a viable strategy, medium probability of detection leads firms with vertical in-
tegration capability to comply with the law. However, higher or lower probability of detection
may lead to irresponsible behavior. On the other hand, when cross sourcing is a viable strategy
higher probability of detection always incentivize behaviors that are more aligned with social
responsibility.
We also shed a light on how governments and NGOs should design their announcements
of violations to incentivize higher levels of compliance by the firms. We show that when cross
sourcing cannot be employed, announcements should highlight the firms with presumably
responsible practices. As the externality increases, capable firms are more likely to adopt
responsible practices. On the other hand when cross sourcing may be used by the firm,
strongly positive externality may lead to less responsible behaviors.
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APPENDIX A
COMPETITIVE QUALITY CHOICE AND REMANUFACTURING
In this section, we present additional results and proofs for Chapter 2
A.1 Benchmarks
A.1.1 Monopoly No-Remanufacturing (NR) Benchmark
The monopoly no-remanufacturing benchmark considers a monopolist OEM who only sells the
new product. The OEM decides on the quality and quantity of its product by solving the
following problem
max
qn,s
piOEM (qn, s) = [s(1− qn)− βs2]qn
s.t qn, s ≥ 0
Firstly, notice that, for s ≥ 1β , the profit function is negative. Hence, the optimum quality
satisfies s < 1β .
∂2piOEM
∂q2n
= −2s < 0. Hence, it is concave in qn and the optimum is q∗n(s) =
1
2(1 − sβ). If we plug this into the profit function, we have piOEM (s) = 14s(−1 + sβ)2. This
function is unimodal for s < 1β and has its maximum at s
∗ = 13β . Hence, q
∗
n =
1
3 and
pi∗OEM =
1
27β . From the optimal quality and the new product quantity, it can be found that
consumer surplus is 154β and the social surplus is
1
18β for the no-remanufacturing benchmark.
A.1.2 Monopoly Remanufacturing Benchmark
The monopoly remanufacturing benchmark considers a monopolist OEM who may sell both
the new product and the remanufactured products. The OEM decides on the quality of the
new products and the quantity of new and remanufactured products by solving the following
problem
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max
qn,qr,s
piOEM (qn, qr, s) = [s(1−qn − δqr)− βs2]qn + [δs(1− qn − qr)− αβs2]qr
s.t qn, s ≥ 0
qn ≥ qr ≥ 0
We first optimize for qn and qr. In this case, the Hessian of piOEM is
 −2s −2sδ
−2sδ −2sδ
.
Hence, it is jointly concave in qn and qr. From the first order conditions, it is straightforward to
show that the interior solution is qr =
βs(δ−α)
2(1−δ)δ and qn =
βs(α−1)+1−δ
2(1−δ) . It can be seen that, qr ≤ 0
if and only if α ≥ δ; therefore, the OEM does not remanufacture for αδ ≥1 and remanufactures
otherwise. If it does not remanufacture, all the decisions are same as in the no-remanufacturing
benchmark. From 0 < qr < qn, this case applies if s <
δ(−1+δ)
β(α−2δ+αδ) , s0. Similarly, if the core
constraint binds, qn = qr =
1+δ−βs(1+α)
2(1+3δ) and this case applies if s ≥ s0. It is easy to see
that in equilibrium s < 1+δβ(1+α) . Now we can optimize for quality. For
α
δ < 1, the profit, as a
function of s (piOEM (s)), is a piecewise function and changes characteristic at s0. piOEM (s) is
continuous at s0. It can be shown that for s ≥ s0, piOEM is a unimodal function and has only
one maximizer at s = 1+δ3(1+α)β . Similarly, piOEM is either unimodal or an increasing function for
s < s0. If it is unimodal, maximizer is s = −−2δ+2δ
2+
√
(−1+δ)δ(3α2−6αδ+δ(−1+4δ))
3β(α2+δ−2αδ) , s1. Using
these, it can be shown that if 0 < αδ ≤ 1−5δ2δ2−5δ−1 , the core constraint binds and s∗ = 1+δ3(1+α)β ,
q∗n = q∗r =
1+δ
3(1+3δ) . Note that, in this case optimum quality is higher than the NR benchmark.
On the other hand if 1−5δ
2δ2−5δ−1 <
α
δ < 1, the core constraint does not bind and the optimum
solution is s∗ = s1, q∗r =
βs∗(δ−α)
2(1−δ)δ and q
∗
n =
βs∗(α−1)+1−δ
2(1−δ) . Similar to the previous case, it can
be shown that optimal quality is higher than the NR benchmark.
For this model, by some algebra it can be shown that CS = piOEM/2. Hence, if the profit
increases, CS and SS increase as well and vice-versa. Notice that, under remanufacturing,
profit cannot be lower than the no-remanufacturing case. Hence, CS and SS is more than or
equal to no-remanufacturing.
Following proposition states the effect of OEM remanufacturing on environment by com-
paring it to the NR benchmark.
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Region Condition q∗n q
∗
r
R1exo α
δ
≥ 1+βsf
2βsf
1−βsf
2
0
R3exo
(3βsf−1+δ)
(2+δ)βsf
< α
δ
<
1+βsf
2βsf
2−δ+βsf (α−2)
4−δ
δ+βsf (δ−2α)
δ(4−δ)
R4exo 0 < α
δ
≤ (3βsf−1+δ)
(2+δ)βsf
1−βsf
(2+δ)
1−βsf
(2+δ)
Table A.1: Equilibrium when product quality is exogenously given
Proposition 22. The following compares environmental impact of the monopoly remanufac-
turing benchmark to the NR benchmark.
• When the OEM does not remanufacture, the environmental impact is the same as the
NR benchmark level.
• When the OEM remanufactures but does not remanufacture all available cores, the envi-
ronmental impact is lower than the NR benchmark level if and only if eE <
(−1+3α−2δ)δ
3(α−δ) +√
(−1+δ)δ(3α2−6αδ+δ(−1+4δ))
3(α−δ) , rm.
• When the OEM remanufactures all available cores, the environmental impact is lower
than the NR benchmark level if and only if eE <
2δ
1+δ .
When the OEM remanufactures maximum eE ratios below which remanufacturing improves
environmental impact stated in this Proposition is always higher than that of the base model
stated in Proposition 5.
A.1.3 Exogenous Quality Benchmark
In the exogenous quality benchmark, the OEM sells the new product and the IR sells the
remanufactured product, but the quality level is fixed at sf . In this case, the OEM’s opti-
mization problem is maxqn piOEM (qn|sf ) and that of the IR is maxqr piIR(qr|sf ) subject to the
feasibility constraints. Table A.1 describes the equilibrium of this benchmark. In the proof of
proposition 1, we first solve the quantity game for a given quality level. Hence, proof of the
exogenous quality benchmark is included in there.
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A.2 Consumer and Social Welfare Results for Extensions to the Base Model
Preemptive Collection
In this section, we study CS and SS when the OEM can collect and dispose of the used cores
to compete with the IR. Figure A.1 is a representative illustration of the resulting CS and SS
levels from our numerical study.
When the cost-to-value ratio αδ is high (0.59 < α < 1), the OEM does not preemptively
collect cores and the equilibrium decisions are similar to those in the base model. Hence,
same as in our base model, the IR’s threat and actual entry can decrease the CS and the SS
compared to NR benchmark.
When the cost-to-value ratio is low (0 < α ≤ 0.59), the IR is a bigger threat and the OEM
relies on preemptive collection as a competitive strategy. The OEM decreases its total new
product quantity and collects all cores to deter the IR’s entry. This strategy decreases the CS
and SS significantly compared to NR benchmark. This result is also consistent with our base
model where we show that entry deterrence reduces both CS and SS.
In the exogenous quality benchmark, new product quality is kept at the NR benchmark
quality disregarding the OEM’s quality response to the IR’s threat as before. Figure A.1 shows
that when the OEM does not use preemptive collection strategy and the IR remanufactures
(i.e, cost-to-value ratio is high), the CS and SS are lower than the exogenous quality benchmark
as in the base model. However, when the OEM collects and disposes all available cores to deter
the IR’s entry (i.e, cost-to-value ratio is low), the CS and SS are higher than the exogenous
benchmark with a small margin. The reason is as follows: In this case, the OEM mainly relies
on collection of used cores to deter the IR’s entry. Having additional lever quality allows the
OEM to use collection strategy more efficiently in terms of the consumer surplus and firm’s
profits. Hence the CS and SS are higher than the exogenous quality benchmark.
A.3 Price Competition
Figure A.2 demonstrates our findings. It is well known that price competition leads to a more
intense competition and a higher CS and SS than quantity competition (Singh and Vives,
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Figure A.1: Comparison of Consumer and Social Surplus with NR and Exogenous Quality
Benchmarks when the OEM can collect and dispose used cores (α = 0.4, β = 1 and Exogenous
quality sf =
1
3β )
1994). Consistent with this fact, Figure A.2 shows that CS and SS are higher than the NR
benchmark when the OEM and the IR compete in prices. The Figure also illustrates that CS
and SS are lower than the exogenous quality benchmark (with NR benchmark quality). Thus,
similar to our base model, ignoring the OEM’s quality decision leads to overestimating the
benefits of remanufacturing for social welfare.
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Figure A.2: Comparison of Consumer and Social Surplus in Price competition with NR and
Exogenous Quality Benchmarks (δ = 0.4, β = 1 and Exogenous quality sf =
1
3β )
A.4 Alternative Remanufacturing Cost
In this section we study the CS and SS when the IR incurs an additional cost n independent
of the product quality level.
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Since the IR’s total unit remanufacturing cost is now βαs2 + n, IR’s competitive position
depends not only on the ratio αδ (as in the base model) but also on the quality-independent
cost component n. Specifically, the IR’s competitive position is strong when αδ and n are
simultaneously low.
In the base model we showed that when the IR’s competitive position is strong enough, the
CS and SS are always higher than the NR benchmark levels. Otherwise, the CS and SS are
lower than the NR benchmark levels (see Propositions 3 and 4). Figures A.3 and A.4 illustrate
that these results continue to hold in the presence of an additional quality-independent cost
component n. In Figure A.3, n is low (n = 0.02). On the same figure, when αδ is also low
(Given δ = 0.4, 0 < α < 0.59 for CS and 0 < α < 0.34 for SS), the IR is strong and the CS
and the SS are above the NR benchmark levels. On the other hand when n is high (n = 0.06)
as in Figure A.4 or αδ is high (Given δ = 0.4, α ≥ 0.59 for CS and α ≥ 0.34 for SS) as in
Figure A.3, the IR is weak and the CS and SS are always lower than the NR benchmark case.
The Figures also illustrate that ignoring the OEM’s quality decision may result in overes-
timating remanufacturing benefits, since the CS and the SS in exogenous benchmark is always
higher than that of endogenous quality model when the IR remanufactures.
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A.5 Independent Quality Gap
In this section we study CS and SS when the quality gap between the new and remanufactured
product is independent of product quality.
Figure A.5 illustrates that all the insights we derived from the base model continue to
hold for this extension. More specifically, the CS and SS can decrease compared to the NR
benchmark when the OEM deters the IR’s entry or when a weak IR (high φ) enters the market.
To achieve a higher CS than the NR benchmark, the IR needs to be strong (small φ).
In the exogenous quality benchmark, the Figure shows that, as opposed to endogenous
quality, independent of the IR’s competitive position remanufacturing always increases CS.
And SS in endogenous quality model is always lower than the exogenous quality benchmark
when the IR remanufactures. These results are same as those derived in the base model.
A.6 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Given s and qr,
∂2piOEM
∂q2n
= −2s < 0. Hence, it is concave in qn and the optimum1 is
q∗n(s) =
1
2(1 − βs − qrδ). This is positive if and only if qr < 1−βsδ and s < 1β . Therefore,
1It is straightforward to show that qn = 0 can never be an equilibrium; therefore, we do not consider this
case.
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equilibrium quality satisfies s < 1β . For the IR,
∂2piIR
∂q2r
= −2δs < 0 and interior solution is
qir , −βαs+δ−qnδ2δ . Thus, there can be three cases:
1. If qir ≤ 0, then q∗r = 0.
In this case q∗n =
1−βs
2 and from q
i
r =
−βαs+δ−q∗nδ
2δ ≤ 0 and q∗n > 0, we have αδ ≥ (1+βs)2βs
(≡ s ≥ δβ(2α−δ)) and α > δ.
2. If 0 < qir < qn, then q
∗
r = q
i
r.
By solving qr = q
i
r and qn =
1
2(1 − sβ − qrδ), we obtain q∗n = 2−δ+βs(α−2)4−δ and q∗r =
δ+sβ(δ−2α)
(4−δ)δ . From the condition 0 < q
∗
r < q
∗
n, we have
α
δ >
δ(3βs−1+δ)
(2+δ)βs (≡ s < (−1+δ)δβ(2α+αδ−3δ)
) for α < δ, and αδ <
(1+βs)
2βs (≡ s < δβ(2α−δ)) for α ≥ δ.
3. If qn ≤ qir, then q∗r = qn.
In this case q∗r = q∗n =
1−βs
2+δ and from q
i
r ≥ q∗n > 0, we have αδ ≤ δ(3βs−1+δ)(2+δ)βs (≡ s ≥
(−1+δ)δ
β(2α+αδ−3δ)) and α < δ.
For the exogenous quality benchmark, by considering α → δ, δ → 0 for α ≥ δ and δ → 1
for α < δ, it can be shown that all these three cases exist for any s < 1β .
Now, we proceed for the solution of the equilibrium quality. From the quantity game
equilibrium, if α > δ and s < δβ(2α−δ) , then q
∗
r = q
i
r. On the other hand, if α > δ and
s ≥ δβ(2α−δ) , then q∗r = 0. This means that for α > δ, the profit function is a piecewise
function and changes characteristic at s0 , δβ(2α−δ) . We define pi1 , piOEM (s ≥ s0) and
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pi2 , piOEM (s < s0). piOEM (s) is continuous at s0, i.e pi1(s0) = pi2(s0). pi2 can be written as
sq2n2 where qn2 ,
2−δ+βs(α−2)
4−δ . pi2 has one root at s = 0 and two roots at s =
2−δ
(2−α)β and it
is positive between these roots. Since α > δ, 2−δ(2−α)β >
1
β .
∂pi2
∂s has roots at s =
2−δ
(2−α)β and
at s = 2−δ3(2−α)β . One of these roots (s =
2−δ
(2−α)β ) is same as the roots of pi2 and the other one
satisfies 1β >
2−δ
3(2−α)β > 0. Thus, for s <
1
β , pi2 is unimodal and the maximizer is s =
2−δ
3(2−α)β .
Similarly, we can write pi1 = s
(
1−βs
2
)2
and show that this is unimodal for s < 1β with a
unique maximizer at s = 13β . By checking the derivatives of pi1 and pi2 at the boundary s0,
we can determine where s∗, the maximizer of the profit function, is. For ∂pi1∂s |s=s0 ≥ 0 and
∂pi2
∂s |s=s0 ≥ 0, the optimum s∗ is in the region s ≥ s0 and it is s∗ = 13β . We can show that these
inequalities are satisfied if and only if αδ ≥ 2. Therefore, for αδ ≥ 2, we have s∗ = 13β , q∗n = 13
and q∗r = 0. Recall that, these are the no-remanufacturing benchmark optimum quality and
quantities. For ∂pi1∂s |s=s0 < 0 and ∂pi2∂s |s=s0 ≥ 0, the optimum s∗ is at the boundary s0. Similar
to the previous case, inequalities are satisfied if and only if 8−δ4+δ ≤ αδ < 2. For this case we have
s∗ = δβ(2α−δ) , q
∗
n =
2(2−δ)
3(4−δ) and q
∗
r = 0. Hence, the OEM deters the IR’s entry in this region.
For ∂pi1∂s |s=s0 ≤ 0 and ∂pi2∂s |s=s0 < 0, the optimum s∗ is in the region s < s0 and it is 2−δ3(2−α)β .
The inequalities are satisfied if and only if 8−δ4+δ >
α
δ > 1. For this case we have s
∗ = 2−δ3(2−α)β ,
q∗n =
2(2−δ)
3(4−δ) and q
∗
r =
(8−δ)δ−α(4+δ)
3(2−α)(4−δ)δ . Hence, the IR enters and collects a portion of the available
cores. It is straightforward to show that ∂pi1∂s > 0 and
∂pi2
∂s < 0 is infeasible.
For α = δ, from the quantity game equilibrium, only qn > 0 and qn > qr > 0 applies.
Hence, the equilibrium quality and the quantities are the same as the equilibrium outcome in
region 8−δ4+δ >
α
δ > 1.
For α < δ, from the equilibrium of the quantity game, q∗r > 0 is always true. The core
availability constraint may or may not bind depending on s. If s < δ(−1+δ)β(2α−3δ+αδ) , s1, then
0 < q∗r < q∗n and if s ≥ s1, then q∗r = q∗n (see the quantity game equilibrium.). We define
pi3 , piOEM (s ≥ s1) and pi2 , piOEM (s < s1) (essentially this is the same function as pi2 defined
for α > δ). piOEM (s) is continuous at s = s1, i.e pi2(s1) = pi3(s1). Before we look at how pi2
and pi3 behave at the boundary s = s1, we first show that pi3 has only one maximizer in the
region of interest, s ∈ (0, 1β ). pi3 can be written as s
(
1−βs
2+δ
)2
, which has one root at s = 0 and
two roots at s = 1β . Similar to pi1, for s <
1
β , pi3 is unimodal and has one maximizer at s =
1
3β .
If ∂pi2∂s |s=s1 < 0 and ∂pi3∂s |s=s1 ≤ 0, the optimum quality is in s < s1 and it is s∗ = 2−δ3(2−α)β . The
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inequalities hold if and only if 3δ
2
2+δ ≤ α < δ. In this case, the equilibrium quality and quantities
are s∗ = 2−δ3(2−α)β , q
∗
n =
2(2−δ)
3(4−δ) and q
∗
r =
(8−δ)δ−α(4+δ)
3(2−α)(4−δ)δ . It is easy to show that
∂pi2
∂s |s=s1 >= 0
and ∂pi3∂s |s=s1 < 0 is infeasible. Therefore, s1 can never be an optimum. If ∂pi2∂s |s=s1 ≥ 0 and
∂pi3
∂s |s=s1 ≥ 0, the optimum quality is in s > s1 and it is s∗ = 13β . Inequalities are satisfied if and
only if α ≤ 3δ2
4−3δ+2δ2 . In this case, q
∗
n =
2
3(2+δ) = q
∗
r . If
∂pi2
∂s |s=s1 < 0 and ∂pi3∂s |s=s1 > 0, we need
to compare the profit function’s values at s = 13β and s =
2−δ
3(2−α)β . Inequalities are satisfied if
and only if 3δ
2
4−3δ+2δ2 < α <
3δ2
2+δ . pi2(s =
2−δ
3β(2−α))−pi3(s = 13β ) = −
4(α(−4+δ)2−δ2(18−8δ−2δ2+δ3))
27(−2+α)β(−4+δ)2(2+δ)2
and it is positive for this region if and only if δ(18−8δ−2δ
2+δ3)
(4−δ)2 <
α
δ <
3δ
2+δ . If we combine
this case with the previous cases we can conclude that if 0 < αδ ≤ δ(18−8δ
2−2δ3+δ4)
(4−δ)2 , then
s∗ = 13β , q
∗
n = q
∗
r =
2
3β(2+δ) . If
δ(18−8δ2−2δ3+δ4)
(4−δ)2 <
α
δ <
8−δ
4+δ , then s
∗ = 2−δ3(2−α)β , q
∗
n =
2(2−δ)
3(4−δ) ,
q∗r =
(8−δ)δ−α(4+δ)
3(2−α)(4−δ)δ .
Proof of Proposition 2
In R3exo, where the IR enters and the core constraint does not bind, consumer surplus
is CSexo3 ,
sf(4+δ−δ2)
2(−4+δ)2 −
s2fβ(4−2α(−2+δ)−3δ+δ2)
(−4+δ)2 +
s3fβ
2(α2(4−3δ)+(4−3δ)δ+2αδ2)
2(−4+δ)2δ . If the OEM is
monopoly without remanufacturing, consumer surplus is CSexom =
sf
8 −
s2fβ
4 +
s3fβ
2
8 . ∆ =
CSexo3 − CSexom = − sf δ(−12+5δ)8(−4+δ)2 −
s3fβ
2(−8αδ2+δ2(4+δ)+4α2(−4+3δ))
8(−4+δ)2δ −
s2fβ(−8α(−2+δ)+δ(−4+3δ))
4(−4+δ)2 . ∆
has three roots for sf : {0, δβ(2α−δ) , δ(12−5δ)β(8α+4δ−6αδ+δ2)}. In ∆, coefficient of s3f is positive for
δ
2 < α < 1, and
δ(12−5δ)
β(8α+4δ−6αδ+δ2) ≥ δβ(2α−δ) for α ≥ δ. Recall that for the exogenous quality
model, the condition for R3exo (where the IR enters and the core constraint does not bind) is
sf <
δ
β(2α−δ) if α ≥ δ. Therefore if α ≥ δ, ∆ > 0. If α < δ, the condition for R3exo is sf <
(−1+δ)δ
β(2α−3δ+αδ) . If
δ
2 < α < δ, it is easy to show that
(−1+δ)δ
β(2α−3δ+αδ) <
δ(12−5δ)
β(8α+4δ−6αδ+δ2) <
δ
β(2α−δ) .
Then if δ2 < α < δ, ∆ > 0. If 0 < α <
δ
2 , then
δ(12−5δ)
β(8α+4δ−6αδ+δ2) >
(−1+δ)δ
β(2α−3δ+αδ) > 0 >
δ
β(2α−δ)
and the coefficient of s3f is negative, therefore ∆ > 0. Finally, for α =
δ
2 , ∆ is a second order
polynomial of sf and roots are {0, 12−5δ2β(4−δ)}. For α = δ2 , 0 < (−1+δ)δβ(2α−3δ+αδ) < 12−5δ2β(4−δ) and the
coefficient of s2f is negative; hence, ∆ > 0.
If the IR enters and the core constraint binds, CSexo4 ,
sf (1+3δ)
2(2+δ)2
− s
2
fβ(1+3δ)
(2+δ)2
+
s3fβ
2(1+3δ)
2(2+δ)2
and CSexo4 − CSexom = sf (−1+sfβ)
2(8−δ)δ
8(2+δ)2
and this is always positive.
Proof of Proposition 3
In R2, since the IR cannot enter, and the OEM acts like a monopoly without remanufac-
turing, consumer surplus is same as the NR benchmark.
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Consumer surplus in R2 is CS2 , (α−δ)
2δ
2β(2α−δ)3 and consumer surplus for the NR benchmark
is CSm , 154β . CS2 − CSm = − (8α−7δ)(α−2δ)
2
54β(2α−δ)3 and this is always negative for α > δ.
ForR3, consumer surplus is CS3 , (−2+δ)
(
−2(−2+δ)(−4+6α−6δ+δ
2)
27(−2+α)2β(−4+δ)2 +
((−8+δ)δ+α(4+δ))2
54(−2+α)3β(−4+δ)2δ
)
.
We show that CS3 at α = δ is greater than CSm and CS3 at α =
(8−δ)δ
4+δ is smaller than the
CSm. Then, we show that in R3, CS3 is always decreasing in α which proves that there
exists a critical αc satisfying δ < αc <
δ(8−δ)
4+δ such that CS3 > CSm if and only if α < αc in
R3. CS3|α=δ = (12−5δ)δ54β(−4+δ)2 and it is always positive. Similarly, CS3|α= δ(8−δ)
(4+δ)
= (12−5δ)δ
2
54β(−4+δ)3
and it is always negative. ∂CS3∂α =
α2(−2+δ)(−16−56δ+23δ2)
54(−2+α)4β(−4+δ)2δ +
(−2+δ)(192−400δ+172δ2−19δ3)
54(−2+α)4β(−4+δ)2 +
2α(−2+δ)(−16+40δ+19δ2−17δ3+2δ4)
27(−2+α)4β(−4+δ)2δ and we want to show that this is negative. This expres-
sion is negative if and only if q , α2
(
16 + 56δ − 23δ2) + δ (−192 + 400δ − 172δ2 + 19δ3) −
4α
(−16 + 40δ + 19δ2 − 17δ3 + 2δ4) < 0. q has two roots with respect α, i.e α1 = x−√yz and
α2 =
x+
√
y
z , where x , −2
(−16 + 40δ + 19δ2 − 17δ3 + 2δ4), y , (−4 + δ)2(−2 + δ)2(16− 8δ+
105δ2− 80δ3 + 16δ4), z , −16− 56δ+ 23δ2. Since z < 0, α2 < α1. In R3, if the boundaries of
α lies within α1 and α2, then
∂CS3
∂α < 0. More specifically, if α2 <
δ2(18−8δ−2δ2+δ3)
(4−δ)2 < α1 and
α2 <
δ(8−δ)
4+δ < α1, then consumer surplus is decreasing in α in R3. By some tedious algebra,
similar to the one in the proof of Proposition 4 (skipped here), it can be shown that this is
indeed the case. Therefore, CS3 is decreasing in α. Therefore, CS3 = CSm has a unique
solution in R3 and it is defined as αc. Once we show that in R4, consumer surplus is always
higher than the NR benchmark, this proves the existence of αc satisfying 1 <
α
δ <
8−δ
4+δ , and
consumer surplus is higher than the NR benchmark if and only if α < αc.
For R4, CS4 , 2(1+3δ)27β(2+δ)2 and CS4 − CSm = (8−δ)δ54β(2+δ)2 which is always positive.
αc is only a function of δ and δ is in the bounded region (0, 1); therefore, we can numerically
verify that the derivative of αc with respect to δ is always positive in R3.
The CS in R1 is same as the NR benchmark. If we exclude this region, we find that CS is
strictly lower than the NR benchmark for αcδ <
α
δ < 2.
Proof of Proposition 4
In R1, the IR cannot enter, and the OEM acts like a monopoly without remanufacturing.
Hence, social surplus is same as NR benchmark.
In R2, social surplus is SS2 , 3(α−δ)
2δ
2β(2α−δ)3 . The NR benchmark social surplus is SSm ,
1
18β .
SS2 − SSm = (8α−7δ)(α−2δ)
2
18β(2α−δ)3 and it is easy to see that this is always positive for α > δ.
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In R3, social surplus is SS3 ,
(−2+δ)2αδ(−224+60δ+3δ2−2δ3)
54(−2+α)3β(−4+δ)2δ +
(−2+δ)α2(48+104δ−53δ2+8δ3)
54(−2+α)3β(−4+δ)2δ +
(−2+δ)δ(192+128δ−80δ2+11δ3)
54(−2+α)3β(−4+δ)2δ . We evaluate SS3 at α = δ and at α =
δ(8−δ)
4+δ , and show that SS3
is greater than SSm at α = δ and smaller than SSm at α =
δ(8−δ)
4+δ . Then, we show that SS3
has a negative derivate in α, if δ > 12 , and there exists a α
′ such that SSm has a negative
derivative if δ < 12 and α < α
′ in R3, where δ(8−δ)4+δ > α
′ > δ. These imply that SS3 = SSm
has a unique solution for δ
2(18−8δ−2δ2+δ3)
(4−δ)2 < α <
δ(8−δ)
4+δ (recall that these inequalities define
R3) and are sufficient for the existence of an αs value such that SS3 > SSm if and only if
α < αs in R3. (SS3 − SSm)|α= δ(8−δ)
4+δ
= (12−5δ)δ
2
18β(−4+δ)3 and this is negative. (SS3 − SSm)|α=δ =
δ(4+δ)
54β(−4+δ)2 and this is positive.
∂SS3
∂α = −
(−2+δ)(α2(48+104δ−53δ2+8δ3)+δ(−320+624δ−228δ2+25δ3)
54(−2+α)4β(−4+δ)2δ +
α(192−480δ+28δ2+44δ3−8δ4)
54(−2+α)4β(−4+δ)2δ and denominator is always positive. Therefore we only need to
consider the polynomial p = α2
(
48 + 104δ − 53δ2 + 8δ3)+ δ (−320 + 624δ − 228δ2 + 25δ3)+
α
(
192− 480δ + 28δ2 + 44δ3 − 8δ4). p is convex in α and has two roots α, i.e., α1 = f−√gη and
α2 =
f+
√
g
η where f = 2
(−48 + 120δ − 7δ2 − 11δ3 + 2δ4), g = (144− 264δ + 481δ2 − 184δ3
+16δ4)(−4 + δ)2(−2 + δ)2 and η = (48 + 104δ − 53δ2 + 8δ3). Since η > 0 it can be seen that
α1 < α2. We want to show that α1 <
δ2(18−8δ−2δ2+δ3)
(4−δ)2 . This can be simplified to showing
−20480+53760δ−50944δ2+9008δ3+13480δ4−5559δ5−1504δ6+1020δ7−32δ8−53δ9+8δ10 < 0.
It can be further simplified to showing 20480− 53760δ+ 50944δ2− 16929δ3 > 0. It is straight-
forward to show that this is true for 0 < δ < 1. In a similar way, it can be shown that
α2 >
δ2(18−8δ−2δ2+δ3)
(4−δ)2 . Now, we compare α2 with
δ(8−δ)
4+δ . α2 =
f+
√
g
η >
δ(8−δ)
4+δ if and only if
(4 + δ)
√
g > (8δ − δ2)η − f(4 + δ). Both sides are positive and this inequality is equivalent to
(−2 + δ)δ(1 − 2δ) (48 + 104δ − 53δ2 + 8δ3) > 0. It can be easily seen that this is true if and
only if δ > 12 . Then, α2 >
δ(8−δ)
4+δ if and only if δ >
1
2 . So far, we showed that SS3 is always
decreasing in α in R3 if and only if δ > 12 , or δ <
1
2 and α < α2. Since (SS3−SSm)|α= δ(8−δ)
4+δ
< 0
and (SS3 − SSm)|α=δ > 0, α2 > δ. This proves that if α increases from δ
2(18−8δ−2δ2+δ3)
(4−δ)2 to
δ(8−δ)
4+δ , it crosses SSm only once. The crossing point is defined as αs and it is the unique
solution to the equation SS3 = SSm in R3.
In R4, SS4 ,
2(3−2α+5δ−αδ+3δ2)
27β(2+δ)2
. SS4 − SSm = −4α(2+δ)+δ(8+9δ)54β(2+δ)2 and it is easy to see that
this expression is always positive for α < δ. Taken together with the previous results for R1,
R2 and R3, this proves that SS is higher than the NR benchmark if and only if α < αs, where
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αs satisfies 1 <
αs
δ <
8−δ
4+δ .
Finally, αs is only a function of δ and δ is confined to the region (0, 1). Hence, we numeri-
cally proved that αs is increasing in δ.
In R1, SS is same as the NR benchmark. If we exclude this region, we find that SS is
strictly smaller than the NR benchmark when αsδ <
α
δ < 2
Proof of Proposition 5
In R1, the IR cannot enter and the OEM acts like a monopoly without remanufacturing.
Hence, the environmental impact is same as the NR benchmark and it is constant in α and δ.
In R2, new product quantity is lower than the monopoly without remanufacturing new
product quantity. In addition to that, the IR cannot enter the market and cannot remanufac-
ture. Hence, the environmental impact is lower than the NR benchmark. In R2, new product
quantity increases in α and decreases in δ; therefore, the environmental impact also increases
in α and decreases in δ.
In R3, the environmental impact is lower than the NR benchmark if and only if Eqn3 +
eqr3 < Eqm, where qn3 , qr3 are new and remanufactured product quantities in R3 and qm
is the monopoly without remanufacturing new product quantity (which is 13). This can be
rewritten as eE <
1/3−qn3
qr3
= (−2+α)δ
2
(−8+δ)δ+α(4+δ) . Without loss of generality we can assume that
E = 1, then
∂qn3
∂α + e
∂qr3
∂α =
e(−2+δ)
3(−2+α)2δ < 0. Hence the environmental impact is decreas-
ing in α for R3.
∂2qn3
∂δ2
+ e
∂2qr3
∂δ2
=
−2(−4(−2+α)δ3+e(−4δ3+α(64−48δ+12δ2+δ3)))
3(−2+α)(−4+δ)3δ3 and denominator
of this is always positive. We only need to consider the numerator, r , 4(−2 + α)δ3 −
e
(−4δ3 + α (64− 48δ + 12δ2 + δ3)). ∂r∂e = 4δ3 − α (64− 48δ + 12δ2 + δ3) and this is positive
if and only if α < 4δ
3
64−48δ+12δ2+δ3 . By some algebra, it can be shown that
4δ3
64−48δ+12δ2+δ3 <
δ2(18−8δ−2δ2+δ3)
(4−δ)2 ; therefore, in R3,
∂r
∂e can never be positive. Hence r is decreasing in e.
Since the minimum value of e is 0 and r is decreasing in e, maximum value of the r is
re=0 = 8(−2 + α)δ3 < 0. Since the maximum value of the r is negative, the environmen-
tal impact is a concave function of δ.
In R4, the environmental impact is lower than the NR benchmark if and only if eE <
1/3−qn4
qr4
where qn4 and qr4 are new and remanufactured product quantities in R4. This is equivalent to
e
E <
δ
2 . In R4, new and remanufactured product quantity is only a function of δ. Hence, the
environmental impact is constant in α. In this region, if δ increases, new and remanufactured
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Region s∗ p∗n p
∗
r q
∗
n q
∗
r
R1p 1
3β
2
9β
α
9β
1
3
0
R2p 2δ
3αβ
4δ
9αβ
4δ2
9αβ
1
3
0
R3p 2(1−δ)
3β(2−α−δ)
4(1−δ)2(8−2α−3δ)
9β(4−δ)(2−α−δ)2
2(1−δ)2(δ(8−3δ)+α(4−3δ))
9β(4−δ)(2−α−δ)2
4
3(4−δ)
(8−3δ)δ−α(4+δ)
3(4−δ)δ(2−α−δ)
R4p 1
3β
2−δ
9β
δ
9β
1
3
1
3
Table A.2: Price Competition Equilibrium product quality, new and remanufactured product
prices and quantities
quantities decreases. Therefore, the environmental impact is decreasing in δ.
Proof of Proposition 6
The equilibrium quality, new and remanufactured product prices and quantities are pro-
vided in Table A.2.
In the price competition game, using the utility functions for the remanufactured and the
new product, it is straightforward to show that if qn > 0 and qr > 0, qn = 1 − pn−prs(1−δ) and
qr =
pn−pr
s(1−δ)− prδs . Using these, profit functions can be written as piOEM (pn, pr) = (pn−βs2)(1−
pn−pr
s(1−δ))and piIR(pn, pr) = (pr−βαs2)( pn−prs(1−δ) − prδs ) for the differentiated market. If qr = 0, then
qn = 1− pns , and the OEM’s profit function can be written as usual. Given s, it can be shown
that OEM’s profit function is piecewise concave in pn and the IR’s profit function is concave
in pr. Following the similar steps as in the proof of proposition 1, we plug in the optimal
prices as a function of quality. For α/δ ≤ (>)1, the OEM’s profit function is a piecewise
concave function of quality. This can be solved for the equilibrium quality as in the proof of
proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 7
Similar to the base model, given s, profit functions of both the OEM and the IR are
concave in production quantities and in the equilibrium s < 1β is satisfied(see the proof of
proposition 1). Using these we can show that for α ≥ δ there can be two cases and these are
stated as follows:
C1. q∗r = 0 and q∗n =
1−βs
2 if one of the followings is satisfied:
(a) 0 < n < − δ2−16αβ+8βδ and 0 < s ≤ − δ2β(−2α+δ) − 12
√
−16nαβ+8nβδ+δ2
β2(2α−δ)2 , s0
(b) 0 < n < − δ2−16αβ+8βδ and s1 , − δ2β(−2α+δ) + 12
√
−16nαβ+8nβδ+δ2
β2(2α−δ)2 ≤ s
(c) n ≥ − δ2−16αβ+8βδ
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C2. The IR remanufactures but the core constraint does not bind and q∗r =
2n+s(2sαβ−(1+sβ)δ)
s(−4+δ)δ
and q∗n =
−n+s(−2−s(−2+α)β+δ)
s(−4+δ) if n < − δ
2
−16αβ+8βδ and s0 < s < s1.
From above, the OEM’s profit function is a piecewise function of s. For C1, define the
profit function as pi1 and for C2 define the profit function as pi2. Unconstraint optimum for
pi1 is
1
3β and for pi2 is
−2+δ−
√
4−24nβ+12nαβ−4δ+δ2
6(−2β+αβ) . Using a similar approach as in the proof of
Proposition 1, one can show that only one of these unconditional optimums can exist at the
same time and the profit function is unimodal in s. These lead us the following equlibrium
regions and decisions:
1. If αδ ≥ 2, or 2 > αδ > 1 and n ≥ 2δ−α9β , the IR cannot enter. Equilibrium decisions are as
follows: s∗ = 13β , q
∗
n =
1
3 , q
∗
r = 0.
2. If 2 > αδ ≥ 8−δ4+δ and 2δ−α9β > n, or 8−δ4+δ > αδ ≥ 54 and 2δ−α9β > n ≥ −16α+32δ+8αδ−28δ
2+3αδ2+3δ3
144β−192αβ+64α2β+24βδ−16αβδ+βδ2 ,
n0, the OEM deters IR’s entry by increasing quality. The equilibrium decisions are
s∗ = s1, q∗n =
1−βs1
2 , q
∗
r = 0.
3. If 54 >
α
δ ≥ 1 and 2δ−α9β > n ≥ n0, the OEM deters the IR’s by reducing quality. The
equilibrium decisions are s∗ = s0, q∗n =
1−βs0
2 , q
∗
r = 0.
4. If 8−δ4+δ >
α
δ ≥ 1 and n0 > n, the IR enters the market but does not remanufacture all
available cores. The equilibrium decisions are s∗ = −2+δ−
√
4−24nβ+12nαβ−4δ+δ2
6(−2β+αβ) , q
∗
n =
−n+s∗(−2−s∗(−2+α)β+δ)
s∗(−4+δ) , q
∗
r =
2n+s∗(2s∗αβ−(1+s∗β)δ)
s∗(−4+δ)δ .
Proof of Proposition 22
The monopoly remanufacturing benchmark achieves a lower environmental impact than
the NR benchmark if and only if eqr + Eqn <
1
3E. This leads to the
e
E thresholds stated in
Proposition 22.
The binding region in the base model includes the binding region in the monopoly reman-
ufacturing benchmark. Therefore, we need three types of comparison to show that maximum
e
E ratios in the monopoly remanufacturing benchmark are higher than that of the base model
for αδ < 1. These are as follows:
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1. Compare thresholds when core constraint binds both in the monopoly remanufacturing
benchmark and the base model.
2. Compare thresholds when core constraint does not bind in the monopoly remanufacturing
benchmark and it binds in the base model.
3. Compare thresholds when core constraint does not bind both in the monopoly remanu-
facturing benchmark and the base model.
Then it can be easily shown that monopoly remanufacturing benchmark thresholds higher
than the base model thresholds.
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APPENDIX B
IS SERVICIZATION A WIN-WIN STRATEGY? PROFITABILITY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF SERVICIZATION
B.1 Full Information
In this section, we study the full information case and assume that the firm can observe
consumer types, and choose either selling or servicization, whichever is more profitable.1 Note
that the firm can charge different prices from each consumer segment even when it sells a
single product. The equilibrium solution to this case is referred as efficient because it leads
to maximum achievable firm’s profit and the social surplus. Next proposition describes the
equilibrium.
Proposition 23. Suppose the firm can observe the consumer types, and can choose the busi-
ness strategy.
(R1FI) When γf (α, β) <
α
β < 1, the firm serves both segments, and
τ∗H =
θδ∗
1 +mi
, τ∗L =
αθδ∗
1 +mi
, δ∗ =
(
α2(1− β) + β) θ2
4c (1 +mi)
, pi∗r =
(
α2(1− β) + β)2Mθ4
16c (1 +mi) 2
.
(R2FI) When 0 < αβ < γf (α, β), the firm serves only high valuation segment, and
τ∗H =
θδ∗
1 +mi
, δ∗ =
θ2
4c(1 +mi)
, pi∗f =
βθ4M
16c(1 +mi)2
.
If r > 1, the firm uses servicization, and mi = mf . Otherwise, the firm uses selling strategy,
and mi = mc. Furthermore, γ(α, β) > γf (α, β).
The proposition shows that the equilibrium outcome is similar to Proposition 8. When
the valuation gap between the consumers segments is small, or the mass of high valuation
segments is small, the firm serves both segments. Otherwise, the firm serves only the high
1Note that the equilibrium of full information model is socially optimal.
99
valuation segment. Furthermore, γf < γ. Therefore, under full information, it is optimal
to serve both consumer segments for a larger region compared to selling and servicization.
This is because, the firm can charge different prices from the consumers, and there is no
cannibalization problem.
B.2 Alternative Operating Cost
In the main body of the paper, we assume that product durability is correlated with the oper-
ating cost. In this section, we consider an alternative operating cost where product durability
does not impact the operating cost under selling and servicization. More specifically, we as-
sume that the operating cost for τ units of use is mcτ
2
2 for selling, and
mf τ
2
2 for servicization.
This functional form does not allow an analytical characterization of the equilibrium. There-
fore, we resort to numerical study. We have run the numerical study for all combinations of
α ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}, β ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, .0.8, 0.9}, θ ∈ {1, 2, 3..10},
mc ∈ {0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.2}, c ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}, and eu,p,d ∈ {0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25} and con-
firmed that the insights are consistent across these parameters. For brevity, we report the
results for a representative parameter set and the regions.
Figure B.1 demonstrates the profits for selling and servicization strategies. Similar to the
base model, servicization is more profitable than selling strategy even when the firm has lower
operating efficiency than the consumers. This is because the firm can incorporate product use
information in pricing under servicization.
Figure B.2 illustrates the equilibrium product durability decisions for selling and servi-
cization for different regions. When the firm serves both segments under both selling and
servicization (see Figure B.2a), servicization can lead to higher product durability even when
servicization is operationally less efficient. However, when the firm serves larger consumer
segment under servicization, product durability can be lower than product durability under
selling strategy despite better operational efficiency. These results are consistent with our base
model where operating cost is correlated with product durability.
Figure B.3 demonstrates the difference in equilibrium product durability under serviciza-
tion when the operating cost is and is not correlated with product durability. When the
product durability is correlated with operating cost, i.e., base case, the equilibrium product
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Figure B.1: Profit for the alternative operating cost. (θ = 2, c = 0.1,M = 1, α = 0.8, β =
0.3,mc = 0.1)
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Figure B.2: Product durability for the alternative operating cost. (a) firm serves both segments
under both selling servicization, and (b) low end segment is served only under servicization.
(θ = 2, c = 0.1,M = 1, β = 0.3,mc = 0.10)
durability is higher compared to product durability in alternative operating cost model. This
is because, when the product durability lowers the operating cost, the firm takes advantage of
this by investing more in product durability.
Figure B.4 illustrates environmental impact under selling and servicization strategy. In
Figure B.4a, the product has low relative use impact, and environmental impact increases
when the firm’s relative operating efficiency decreases (high mf ). The intuition behind this
result is similar to the base model, when the relative use impact is low, it is better to use
the product for a longer time from an environmental perspective, and it is achieved when the
relative efficiency of servicization is high. Therefore, servicization is environmentally preferable
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Figure B.3: Comparison of product durability for the alternative operating cost and the base
case. (θ = 2, c = 0.1,M = 1, α = 0.8, β = 0.3,mc = 0.1)
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Figure B.4: Environmental impact for the alternative operating cost. (θ = 2, c = 0.1,M =
1, α = 0.8, β = 0.3,mc = 0.10, ep = 0.1, ed = 0.1)
when the relative operating efficiency is high enough (mf < 0.097). Otherwise, selling is more
environmentally preferable. In Figure B.4b, the product has high relative use impact, and
environmental impact decreases when the firm’s relative operating efficiency decreases (high
mf ). As explained in the base case, when the relative use impact is high, it is better to use
the product for a shorter time from an environmental perspective. This is precisely the case
when the relative operating efficiency of servicization is low enough (mf > 0.103).
Finally, Figure B.5 compares the CS and SS for the alternative operating cost when the
firm serves both segments under both selling and servicization strategies. As expected both
the CS and SS decrease under servicization as the firm’s relative operating efficiency decreases
(high mf ). It is important to note that the CS and the SS under servicization can be lower
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Figure B.5: Consumer and Social Surplus for the alternative operating cost. (θ = 2, c =
0.1,M = 1, α = 0.8, β = 0.3,mc = 0.1)
even when the firm has a better operating efficiency. From the Figure, this can be observed for
mf values smaller than but closer to 0.1. Therefore, similar to the base model, servicization
can have a detrimental effect on both the CS and SS.
B.3 Parameters and Decision Variables
Table B.1 summarizes the parameters and decision variables of our model.
B.4 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 8: We first solve the equilibrium for selling strategy, then we solve
it for servicization strategy. In selling strategy, if type-θi purchases the product, it uses the
product for τi =
δθ
1+mc
. Then, Ur(θi) =
δθ2i
2(1+mc)
− p. If the firm sells to both segments,
p =
δθ2L
2(1+mc)
; otherwise, p =
δθ2H
2(1+mc)
. It is easy to see that when these prices are plugged
into firm’s profit function, the function becomes concave in product durability δ. If the firm
serves both segments, product durability is δ∗ = α
2θ2
4c(1+mc)
; otherwise, δ∗ = θ
2
4c(1+mc)
. The firm
profits are pir,B =
α4Mθ4
16c(1+mc)2
, pir,H =
β4Mθ4
16c(1+mc)2
, respectively. Therefore, the firm serves both
segments if and only if α > 4
√
β.
In servicization, if the firm serves both segments, one can show that at the equilibrium,
IRH and ICL constraints do not bind, but IRL and ICH bind. Hence, FL = τL
(
θL − τL2δ
)
and
FH = τH
(
θH − τH2δ
) − τL (θH − τL2δ ) + FL. When we plugged in these to the profit function,
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Symbol Definition
θi Segment i’s valuation
α The ratio of θH to θL
M Size of the market
Qi Size of segment i
β Fraction of θH consumers
δ Durability of the product
mc Consumers’ operating cost coefficient
mf Firm’s operating cost coefficient
τi Segment i’s total product use
p Selling price
F Service price
c Cost coefficient for durability investment
eu Environmental impact cost coefficient for use phase
ep Environmental impact cost coefficient for production phase
ed Environmental impact cost coefficient for disposal phase
Table B.1: Parameters and Decision Variables
we have piv,B(.|FH , FL) = M
(−cδ2 + bθH (τH − τL) + θLτL) − (1+m)M(bτ2H−(−1+b)τ2L)2δ . This
function is concave in τH , then from FOC, τH =
δθH
1+mf
. After incorporating this expression
to the profit function, we obtain piv,B(.|FL, FH , τH) = −M
(
cδ2 + βθHτL − θLτL
)
+
Mβδθ2H
2+2mf
+
M(−1+β)(1+mf)τ2L
2δ . This is concave in τL; hence, τL can be found as
δ(βθH−θL)
(−1+β)(1+mf) . Note
that τL > 0 if and only if α > β. After plugging this in, δ can be found as
(α2+β−2αβ)θ2
4cα2(−1+β)(1+mf) ,
similarly. When the firm serves only the high-end segment, only IRH binds and the equilibrium
can be obtained similar to the selling model.
Under servicization, the firm serves both segments if and only if piv,B ≥ piv,H . One can show
that limα→1
piv,B
piv,H
> 1, limα→β
piv,B
piv,H
< 1, and
piv,B
piv,H
is increasing in α when α ∈ (β, 1). Therefore,
there is only one threshold αt where
piv,B(αt(β))
piv,H(αt(β))
= 1. Define γ(α, β) = αt(β)β = γ(α, β). It can
be shown that at α = 4
√
β, serving to both segment is more profitable. Hence, γ(α, β) < 4
√
β.
Proof of Proposition 9: In R1,
piv,B
pir,B
> 1 if and only if
M(α2+β−2αβ)2θ4
16c(−1+β)2(1+mf)2 >
Mα4θ4
16c(1+mc)2
.
This can be rearranged to show that
piv,B
pir,B
> 1 if and only if r > α
2(1−β)
α2+β−2αβ , f1. Simple
algebra shows that f1 < 1. The the other parts can be shown similarly.
Proof of Proposition 10: We only show the proof for region R2. The rest can be shown
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similarly. In R2, δ∗v =
(α2+β−2αβ)θ2
4c(1−β)(1+mf ) and δ
∗
r =
θ2
4c(1+mc)
. We can rearrange the terms and find
that product durability is higher under servicization if and only if r > 1−β
α2+β−2αβ , rδ. We
compare this with the minimum operating efficiency threshold above which servicization is
more profitable than selling, i.e., f1 =
α2(1−β)
α2+β−2αβ . rδ > f1 if and only if 1 > α
2 which is true
by assumption. ∂rδ∂α < 0 for α ∈ (β, 1) and limα→1 rδ > 1. Hence rδ > 1.
Proof of Proposition 11: In R1, τH,v > τH,r if and only if r >
√
α2(1−β)
α2−2αβ+β . Similarly,
τL,v > τL,r if and only if r >
√
α3(β−1)2
(α−β)(α2−2αβ+β) . One can show that
√
α3(β−1)2
(α−β)(α2−2αβ+β) >√
α2(1−β)
α2−2αβ+β > f1, where f1 is the thresholds above which servicization is more profitable and
it is defined in the proof of Proposition 9. This proves the first part of the proposition. The
other parts can be proved similarly.
Proof of Proposition 12: CSR1v =
∑
i=L,H
∫ τ∗i,v
0 (θi − tδ )dt− Fi, = M(−1+α)βθ
4
8c (
α2(1+α)
(1+mc)2
−2(α−β)(α
2+β−2αβ)
(−1+β)2(1+mf)2 ) and CS
R1
r =
∑
i=L,H
∫ τ∗i,r
0 (θi − tδ )dt− mc2δ τ∗2i,r − p = −
Mα2(−1+α2)βθ4
8c(1+mc)2
. CSR1v >
CSR1r if and only if −
(
α2(1+α)
(1+mc)2
− 2(α−β)(α
2+β−2αβ)
(−1+β)2(1+mf)2
)
> 0. Then, CSR1v > CS
R1
r if and
only if r2 > (1−β)
2α2(1+α)
2(α−β)(α2+β−2αβ) = h
2, and the result follows. h > 1 if and only if (−1 +
α)
(−α2 + 2αβ − 2α2β − 2β2 + 2αβ2 + α2β2) > 0. α < 1 by assumption; hence, if we show
that second expression is negative, the result follows. Second derivative of the expression is
2(−1 + (−2 + β)β) < 0; hence, it is concave in α. At α = 1, it is −1 + β2 < 0, and at α = β,
it is β2
(−1 + β2) < 0. Therefore, the expression is negative in R1.
In R2, the firm has to leave positive informational rent to high end segment under servi-
cization. However, the firm extracts the entire surplus under selling. Hence, the CS under
servicization is always higher. In R3, since the firm only serves high-end segment, the CS is
zero for both selling and servicization strategies.
Proof of Proposition 13: In R1, SSv,B = −M(−α
2−β+2αβ)(α2+β+2(1−2α)αβ+4(−1+α)β2)θ4
16c(−1+β)2(1+mf)2
and SSr,B =
Mα2(α2(1−2β)+2β)θ4
16c(1+mc)2
. By rearranging the terms, SSv,B > SSr,B if and only
if r2 >
α2(−1+β)2(−2β+α2(−1+2β))
(α2+β−2αβ)(−2αβ(1+2β)+α2(−1+4β)+β(−1+4β)) , k
2
1. We need to show that k1 > f1.
This is true if and only if
α2(−1+β)2(−2β+α2(−1+2β))
(α2+β−2αβ)(−2αβ(1+2β)+α2(−1+4β)+β(−1+4β)) >
α4(−1+β)2
(α2+β−2αβ)2 . This
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inequality can be written as − 2(−1+α)
2α2(−1+β)2β(α2+β)
(α2+β−2αβ)2(−2αβ(1+2β)+α2(−1+4β)+β(−1+4β)) > 0. Note that nu-
merator is always positive and
(
α2 + β − 2αβ)2 > 0. Hence, we need to show that e1 ,
− (−2αβ(1 + 2β) + α2(−1 + 4β) + β(−1 + 4β)) > 0. ∂2e1
∂β2
= 8(−1 + α) < 0, and hence, e1
is concave in β. Then it is sufficient to show that e1 is positive at β = 0 and β = α.
e1(β = 0) = α
2 and e1(β = α) = α(1 − α). This proves that when servicization is more
profitable than selling strategy in R1, SSv,B > SSr,B if and only if r > k1. To complete the
proof for region R1, we need to find when k1 > 1 is true. Observe that this is true if and only if
l = −1−2α+5α2+(4−2α(2+α))β > 0. When β < 12 , l has two roots αl1 =
−1−2β−√6
√
1−3β+2β2
−5+2β
and αl2 =
−1−2β+√6
√
1−3β+2β2
−5+2β . Furthermore, α
l
1 > α
l
2 and α
l
2 < β. Since, l is convex in this
region, l > 0 if and only if α > min{αl1, 4
√
β}. ∂α1l∂β < 0 for β ∈ (0, 0.5). α1l (β = 0) ≈ 0.69 and
α1l (β = 1) = 0.5. Therefore, there exist a βc ∈ (0, 0.5) such that αl1 > 4
√
β if and if 0 < β < βc.
When β ≥ 12 , l does not have any roots. Hence it is either always positive or always negative.
It is easy to see that it is always positive. Then, define
σ(β) =

4
√
β : β ≥ βc
αl1 : β < βc
In R2, SSr,H =
Mβθ4
16c(1+mf)2
. By rearranging the terms we can show that SSv,B > SSr,H
if and only if r >
√
− (−1+β)2β
(−α2−β+2αβ)(α2+β+2αβ−4α2β−4β2+4αβ2) , k2. f2 > k2 if and only
if (1−β)
2β
(α2+β−2αβ)2 > −
(−1+β)2β
(−α2−β+2αβ)(α2+β+2αβ−4α2β−4β2+4αβ2) . The inequality can be written as(
α2 + β − 2αβ) (−1−α2−β−2αβ+ 4α2β+ 4β2−4αβ2) < 0. First expression in the equality
is convex in α and takes its minimum value at α = β which is β(1−β) > 0. Second expression
is convex in β, and hence, it is sufficient to show that it is negative at β = 0 and β = α. These
can be shown by simple algebra.
In R3, since the SS is equivalent to firm’s profit under both selling and servicization. The
proof is same as the comparison of the profits in the proof of Proposition 9.
Proof of Proposition 14: InR1, product use impact under servicization is eu
Mα(α2+β−2αβ)θ3
4c(1−β)(1+mf)2 =
euU
B
v and under selling is eu
Mα2(α+β−αβ)θ3
4c(1+mc)2
= euU
B
r . Then, use impact under servicization is
smaller than under selling strategy if and only if r <
√
α(1−β)(α+β−αβ)
α2+β−2αβ . Product disposal and
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production impact under servicization is (ed + ep)
4cM(1−β)(1+(−2+α)β)(1+mf)2
(α−β)(α2+β−2αβ)θ3 = (ep + ed)D
B
v
and under selling is (ed + ep)
4cM(1+(−1+α)β)(1+mc)2
α3θ3
(ep + ed)D
B
r . Hence, production and dis-
posal impact is lower under servicization if and only if r >
√
α3(1−β)(1+(−2+α)β)
(α−β)(1+(−1+α)β)(α2+β−2αβ) .
We now show that g2 > g1 > f1 to complete the proof.
g2
g1
> 1 if and only if
α2(1+(−2+α)β)
(α−β)(1+(−1+α)β)(α+β−αβ) > 1. This can be rewritten as (−1 + α)2(1 + α − β)β2. Because
in this region α > β, the result follows. In order to facilitate the discussion we define
j1 =
(
α− 2α2 − 5α3 + 11α4 − α5 − α6)β2 + (1− 6α+ 12α2 − 8α3)β3 and j2 = 3α5 − 2α6 +(
3α3 − 6α4 − 3α5 + 3α6)β. g1f1 > 1 if and only if j , j1 + j2 > 0. ∂3j∂β3 = −6(−1 + 2α)3
and it is greater than 0 if and only if α < 1/2. Hence, ∂
2j
∂β2
has its minimum at α = 12 ,
and it is 132 > 0. This proves that
∂2(j)
∂β2
is always positive. Furthermore, j(β = α) =
−(−1 + α)3α3 (2 + α+ α2) > 0 and j(β = 0) = (3 − 2α)α5 > 0, which proves that j > 0.
Since g2 > g1 > f1 holds, when g1 > r > f1 servicization decreases use impact but increases
production and disposal impact and profit. Therefore, it is more environmentally friendly and
profitable for products with high relative use impact. When r > g2, servicization increases
use impact and profit but decreases production and disposal impact. Therefore, it is more
environmentally friendly and profitable for products with low relative use impact. We define
∆1 =
DBr −DBv
UBv −UBr .
In R2, product use impact, and production and disposal impact are same as in R1 under
servicization. Under selling, product use impact is eu
Mβθ3
4c(1+mc)2
= euU
H
r . Use impact under
servicization is lower if and only if eu
Mβθ3
4c(1+mc)2
> eu
Mα(α2+β−2αβ)θ3
4c(1−β)(1+mf)2 . This can be reorganized
as r <
√
(1−β)β
α(α2+β−2αβ) , gp. Under selling, product production and disposal impact is given
by (ed + ep)
4cMβ(1+mc)2
θ3
. Then, production and disposal impact under servicization is lower
than under selling if and only if r >
√
(1−β)(1+(−2+α)β)
(α−β)β(α2+β−2αβ) , g3.
We now show that g3 > f2 > gu. g3 > f2 if and only if
(1−β)(1+(−2+α)β)
(α−β)β(α2+β−2αβ) >
√
(1−β)2β
(α2+β−2αβ)2 .
By taking the square of both sides, the expression can be rewritten as , α2(1−β)3β2−2α(1−
β)3β
(−1 + β + β2)+(1−β)3 (1− 3β + β2 + β3 + β4) > 0. The expression is strictly convex in
α and has its minimum at α = 1− 1β +β < β. Therefore, if the expression is positive at α = β,
it is always positive in R2. The value of the expression at α = β is (−1 + β)6 > 0. f2 > gu if
and only if f22 − g2u = (
α2−β)(−1+β)2β
α2(α2+β−2αβ)2 > 0. Hence, it is enough to show that in R2, α >
√
β.
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In order to show this, we will prove that at
piv,B
piv,H
|β=α2 < 1. piv,Bpiv,H |β=α2 =
(2α2−2α3)2
α2(−1+α2)2 < 1 if and
only if (−1 + α)3α2(1 + 3α) < 0, which is indeed correct. Hence, γ > √β, and hence, in R2,
α >
√
β. Since g3 > f2 > gu holds, when r > g3 servicization increases use impact and profit
but decreases production and disposal impact. Therefore, it is more environmentally friendly
and profitable for products with low relative use impact. We define ∆2 =
DHr −DBv
UBv −UHr .
In R2, product use impact, and production and disposal impact are same as in R1 under
selling. Under servicization product use impact is eu
Mβθ3
4c(1+mf)2
= euU
H
v . Use impact under
servicization is lower if and only if r < 1. Under servicization, product production and dis-
posal impact is given by (ed + ep)
4cMβ(1+mf)2
θ3
. Then, production and disposal impact under
servicization is lower than under selling if and only if r > 1. Furthermore, we know that ser-
vicization is more profitable if and only if r > 1. Hence, servicization is more environmentally
friendly and profitable for products with low use impact. We define ∆2 =
DHr −DHv
UHv −UHr .
Proof of Proposition 15: When a consumer segment buys the product, it uses the product
at τi =
δθi
1+mc
. Hence, maximized utility for type-θi consumers is U
pl
r (θi, δi) =
δiθ
2
i
2(1+mc)
− pi
where pi is the price of the product. The firm solves the following:
pipl∗r = max
Fi,τi,i=H,L
∑
i=H,L
(pi − cδ2i )Qi, (B.4.1)
s.t, IRpli , IC
pl
i i = H,L.
where IRpli : U
pl
r (θi, δi) ≥ 0 and ICpli : Uplr (θi, δi) ≥ Uplr (θi, δj) , i = H,L and i 6= j. We
can easily show that IRH and ICL constraints do not bind. Therefore, pL =
δLθ
2
L
2(1+mc)
and
pH =
δHθ
2
H
2(1+mc)
− δLθ2H2(1+mc) + pL. After plugging in these to the profit function, we can show
that the profit function is jointly concave in δH and δL. Hence, from FOC, we can obtain
the optimum values in Table 3.3. Note that δL > 0 if and only if α >
√
β. Combining these
with the equilibrium for servicization with single product, the equilibrium structure in the
proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 16: InR1pl, piplr > piv if and only if
M(α2+β−2αβ)2θ4
16c(−1+β)2(1+mf)2 >
M(α4+β−2α2β)θ4
16c(1−β)(1+mc)2 .
This can be rewritten to obtain r >
√
(1−β)(α4+β−2α2β)
(α2+β−2αβ)2 , h1(α, β). h1 > 1 if and only if
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−(−1 + α)2β(−1 + (−2 + α)α + 2β) > 0. It can be shown that this expression is indeed
positive. The other regions can be shown similarly.
Proof of Proposition 23:
If the firm uses selling strategy, the consumers use level will be τi =
δθi
1+mc
. Given
this, the maximized consumer utility is
δθ2i
2(1+mc)
. When the firm sells both segments, it
can extract the entire consumer surplus by charging the consumers pi =
δθ2i
2(1+mc)
. Then,
pir,B = Mβ
(
−cδ2 + δθ2H2+2mc
)
+ M(1 − β)
(
−cδ2 + δθ2L2+2mc
)
.
∂2piv,B
∂δ2
= −2cM < 0; hence, it
is strictly concave in δ. From FOC, δ∗ = (−α
2(−1+β)+β)θ2
4c(1+mc)
and pir,B =
M(−α2(−1+β)+β)2θ4
16c(1+mc)2
.
pir,B > pir,H if and only if
M(−α2(−1+β)+β)2θ4
16c(1+mc)2
> Mβθ
4
16c(1+mc)2
. This can be reorganized as
x1 , α4 +
(−1 + 2α2 − 2α4)β + (1− 2α2 + α4)β2 > 0. ∂3x1
∂α3
= 24α(−1 + β)2 > 0, and
∂2x1
∂α2
|α=0 = −4(−1 + β)β > 0. Therefore, ∂2x1∂α2 > 0. ∂x1∂α |α=0 = 0, and hence, ∂x1∂α > 0. There-
fore, x1 is monotone increasing in α for α ∈ (0, 1). x1|α = 0. x1(α = 0) = (−1 + β)β < 0
and x1(α = 1) = (1 − β) > 0. Hence, there exist a αc ∈ (0, 1) such that the firm sells both
segments when α > αc; otherwise, it sells high end segment. We define γf =
αc
β .
If the firm uses servicization strategy and serves to both segments, only individual ra-
tionality constraints bind for the both consumer segments. The firm sets the prices of the
contracts FH = τH
(
θ − τH2δ
)
and FL = τL
(
αθ − τL2δ
)
. When we plug these into the profit
function, we have piv,B = Mβ
(−cδ2 + τH (θ − τH2δ )) + M(1 − β) (−cδ2 + τL (αθ − τL2δ )) −
mf
2δ
(
τL
2(1− β)M + τH2βM
)
.
∂2piv,B
∂τL
=
M(−1+β)(1+mf)
δ , and hence, profit is strictly concave
in τL. From FOC, τL =
αδθ
1+mf
.
∂2piv,B(|τL)
∂τ2H
= −Mβ(1+mf)δ , and hence, from FOC, τH = δθ1+mf .
Similarly δ can be found as
(−α2(−1+β)+β)θ2
4c(1+mf)
. From here, it is easy to see that the firm serves
both segments if and only if γf <
α
β .
If we compare the selling and servicization strategy, the firm uses servicization if and only
if r > 1; otherwise, it uses selling strategy. By comparing, the firms profits when it serves to
both segments in full information, with the one in the asymmetric information, one can show
that γf < γ.
109
APPENDIX C
RESPONSIBLE SOURCING VIA VERTICAL INTEGRATION: THE
IMPACTS OF SCRUTINY, DEMAND EXTERNALITY, AND CROSS
SOURCING
We first define the following difference functions:
∆1 = pi
A
vr|dn − piAvn|dn, (C.0.1)
∆2 = pi
A
vr|dn − piAdn|dn, (C.0.2)
∆3 = pi
A
vn|dn − piAdn|dn, (C.0.3)
∆4 = pi
A
vrc|drc − piAvn|dn, (C.0.4)
∆5 = pi
A
vrc|drc − piAvr|dn, (C.0.5)
∆6 = pi
A
vnc|dnc − piAvn|dn, (C.0.6)
∆6 = pi
A
vrc|dnc − piAvnc|dn. (C.0.7)
C.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 17
Suppose that f = 0. In this case, ∆3 > 0. When 0 < α <
βp+cr
p−cr we can show that ∆1 is a
concave function and ∆1 > 0 if and only if σ
1
vr,vn < σ < σ
2
vr,vn where σ
1
vr,vn, σ
2
vr,vn are such
that ∆1(σ) = 0. Therefore, as long as f is small enough, (V,N) is the optimum strategy for
σ < σ1vr,vn and σ > σ
2
vr,vn, and (V,R) is the optimum for the rest.
As f increases (D,N) would start arising in the equilibrium. The threshold f for this is
determined by the minimum value of ∆3. ∆3 takes its minimum at σ = 1, and lim
σ→1
∆3 =
Qw(1 + β). Therefore, as long as f ≤ Qw(1 + β), optimal strategy described above would not
change.
Define f1 = ∆3(σ
2
vr,vn) . As long as Qw(1 + β) ≤ f < f1, (D,N) is in the equilibrium if
only if 1 > σ > σvn,dn where σvn,dn is such that ∆3(σvn,dn) = 0.
Define f2 = ∆3(σ
1
vr,vn) and suppose that f1 ≤ f < f2. In this case, when σ2vr,dn < σ < 1,
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∆3 < 0 and ∆2 < 0 where σvr,dn is such that ∆2(σ) = 0. Hence, (D,N) is the optimal strategy.
When σvr,vn ≤ σ < σvr,dn, ∆3 > 0 and ∆1 > 0, and hence (V,R) is the optimal strategy.
When f2 ≤ f < min{Qw, fm}, (D,N) becomes optimal strategy for σvn,dn < σ < σ1vr,dn.
This leads to the optimal structure stated in the proposition. Note that fm = max
σ
∆2.
The upper bound essentially ensures that staying disintegrated does not dominate (V,R) and
(V,N).
Proof of Proposition 18
We will prove the proposition only for α > 0. However, similar analysis can be performed
for min{ cr+β(p−w)p−cr ,
β(p−w)
−cr+2p+w} < α ≤ 0. Suppose that f = 0. When 0 < α < −β, d∆1dσ =
−Q (αcr + p(β − 2ασ)) > 0, lim
σ→0
∆1 = −Qcr < 0 and
lim
σ→1
∆1 = −Q (αcr + cr + α(−p) + βp) > 0. Hence, ∆1 < 0 if and only if σ1vr,vn > σ > 0
where ∆1(σ
1
vr,vn) = 0. Similarly,
d∆2
dσ = Q (−αcr + 2αpσ + β(−p) + w(−2ασ + α+ β)) > 0,
lim
σ→0
= Q (w − cr) < 0 and lim
σ→1
= Q (−(α+ 1)cr + αp− βp+ βw + w) > 0. Hence, ∆2 < 0
if and only if σ2vr,dn > σ > 0 where ∆2(σ
2
vr,dn) = 0. Since when f = 0, pi
A
vn|dn > pi
A
dn|dn, it
must be that σ2vr,dn > σvn,dn. And these are true as long as f ≤ f2, where f2 is defined as
f2 = ∆2(σ
1
vr,vn). Note that ∆2(σ
2
vr,vn) > lim
σ→1
∆3 but (V,R) is more profitable than (D,N) for
σ ≥ σ2vr,vn when f ≤ f2. Hence, when f ≤ f2, for σ < σ1vr,vn, (V,N) is the optimum strategy.
Otherwise, (V,R) is the optimum strategy.
When f > f2, from the definition of f2 we can see that σ
2
vr,dn > σ
1
vr,vn > σvn,dn. Hence the
proposition is proved.
Proof of Proposition 19
First lets find the equilibrium wholesale prices and profits of firm A for equilibriums (V,R)c
and (V,N)c. Note that the wholesale price offered to the firm B will make firm B indifferent
between sourcing from firm A or from an outside supplier. Hence, piBdn|vn = pi
B
dnc|vnc and
piBdn|vr = pi
B
drc|vrc. From these we can find the wholesale prices stated in the equilibrium. The
profits are as follows:
piAvrc = Q (−cr − βσ(p− w) + w) +Q (p− cr)− f (C.1.1)
piAvnc = σ(α(−p)Q+ βpQ+ αQw + βQw) + σ2(αpQ− αQw) + pQ+Qw − f (C.1.2)
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Lets look at how functions ∆4, ∆5 and ∆6 behave.
d2∆4
dσ2
= 2αpQ, and hence, this function
is concave for α < 0, linear for α = 0, and convex for α > 0. d∆4dσ |σ=0 = Q(βw − p(α +
2β)) > 0, d∆4dσ |σ=1 = Q(p(α − 2β) + βw) > 0, ∆4|σ=0 = Q (w − 2cr) < 0, and ∆4|σ=1 =
Q (−2cr − 2βp+ βw + w) > 0. Therefore, There exists a single σvrc,vn such that ∆4 > 0 if
and only if σ > σvrc,vn. Similarly, we can show that when α ≥ −cr+(−β)(p−w)+wp−cr , ∆5 < 0. And
when α < −cr+(−β)(p−w)+wp−cr , there exists a σvrc,vr such that ∆5 > 0 if and only if σ > σvrc,vr.
d2∆6
dσ2
= 2αQ(2p− w), then it is concave for α < 0, convex for α > 0 and linear for α = 0.
We can show that as long as α ≤ (β+2
√
β+1+2)w
2p−w , ∆6 ≥ 0. Otherwise, There exist σ1vnc,vn
and σ2vnc,vn such that ∆6 < 0 if and only if σ
1
vnc,vn < σ < σ
2
vnc,vn. Therefore, as long as
α ≤ (β+2
√
β+1+2)w
2p−w , (V,N) cannot be in the equilibrium.
From above, we can see that when α ≤ (β+2
√
β+1+2)w
2p−w , (V,N)c is the equilibrium for
σ < σvrc,vnc; otherwise, (V,N)c is the equilibrium.
Now, we will show that there exists a α1 >
(β+2
√
β+1+2)w
2p−w such that (V,N) and (V,R)
cannot arise in the equilibrium and the equilibrium structure described above continue to hold
for this region as well. From the implicit differentiation:
dσvrc,vnc
dα
= −
∂∆7
∂α
∂∆7
∂σ
= − (σ − 1)σ(p− w)
α(−p) + 2βp+ 2ασ(p− w) + αw |σ=σvrc,vnc < 0, (C.1.3)
dσvrc,vn
dα
= −
∂∆4
∂α
∂∆4
∂σ
= − p(σ − 1)σ
βw − p(−2ασ + α+ 2β) |σ=σvrc,vn > 0. (C.1.4)
In addition, we can show that σvrc,vnc = σvrc,vn if and only if
α = α1 =
2β2w
(
4p2 − 3pw + w2) (cr − p)
(−w (2cr + p) + 4pcr + w2) (cr(4p− 2w) + 4βp2 − p(3βw + w) + (β + 1)w2) .
(C.1.5)
When
(β+2
√
β+1+2)w
2p−w < α ≤ α1, piAvn > piAvnc for σ1vnc,vn < σ < σ2vnc,vn; however, we can
show that piAvrc > pi
A
vn for the same region. Therefore, (V,N) cannot be in the equilibrium.
For α > α1, we can proceed in the same manner to show the rest of the proposition. Note
that α2 is such that σvrc,vr = σvrc,vn.
In order to show that
(β+2
√
β+1+2)w
2p−w < α2, consider αˆ =
2(β+2)w
2p−w >
(β+2
√
β+1+2)w
2p−w . Then we
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can directly compare σvrc,vr and σvr,vn at α = αˆd to show that at this α value σvrc,vr < σvr,vn
which essentially proves that
(β+2
√
β+1+2)w
2p−w < α2.
Proof of Proposition 20
By using the implicit function theorem we can show that
dσ1vr,vn
dα < 0,
dσ1vr,dn
dα < 0,
dσ2vr,vn
dα > 0,
dσ2vr,dn
dα > 0. This proves that the region where (V,R) is the equilibrium expands.
Proof of Proposition 21
This can be shown similar to the previous proposition.
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